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This thesis examines British intelligence collection efforts against the Soviet Union’s nuclear 
bombers and long-range nuclear ballistic missiles during the period 1949 until 1962. It also 
analyses the serious intelligence collection problems that were encountered concerning this 
topic and how successful Britain’s intelligence efforts were in the light of what is now 
known. This period of Cold War history covers from the Soviet Union’s atomic bomb test 
through to the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
 
The thesis commences with an analysis of the Soviet Union’s nuclear bombers which posed 
the initial nuclear strike threat to the United Kingdom. It explores how German personnel 
returning from captivity in the Soviet Union were used by the West to provide information on 
Soviet military research and how British analysts struggled to gather intelligence on nuclear 
bombers in a secret police state. 
 
The issue of the Soviet ballistic missile threat to the UK is then considered, again by initially 
examining intelligence provided by German returnees, through to more sophisticated 
intelligence collection methods such as advanced radar. The papers of the British Joint 
Intelligence Committee and other government departments were used to examine collection 
problems and assessments. The role of secret intelligence assessments in the Macmillan 
government’s decision to cancel the British Blue Streak nuclear missile is also explored. 
 
Aerial reconnaissance was a particularly useful intelligence asset. Britain’s clandestine over-
flights of the USSR and role in the U-2 programme have only been briefly discussed before. 
These missions and the UK’s role in covert balloon operations are explored for the first time 
in a detailed case study. The use of satellite reconnaissance in Britain’s intelligence collection 
efforts is also assessed. 
 
 
 The Colonel Oleg Penkovsky spy case is then analysed as a case study of human intelligence 
collection and its problems when dealing with Soviet bombers and missiles from 1961-62. 
This chapter uses declassified American documents to examine the nuclear material he 
provided, his role in the Cuban Missile Crisis and his overall value to the British and 
American intelligence agencies. 
 
The conclusion is that intelligence collection and analysis evolved significantly from 1949 to 
1962 from the use of basic human intelligence to the development of satellite reconnaissance. 
My thesis, written chronologically, demonstrates that analysts did well to overcome 
enormous problems when dealing with an extremely difficult intelligence target. At the end 
of the period they provided far better intelligence collection and analysis on Soviet nuclear 
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The detonation of the Soviet Union’s first atomic bomb, (nicknamed “Joe-1” by western 
intelligence agencies), in August 1949 came as a colossal shock to the West. America’s 
monopoly on nuclear weapons technology had been broken and Soviet science and espionage 
were shown to be terrifyingly advanced and effective. The “Joe-1” test had occurred several 
years before western intelligence thought the USSR would possess the atomic bomb. This 
revealed a misjudgement by western intelligence of the state of the USSR’s progress in 
nuclear physics, as well as of the loyalty of some members of the allied atomic bomb 
programme. Owing to the USSR’s hostile ideology and proximity to the UK, this dramatic 
event posed severe security implications for the nation. The secret test of this weapon had 
only been discovered accidentally due to an American WB-29 aircraft undertaking 
atmospheric sampling operations between Japan and Alaska on 3 September 1949.1 Analysis 
of the radioactive elements its equipment picked up revealed that it was artificial nuclear 
material and had not come from a natural source.2 Further flights, including one from the 
UK, confirmed that it had not come from an American nuclear test and that it was likely that 
the USSR had exploded an atomic bomb.3  
 
 
British intelligence informed the Prime Minister of this fact and the UK’S Secret Intelligence 
Service (SIS) Liaison Officer with the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 
Washington, Mr ‘Kim’ Philby (later found to be a Soviet Intelligence Service (KGB) agent) 
likely informed Moscow that the allies were aware that the USSR had the atomic bomb.4 
Measurements of weather patterns and radioactive material also revealed the likely date and 
location of the explosion. The announcement of this momentous event was not made in the 
West until 23 September 1949 to deny Moscow knowledge of the West’s nuclear intelligence 
capabilities and no date or location of either the explosion or type of nuclear device were 














It was now, however, clear that the Russians possessed a weapon of terrifying potential. In 
1949 memories of the Luftwaffe’s bombing campaign on British cities, as well as Germany’s 
innovative use of V-1 and V-2 rockets, were still fresh. This wartime experience showed how 
vulnerable the UK was to aerial attack. The potential marrying of nuclear weapons to 
delivery systems now posed, for the first time, an existential threat to the UK in any future 
conflict. The Royal Navy (RN), traditionally the primary protector of this island nation, 
would be incapable of defending the realm against this type of attack and the Royal Air Force 
(RAF) would be unable to neutralise the USSR’s considerable air assets.6  It is ironic that the 
UK approved the world’s first nuclear weapon programme during the Second World War, 
before joining America’s vast effort in this field. It then subsequently found itself, before it 
possessed its own atomic bomb, facing potential atomic destruction from Moscow as its 
former wartime ally became a Cold War adversary.7   
 
 
The first Soviet nuclear test made clear the importance of airborne intelligence collection and 
scientific analysis in producing assessments of foreign nuclear weapon programmes. It also 
demonstrated the importance of allied intelligence co-operation on a global scale and 
revealed the paucity of western intelligence on the USSR’s nuclear weapons programme. 
This dramatic event further highlighted the potential dangers posed by intelligence failures 
against a secretive and militarised state. Without this fortuitous mission being undertaken and 
co-operation in intelligence collection between the United Kingdom and the United States, it 
could have taken much longer for the West to establish the Soviet Union’s nuclear weapon 
capability. It thus demonstrated the need for new technical methods of collecting secret 
intelligence from a distance, because traditional human intelligence operations were 
extremely difficult to undertake in a secret police state such as the USSR. Information on 
Soviet nuclear weapons was also shrouded in particular secrecy, creating an intelligence 
target of unusual difficulty. The presence of British traitor Kim Philby further complicated 
the problem of collecting and using secret intelligence when those national intelligence 
efforts were being undermined from within. A priority target of British intelligence efforts 









powerful, were useless unless the Russians could launch them at the United States and her 
allies. To assess the threat posed by the Soviet Union’s nuclear bombers, and later its ballistic 
missiles, as well as gauging its intentions, intelligence collection and analysis were crucial. 
This requirement also escalated as the UK took the formal decision to build its own atomic 
bomb in January 1947  and later to develop the hydrogen bomb and so maintain strategic 
nuclear deterrent forces.8 Such forces needed intelligence information on Soviet nuclear 
bombers and missiles for warning and targeting purposes.  
 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the UK’s intelligence collection efforts against the 
Soviet Union’s long-range nuclear bombers and ballistic missiles from the time of Moscow’s 
first nuclear test in 1949, through to the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, arguably the most 
dangerous crisis of the Cold War. It is written from a British perspective and is divided into 
two parts. The first examines the intelligence targets and what was known about them. The 
second part consists of two case studies dealing with aerial reconnaissance and human 
intelligence, examining intelligence collection problems encountered by analysts and 
successes achieved in these fields. The thesis assesses what the UK thought it knew about 
Soviet nuclear weapon delivery systems in terms of numbers and types of systems deployed, 
as well as how they might be used. It uses declassified files to analyse the enormous 
problems intelligence agencies encountered in gathering this intelligence and how they 
attempted to resolve them. Particular success was achieved in the field of aerial 
reconnaissance and more material has been declassified about it, hence Chapter Three is 
presented as a special case study of this rather neglected area. Further intelligence progress 
occurred in the field of human intelligence in 1961 with the recruitment of Colonel Oleg 
Penkovsky, a Russian intelligence officer. Chapter Four is a case study assessing the 
importance of the material on nuclear weapons that he passed to the West. The thesis does 
not explore the history and theory of UK nuclear deterrence, or nuclear strategy, all of which 
are well covered elsewhere.9 It also does not cover intelligence on Soviet nuclear warheads, 













The value and originality of this thesis, I believe, lies in several areas. On the issue of Soviet 
nuclear bombers it examines declassified material concerning debriefings of German 
personnel who worked on missile and aeronautical technology in the USSR. Much of this 
work concerned the V-1 “doodlebug” a German missile system which would form the basis 
for nuclear missiles later deployed on Soviet bombers. This point has not been covered by 
other authors who concentrate on ballistic missile knowledge imparted by the Germans. 
These debriefings also provided the first insights into military research and development 
facilities in the USSR, so forming the basis for further western intelligence collection efforts. 
The theme of the paucity of intelligence on Soviet nuclear weapon delivery systems runs 
through the thesis and I examine why this was the case and how the West’s intelligence 
agencies tried to address it. Whilst covering intelligence on Soviet nuclear bombers, the 
thesis examines the problem of the West receiving so few defectors in the early Cold War 
period and the policy discussions surrounding this problem. This material is not cited by 
other authors writing about Cold War intelligence. To further explore British intelligence 
collection problems in the USSR, I analysed declassified material from the British Air 
Attachés in Moscow. These reports, which have not been used by other authors, demonstrate 
the oppressive surveillance environment intelligence collectors encountered and the meagre 
data they had available. This insight helps explain the lack of success concerning intelligence 
collection on the USSR that the UK enjoyed in the early Cold War period.  
 
 
The examination of Soviet nuclear bombers also deals with British intelligence assessments 
of specific types of aircraft and missiles which do not feature in other studies. It further 
examines the impact of the Strath Report which assessed the possible effects of a Soviet 
hydrogen bomb attack, delivered by aircraft on the UK in the mid-1950s. This provides a 
disturbing picture of what would have happened had Soviet nuclear bombers been used in 
anger. The thesis also explores the differences in British and American assessments of the 










not inflate their estimates. It also examines intelligence assessments of how the USSR could 
mount an aerial attack on the UK and the nation’s vulnerability to it. No other author has 
examined such attack assessments made by the British government.  
 
 
On the issue of Soviet ballistic missiles, the thesis examines the intelligence debriefings of 
Germans who worked in this field in the USSR after 1945. It also analyses in detail the 
special conferences held between British and American ballistic missile experts in the early 
Cold War to allow the extent of western knowledge of this topic to be gauged. This again 
reveals the paucity of western knowledge and the acute intelligence collection problems 
encountered. The paper examines material from a Soviet defector Colonel Grigori Tokaev, 
code-named EXCISE, whose debriefing reports have now been declassified. He was the first 
Cold War Soviet defector who had access to information on ballistic missiles. Using pieces of 
intelligence from numerous Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) files, the thesis examines 
British intelligence’s view of the development of Soviet ballistic missile systems from 
medium to intercontinental range. It also examines the Templer Report which is an internal 
British government review analysing the UK’s missile intelligence efforts.  
 
 
The thesis also reveals that much of the intelligence concerning Soviet long-range ballistic 
missiles was gathered by special American long-range radars in Turkey and another station in 
the Aleutian Islands. Secret British radar efforts based on Cyprus are also examined. Britain 
had access to these American technical intelligence developments which improved missile 
intelligence collection in the late 1950s. The paper further analyses British intelligence 
material which suggested that the USSR had deployed nuclear missiles to East Germany in 
1959. This builds on earlier scholarship undertaken by German academics. The USSR’s early 
space programme, such as the Sputnik satellite launch, is also analysed using British 
intelligence assessments of its role in Moscow’s intercontinental ballistic missile programme. 
Much of this material has not been used elsewhere and the paper explores British intelligence 
assessments of Premier Khrushchev’s rhetoric concerning Soviet ballistic missile capabilities. 
The chapter concerning ballistic missiles also incorporates work from Russian scholars, so 
allowing the accuracy of some of the UK’s intelligence assessments to be partially 





government policy decisions through declassified papers concerning the Macmillan 
government’s decision to cancel the British Blue Streak ballistic missile. This is a rare 
occasion where a direct link between intelligence assessments and a defence policy decision 
can be drawn. It shows that the decision to cancel the programme was made using 




During the research it became apparent that one of the most successful fields for gathering 
intelligence against the USSR was aerial reconnaissance. Chapter Three of the thesis is a 
special study of this topic, which includes material not seen before. It analyses how a special 
relationship formed between the UK and the US during the war concerning imagery 
intelligence and how captured German material was shared after the war. A study is also 
undertaken using declassified papers of the destruction of an RAF Lincoln Bomber over East 
Germany in 1953. This was the only British aircraft lost to an attack by Soviet forces in the 
Cold War and demonstrates the danger of airborne intelligence collection, although it is 
uncertain if it was on a covert mission. The chapter on aerial reconnaissance also reveals 
British involvement in a covert American-sponsored intelligence collection programme to 
launch high-altitude balloons carrying cameras and electronic monitoring equipment across 
the USSR. British involvement in this once highly-classified programme is not mentioned by 
any other author. Material recently declassified by the CIA also allows the UK’s involvement 
in the U-2 over-flight programme to be more fully assessed. This has not yet appeared in any 
research or publication and allows details of the two British covert U-2 over-flights of the 
USSR to be examined for the first time. Declassified British government papers also allow an 
analysis of the aftermath of the shoot-down of both the U-2 and an American RB-47 
reconnaissance aircraft in 1960 to be made for the first time. Again, this material does not 
appear in any other research.  
 
 
Papers declassified by the CIA also show that the UK made a covert over-flight of the 
USSR’s ballistic missile testing facility at Kapustin Yar in 1953. This flight was the subject 
of rumours for several years and recent releases of papers reveal that this dangerous mission 





additional details on the highly sensitive Operation JIU-JITSU missions which involved over-
flights being made of the USSR by the RAF in 1952 and 1954. The thesis also contains 
details of RAF electronic collection or “ferret” flights conducted against the USSR which do 
not appear in any publications. Some numbers, dates and locations of these missions are 
included to give a sense of their scale as well as the political discussions and sensitivities 
surrounding them.    
 
 
The chapter on aerial reconnaissance further includes an analysis of the role of satellites in 
intelligence collection against Soviet strategic nuclear delivery systems using recently 
declassified American material. For many years it was unclear when, or if, the UK received 
imagery intelligence from these systems. During my research a document emerged from the 
US which shows that the UK was receiving this product from the start of the programme but 
detailed information on the collection systems appears to have been withheld from the 
British. This information does not appear in any other British academic research. The thesis 
also explores British theoretical work on reconnaissance satellites, material which does not 
appear elsewhere.  
 
 
Using declassified material from the US on the Colonel Oleg Penkovsky espionage case, the 
thesis examines the role of human intelligence in collection operations against the USSR’s 
nuclear bombers and ballistic missiles. Instead of concentrating on espionage “tradecraft”, 
my unique focus is on determining what specific intelligence he passed to the West. No other 
author has done this and I used CIA debriefing documents to extract this material and gain an 
understanding of how it confirmed or disproved British intelligence’s assessments of the 
USSR’s nuclear weapon delivery systems. I also examine the latest secondary literature on 
the Penkovsky case to determine his role in the Cuban Missile Crisis and assess how he was 
captured and if he was a genuine defector.   
 
 
It must be emphasised that only a small amount of literature has appeared on British 
intelligence collection against Soviet nuclear bombers and ballistic missiles. Zaloga, shortly 





Russian archives to examine the development of Soviet nuclear weapon delivery systems.11 
They are useful to measure the accuracy of what British intelligence thought it knew but they 
are written from a Soviet technical perspective and do not consider allied intelligence 
collection or policy implications. Some analysis concerning the development of the USSR’s 
nuclear weapon delivery systems has been produced by Russian authors, the most thorough 
of which is by Podvig.12 This again allows Soviet archival material and interviews with 
Soviet personnel to be used as a comparison to British intelligence assessments.  
 
 
Hitherto, however, very little has been written from a British perspective concerning the 
USSR’s nuclear delivery systems using archival sources in the UK. Some wide-ranging 
British academic studies of intelligence have been produced, notably by Aldrich, but these do 
not focus on intelligence concerning Soviet nuclear weapon systems or their specific 
intelligence collection problems.13 Aldrich provides some analysis of Britain’s intelligence 
collection against the USSR’s ballistic missiles but does not cover its nuclear bombers. He 
also concentrates on the relationships between allied intelligence services, internal politics 
and the development of intelligence departments. More recently, Dylan produced an 
interesting study examining the role of the British Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB) which 
contains some material on its assessments of the USSR’s bombers and ballistic missiles.14  
His work, in part, examines Soviet aircraft and missile production rates as well as economic 
and topographical intelligence. It aids understanding of the organisation of British 
intelligence at this time but does not explore in detail the problems British intelligence faced 
when attempting to gather intelligence on Soviet nuclear weapon delivery systems. Goodman 
also produced a very interesting study on allied intelligence collection concerning the 
USSR’s nuclear bomb tests and fissile materials as well as the nuclear intelligence 
relationship between the UK and the US.15 This again does not provide much information on 















them. His study also ends at 1958 thereby not covering important developments such as the 
Colonel Oleg Penkovsky espionage case and the later stages of the U-2 programme. 
Goodman’s later study, as official historian of the JIC, is a broad analysis of its work 
covering a plethora of global issues and ends in 1956.16 This official history has some 
coverage concerning British assessments of the USSR’s stockpile of fissile material as well 
as intelligence on nuclear missiles derived from a selection of JIC papers. It only has limited 
coverage concerning Russian nuclear bombers and British intelligence collection problems 
during the period.  
 
 
There is a limited amount of literature available on British aerial reconnaissance during the 
Cold War, notably by Lashmar.17 This reflects the sensitivity which still surrounds this 
subject and the sparse releases of documentary material on certain areas. Much secondary 
literature has been published on the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft programme with its covert 
over-flights of the USSR, but only recent releases of intelligence material in the US has 
allowed a fuller picture to emerge of Britain’s role in the programme.18 A particularly useful 
modern study concerning allied aerial reconnaissance, particularly U-2 operations, is by 
Brugioni, a former senior CIA photographic analyst.19  
 
 
The Colonel Oleg Penkovsky espionage case has also generated a considerable volume of 
literature, the most thorough of which is by Deriabin and Schecter.20 This study was the first 
one compiled using declassified CIA papers from the case. Some studies on Penkovsky 
recycle myths about him and tend to focus on conspiracy theories as well as the operational 
tradecraft of “running” a human agent. None of these works explores the intelligence on 

















of material from the CIA now allows some assessment to be made of this issue for the first 
time and forms part of Chapter Four.  
 
 
Much intelligence literature published in the UK has been popular ‘spy’ literature which 
focusses on cases of Cold War espionage and treachery rather than examining intelligence 
material which had been provided to policy makers. However, the declassification of 
intelligence material in recent years has made it possible for scholars such as Goodman and 
Aldrich to show what it is possible to learn by examining intelligence files released to The 
National Archives (TNA). This thesis was written primarily using declassified documents in 
the UK, particularly from the JIC and the Ministry of Defence (MOD), as well as the Foreign 
Office (FO) and the Prime Minister’s office. American electronic resources from the CIA 
were also used, particularly in Chapter Three on aerial reconnaissance and in Chapter Four on 
the Colonel Oleg Penkovsky espionage case.  
 
 
Many JIC files have been declassified since the 1990s and they proved to be of immense 
value in gaining an understanding of British thinking about the USSR’s nuclear weapons. 
Based in the Cabinet Office in Whitehall, JIC acts as the highest level intelligence assessment 
organisation in the British government and regularly issues reports for senior government 
officials and ministers on topics of current interest on foreign and security affairs. It focusses 
on issues that Whitehall considers policy priorities or of current interest in a crisis. It also 
directs the use of resources within British intelligence. Initially a sub-committee of the 
Imperial Defence Committee from 1936 onwards, it became part of the Cabinet Office in 
1957 to serve government intelligence needs on a cross-Whitehall basis as the Cold War 
gathered pace. JIC seeks to obtain consensus on issues it considers and no dissenting opinions 
are included. There is also no indication of what intelligence material or sources were used 
from SIS or GCHQ in its deliberations before a report is issued. JIC issued many weekly 
reports on the USSR from 1949 to 1962 and all declassified material was examined for this 
thesis. It is not possible to say what was said in JIC discussions, which papers were 
considered or intelligence seen, or how its decisions were made. It is also impossible to 
establish how individual JIC reports may have steered policy decisions in government 





of intelligence may have been in influencing recipients. Some JIC papers are still retained 
and Freedom of Information Act requests submitted by me failed to secure their release. As 
the top level national intelligence organisation it is reasonable to assume that all relevant 
intelligence material received by the British government was read and assessed in writing its 
reports so its output is a reflection of knowledge at that time.  
 
 
Much atomic and scientific intelligence was assessed by the Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB) 
which was a tri-service military organisation with its roots in the Second World War. 
Originally it dealt with topographic intelligence, mapping and economic issues but as the 
Cold War progressed it expanded into scientific, technical and atomic matters. It also 
examined strategic military intelligence and directed Air Intelligence which took the lead for 
intelligence assessment on Soviet nuclear bombers and ballistic missiles. JIB was eventually 
absorbed into the Defence Intelligence Staff in the MOD upon its formation in 1964. Reports 
from JIB are sparse and appear in the files of other departments with assessments being 
offered on topics such as missile production and Soviet warhead stockpiles. With the 
intelligence record fragmented, it is difficult to assess what impact JIB had but it is an early 
example of tri-service co-operation and centralisation during the Cold War. The impression is 
gained though that intelligence on Soviet nuclear weapon delivery systems gathered from 
human sources by the UK’s SIS and electronically by GCHQ was sparse and there was only a 
limited amount of data to be pooled. This all had to be made available to JIC as a central 
organisation for assessment so nothing was missed, a joint view could be formed and 
resources not wasted. It is unclear what reports JIB produced in total because there is no 
central depository of its files in The National Archives. However, all intelligence produced 
by the UK on Soviet nuclear weapon delivery systems was passed to the Assessment Staff in 
the JIC for analysis and conclusion. This material was discussed and sifted by analysts to 
produce JIC assessments on ad-hoc subjects and for Weekly Intelligence Summaries. This 
would be distributed to key officials and politicians for decision-making, with no indication 
given of the intelligence sources used in the product. It is impossible to say who saw which 
reports and how intelligence may have influenced government policy. Some, but not all, of 







The thesis, although historical, deals with serious issues surrounding intelligence, weapons of 
mass destruction and political intentions which remain relevant today. Seventy years after the 
last use of nuclear weapons in anger, the atomic threat still remains with Iran and North 
Korea being current concerns. The perennial problems that British intelligence analysts 
grappled with concerning intelligence collection and assessment, as well as the interaction 
between intelligence and policy, are still pertinent. This issue was clearly and controversially 
examined in the Butler Report in 2004 which examined the issue of British intelligence and 
Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. It shows the relevance of the thesis to our current era.   
 
 
The problems facing British intelligence analysts dealing with the “hard target” of the Soviet 
nuclear weapons programme are similar to those experienced many years later by their 
successors examining Iraq’s covert weapons programmes. A report produced in 2004 under 
the chairmanship of Sir Robin Butler examined British intelligence’s collection and 
assessment work on these covert programmes.21 It provides the only publicly available 
insight into the problems faced by the JIC in dealing with collecting, assessing and using 
intelligence. Many of the lessons drawn can be seen to be equally relevant to the work of 
British intelligence analysts addressing the Soviet nuclear target in the early Cold War. It sets 
a framework against which their work can be assessed.  
 
 
Butler examined the intelligence sources used by the JIC concerning Iraq’s weapons of mass 
destruction programme. This was primarily HUMINT (Human Intelligence) i.e. material 
gathered from human sources by the UK’s Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). The other major 
source of secret intelligence available was SIGINT (Signals intelligence) which is 
intelligence obtained through the interception of communications and electromagnetic 
emissions by the UK’s Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). The HUMINT 
material collected by SIS on Iraq’s secret weapons programmes was examined by Butler 
during the enquiry. Additionally, Butler explored how that intelligence was used and the 
conclusions that were drawn from it. He highlighted common errors that occurred in 








agencies would not be needed to collect and analyse covert data.22  Butler also highlighted 
that states employed formidable protective security barriers for military information, and the 
measures used to shield information concerning nuclear weapons and other weapon of mass 
destruction programmes were particularly challenging.23 Knowledge of such programmes is 
limited to a few people who have a genuine “need to know” and their access is restricted to 
their immediate working environment. Special compartmentalisation procedures further 
control the issue, release, storage; development and usage of such weapons systems and only 
people in these chains of command may have access to information about them. This was as 
true for Soviet nuclear weapon programmes in the 1950s as it was for covert Iraqi weapons 
programmes in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. The intelligence collection 
problems and issues of analysis and assessment also remain similar.  
 
 
Butler also judged that intelligence analysts might seek to over-compensate for earlier 
intelligence errors. In 1949 western intelligence failed to predict the timescale by which the 
Soviet Union would get the atomic bomb and were likely to be keen to avoid under-
estimating Soviet capabilities in the future. However, compensating over-estimates can also 
be useful for bureaucratic self-interest, through encouraging increases in budgets and support 
for particular programmes. A far bleaker picture of a target could therefore emerge in 
intelligence assessments. It is important to note however that due to the problems of dealing 
with a secret police Security State, it was very difficult to get accurate intelligence 
concerning any Soviet weapon programme. A secret intelligence picture, by its very nature, is 
always incomplete and Butler acknowledged that it is extremely difficult to corroborate 
information on a hard target.24  
 
 
Butler also noted that in any intelligence assessment, choices have to be made about which 
intelligence material to include in a report and what to leave out.25  The danger exists of a 
tendency to include material that supports and reinforces earlier conclusions, therefore any 










intelligence targets it is difficult to find supporting material that can corroborate an 
unconventional view. There is also a danger, Butler thought, of “group-think” developing in a 
team of analysts whereby they develop a form of “tunnel vision”.26 A team can engage in 
consensus seeking behaviour whereby they believe in a conclusion because they want it to be 
true. Participants may also end up agreeing with one another in order not to appear to be 
anomalous, defying conventional wisdom, or be “rocking the boat” thereby displeasing 
colleagues, superiors and policy makers. Under conditions of stress and when dealing with 
matters of great importance, peer pressure can influence what is normally dispassionate 
judgement. In intelligence analysis, well-developed thinking and an open mind in dealing 
with the shortcomings of the intelligence under scrutiny are essential characteristics.  
 
 
When assessing intelligence on a sensitive subject like the Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons 
programmes it was important not to fall under the influence of policy branches. Butler 
pointed out that this was a danger in intelligence analysis.27 Intelligence staffs could tell their 
political masters what they thought they wish to hear and start seeing the target, as the 
politicians would want them to see it, so serving their political objectives. Butler highlighted 
this danger in relation to Iraq, but it could also be applied to the testing and dangerous era of 
the Cold War from 1949 to 1962. There was a risk that intelligence analysts could be swept 
along on a wave of fear generated by the existential threat to the UK represented by the 
Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons and political system. This mentality is likely to have 
occurred in the United States in the 1950s, resulting in the “missile gap” and “bomber gap”, 
whereby inflated estimates of numbers of Soviet nuclear weapon delivery systems were 
published by the US government. However, American intelligence analysts were also being 
subjected to bureaucratic and political pressure to justify greater defence expenditure. The 
spectre of the December 1941 surprise attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese was also 
possibly a factor in their thinking, made worse by the latest adversary’s possession of a 
substantial nuclear weapon stockpile. Analysts’ lack of knowledge about the Soviet Union 
could also drive fear, clouding judgement and ensuring that “worst case scenarios” became 
the normal and only assessment. A worst case prognosis could become the central case but in 
the absence of accurate, or alternative assessment it could be argued that it was the most 










The Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin was also an alien culture and few British people had 
direct experience of it.28 Its political system was an enigma and even after the wartime 
alliance, Britain appears to have been left with a limited understanding of the Soviet state and 
society. Butler indicated that another serious problem faced by intelligence analysts is that 
their targets do not look like them and they may struggle to understand a foreign state or 
empathise with it.29 The problem of “mirror-imaging” involves an assumption that our 
practices and values are universal and so are transferable onto the target. During the period 
under consideration British analysts looked from afar through primarily British, English 
speaking, democratic, male, middle-class, Civil Service, Christian, university-educated eyes 
at an alien, closed society. Any intelligence produced therefore ran the risk of incorporating 
the potential bias, foreign disinformation and lack of experience or knowledge of the analyst. 
Soviet society was immersed in a radical political belief enforced by an intolerant and brutal 
secret police system that was run as a murderous, paranoid dictatorship based on a 
“personality cult” in the aftermath of an appalling war.30 To develop an understanding of 
such a closed society, let alone the most secret programmes that it felt were crucial to its 
security, was a very difficult task with arguably a very low probability of success.  
 
 
Butler also makes the interesting comment that because secret intelligence material is 
necessarily highly classified, due to the use of special materials in its drafting; it appears to be 
of enormous importance.31 This can give the material a certain mystique, prompting an 
exaggerated impression that intelligence agencies are all-seeing and all-knowing with unique 
highly accurate insights into a target. In fact, a report may consist of uncorroborated single-
source material of dubious origin which may, nonetheless, be the only material that the 
intelligence agencies possess. It is very easy to become over-confident in what is thought to 
be a “good source” and to accept information without examining it critically. It is also 










thought that an intelligence agency’s confidence in a report should be made clear to users of 
its intelligence products to allow them to appreciate the limitations of the material.  
 
 
Butler’s comments in 2004 offer the only official exposition of the limitations of British 
intelligence gathering and the related challenges faced by analysts in the JIC and the wider 
intelligence establishment. The problems faced by analysts covering the well-protected 
Soviet nuclear target in the early years of the Cold War were similar. They struggled with 
partial information from limited sources to produce intelligence about the existential threat to 
the UK posed by the Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons programmes. Additionally, there were 
hurdles to be overcome by the intelligence collectors who had to recruit human sources, 
break codes, intercept communications, conduct covert aircraft over-flights and do so in 
complete secrecy at a time when several traitors were active in the British government. This 
all had to be undertaken in the austerity years after 1945 whilst facing impressive Soviet state 
security. The crucially important final intelligence products helped British decision-makers to 
guide the nation through the perilous days of the Cold War. However, all assessments and 




My thesis starts with a chapter examining British intelligence’s view of the Russian long-
range manned nuclear bomber threat between 1949 to 1962. In 1949 this was the only way 
for the Soviet Union to deliver a nuclear weapon to the UK. The Second World War had 
shown that massed enemy bombers could overload the nation’s air defences and Baldwin’s 
adage from the 1930s that “the bomber will always get through” remained a vital cause for 
vigilance in the period under review. This chapter was researched using declassified files 
from the Air Ministry as well as the JIC’s weekly and ad hoc reports. Papers relating to 
interviews with German scientists and engineers who worked in the Soviet Union after the 
war were also examined. The Strath Report which assessed the likely effects of an attack on 
the UK using the hydrogen bomb was also used to gain an understanding of what it was 
thought a nuclear strike on the UK would have involved in a worst case scenario. British Air 
Attaché reports from Moscow are also assessed to highlight the considerable intelligence 







Chapter Two concerns an examination of Britain’s knowledge of the development of the 
USSR’s long-range ballistic missile systems in the period. It explores the extensive, 
declassified debriefs undertaken in the 1950s with German scientists and engineers who 
worked on Soviet ballistic missile development. I also used JIC assessments and associated 
material, as well as reports from missile conferences held jointly with the United States in the 
1950s, to determine the extent of the UK’s knowledge of the USSR’s ballistic missile 
programme. This chapter also covers the launch of the Sputnik satellite and the Soviet 
Union’s development of the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). The threat this posed 
to the US raised the possibility of a nuclear “first strike” by the Soviet Union. No defence 
system existed to protect the West from ballistic missiles, other than the policy of nuclear 
deterrence, so developments in Soviet ballistic missiles raised serious security concerns. This 
was particularly pertinent to the UK which would be incapable of detecting an incoming 
Russian nuclear missile launch until 1963 and whose nuclear deterrent was based on manned 
bombers which could be destroyed on the ground in a surprise attack. Concerns about Soviet 
nuclear missile attack also had implications for British defence policy and was a key factor, 
amongst others, in the Macmillan government’s decision to cancel the Blue Streak silo-based 
nuclear ballistic missile. This decision terminated British ballistic missile development and 
declassified papers on this were examined for this thesis.  
 
 
Having examined intelligence targets, attention shifts in the second half of the thesis to 
developments in intelligence gathering, starting with the third chapter which examines 
photographic and electronic intelligence collection and its problems. The issue of airborne 
intelligence collection is explored by looking at the development of aerial reconnaissance and 
the capture of German wartime imagery of the Soviet Union. It also explores covert over-
flights of the USSR by the RAF, as well as the extent of British involvement in the CIA’s U-
2 programme. This was undertaken using recently declassified American material. It also 
reveals a covert balloon programme for intelligence collection, run by the US in the 1950s, 
with British involvement examined for the first time. Declassified papers concerning the 
shooting down of the U-2 and RB-47 intelligence aircraft by the USSR in 1960 are also 





the thesis also examines the impact of satellite reconnaissance on intelligence collection. In 
the process, new light is cast on very early British involvement in the programme. Some 
information is also included concerning British electronic intelligence collection against the 
USSR. The chapter concludes that airborne operations using the U-2 and reconnaissance 
satellites helped to dismiss as myths both the bomber and missile “gaps” which prompted such 
anxiety in the US in the 1950s; instead it showed that the “gap” was in America’s favour.  
 
 
The final chapter uses secondary literature and the CIA’s electronic archive to examine the 
controversial and famous espionage case of Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, a Russian army officer 
who worked for British and US intelligence from 1961-62. Using declassified documents and 
interview transcripts I examine both the developing espionage methods used to “run” him as 
an agent as well as assessing the importance of the material he provided on Russian nuclear 
bombers and ballistic missiles. I also research his role in the Cuban missile crisis which I 
demonstrate has been somewhat distorted over the years. Penkovsky provided unique insights 
into Soviet nuclear doctrine and strategy over many months and his case produced a plethora 
of official material, much of which has been released in the United States. Some of this 
unique material details British involvement in the case. I also examine how he was captured 
in the light of the latest secondary literature concerning his espionage.    
 
 
This thesis was written using hundreds of government files and dozens of academic works. 
However, no operational material has been released from GCHQ and SIS on the topics under 
consideration so any study will be a partial analysis using fragmented material. For this 
thesis, I submitted several Freedom of Information Act requests for papers, all of which were 
rejected. In the future the intelligence picture will undoubtedly change as more information is 
released to The National Archives but the culture of secrecy still pervades government 
activity in the UK. However, it needs to be borne in mind that tensions still exist between 
Russia and the West and updated nuclear weapon delivery systems remain ready for use. We 
are likely to be “living in the shadow” of Moscow’s nuclear bombers and ballistic missiles 




 CHAPTER 1 – RUIN FROM THE AIR: BRITISH INTELLIGENCE 




By the summer of 1949 the Soviet Union had shown that it could build and test an 
atomic bomb. However, to turn this capability into a credible offensive weapon, or 
have a nuclear deterrent, it needed the means to deliver it to a target either in Europe 
or North America. Until the mid-1950s, the only means that a state had to deliver a 
nuclear weapon to a target was by using a manned bomber such as the American B-29 
Superfortress used in the atomic bomb attacks on Japan in August 1945. In World 
War Two the Soviet Union did not develop a long-range four engine strategic bomber 
and made few air strikes on Germany. The wartime Soviet Air Force was primarily 
tactical, providing air defence to the USSR and supporting Russian ground forces. 




The end of the war had left the United States and Britain with impressive and 
powerful strategic bomber forces capable of mounting devastating conventional raids, 
as seen by the offensives against the cities of Tokyo and Dresden. The arming of 
high-flying, long-range bombers with nuclear weapons capable of destroying a whole 
city gave war a new and terrifying dimension. Although Nazi Germany had made 
impressive advances in the field of rocket technology, novel weapons such as the V-2 
rocket did not have the capacity to carry a nuclear warhead. Extensive testing and 
development needed to be done before atomic munitions could be miniaturised for use 
with a rocket. Additionally, guidance systems and engines of sufficient power and 
range were necessary for a system to be of strategic use. In 1949 therefore, the 
primary nuclear threat to the UK from the Soviet Union came from its development of 
long-range strategic bombers. At this time the devastation wrought on British cities by 
the German Luftwaffe was still fresh in the national mind, as was Britain’s inability to 
completely stop bombers and rockets from penetrating its airspace. By the 1950s there 
were doubts in government about whether to retain RAF Fighter Command and over 
its ability to detect and intercept Russian bombers, some of which were jet powered. 
Britain did not have a supersonic fighter for air defence until the mid-1960s and 
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 radars in the late 1940s and early 1950s had limited range. The advent of the atomic 
bomb, and later the hydrogen bomb, meant that potentially only a few Russian 
bombers flying over Britain could devastate cities, military bases and bring casualties 
on an unprecedented scale. As seen later in this chapter, the highly secret Strath 
Report, produced in 1955, assessed that even a few large-yield hydrogen bombs 
dropped on British cities would likely lead to governmental collapse and the nation’s 
inability to continue fighting a war. 
 
 
As the Cold War gathered momentum with the Berlin airlift, Korean War and 
development of the hydrogen bomb and ballistic missiles, so intelligence on the 
Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons programme became a top intelligence collection 
priority. The lack of a long-range strategic bomber was a serious gap in the Soviet 
Union’s nuclear arsenal and would have to be urgently addressed by the Soviet 
government. The Russians were also developing ballistic missiles in parallel to their 
bomber programme and this target was also competing for British intelligence 
resources. The ballistic missile issue is explored in Chapter Three and it is important 




Assisting the Russians in their development of weapon delivery systems was the fact 
that they, like the West, had benefited from the wartime capture and subsequent co-
operation of large numbers of German scientists and engineers who had worked on 
Nazi Germany’s advanced weapons programme. Some of these men were put to work 
in the Russian bomber programme. The Russians also impounded military and 
scientific equipment, so there was a real possibility that the Soviet Union could pull 
ahead of the West in military technology. Despite the fact that western aircraft were 
far more advanced than those in the Soviet Union and it was a major undertaking for 
the USSR to catch up, the Russians maintained manned strategic bomber programmes 





 The Second World War had demonstrated the value of secret intelligence material, 
and particularly scientific intelligence.32 The war had seen the systematic collection, 
analysis, assessment and dissemination of intelligence on an industrial scale. The 
combined secret intelligence effort undertaken by the UK and United States was an 
essential component in the eventual allied victory. The use of stereoscopic 
photography in aerial reconnaissance, the skilful use of ULTRA decrypts33 and 
employment of networks of human agents in enemy territory had all contributed to the 
provision of early warning concerning German advances in technology and allowed 
prudent deployment of allied resources.34 The organised direction and use of secret 
intelligence had helped policy makers to understand the thinking of the German 
leadership, their intentions, innovations and plans. Similar intelligence collection tools 
and techniques were likely to be equally important during the Cold War, where early 
warning and accurate information were crucial to national survival. The primary 
sources of secret intelligence available to the British government then, and now, were 
HUMINT (Human Intelligence) which is material gathered by human sources and 
SIGINT (Signals Intelligence) derived from the interception and analysis of 
communications. In the UK HUMINT is primarily the preserve of the Secret 
Intelligence Service (SIS)35 also known as MI6 and SIGINT is dealt with by the 
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ).36 
 
 
It is impossible to say with confidence how much Britain’s intelligence services knew 
or assumed about Russian nuclear bombers. Many official papers still remain 
classified despite the release of large numbers of intelligence files following the 1993 
Waldegrave initiative. The post-war files of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) are 
closed and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) has released 
nothing on the topic of its intelligence collection against Soviet strategic weapons. 
Select items from the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) are now publicly available 











 nuclear threat at this time. The papers of the various JIC sub-committees dealing with 
nuclear weapons are however still closed. The overall impression is that there was a 
paucity of intelligence available to the JIC, and that what was available is still too 
sensitive to release.37 It is also unclear what intelligence material was compromised 
by traitors in British government service to the Soviet Union38 and how much 
intelligence collection effort was wasted, with collection methods being revealed and 
incorrect conclusions drawn based on Soviet misinformation. What is certain is that 
early secret intelligence on Soviet nuclear bombers originated from Germans who had 
been held in the USSR after 1945. 
 
German Returnees and Intelligence Collection Problems 
 
In World War Two, Germany had led the world in rocket technology and the use of 
jet engines in military aircraft. The Soviet Union, from exploitation of assets likely 
captured in its German zone of occupation, could use this technology in their own 
military aircraft and missile development and production. Ironically, if German 
personnel who were exploited in weapon programmes were subsequently returned to 
Germany, they in turn could be exploited by western intelligence. However, it is also 
important to note that the Germans did not develop and deploy a long-range, four-
engine strategic bomber in World War Two so there was no German aircraft type for 
the Russians to copy. The latter would therefore have to design, test and build a long-
range strategic bomber themselves if they wanted to develop a strategic bombing 
capability.   
 
 
The Russians did gain access to technology developed by the Germans for their V-2 
rockets and they could exploit this for in the USSR’s own missile programme (which 
will be examined in Chapter 2).39 They also acquired technology, factories and 








 against Britain in the Second World War.40 The principles of this weapon would be 
developed over time to become the air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) used by many 
air forces in the conventional and nuclear role during the Cold War and beyond. The 
advantage of this system was that it could be launched as a fast “stand-off” weapon, 
fired beyond the range of a nation’s air defences, with no risk to aircrew or the 
aircraft. The system could therefore be adapted as a rocket-powered nuclear weapon 
delivery system which would be hard to detect and intercept. This innovation would 
enhance the strike range of a nuclear force when attacking targets at long-range, or 
those protected by sophisticated air defences. As the Cold War progressed, technical 
problems encountered in developing nuclear weapon delivery systems were solved 
with some help, initially, from German scientists and engineers.  
 
 
Due to the limited nature of Germany’s long-range bomber programme there is sparse 
information in The National Archives (TNA) concerning the intelligence derived from 
post-war German scientists about Soviet bombers. The main, albeit limited, source 
available to British intelligence came from interviews with German scientists, 
engineers and prisoners of war who had worked in Soviet factories and design 
facilities during their captivity.41 The information they provided on bombers appears 
to have been partial and terminated towards the end of the 1950s as the remaining 
Germans returned home. 
 
 
The only real hope of gathering large quantities of reliable secret intelligence on 
Soviet bombers seemingly lay with the SIGINT operations of GCHQ as well as the 
human intelligence collection activities of Britain’s SIS. The operational files of these 
organisations remain closed so it is impossible to gauge the state of their knowledge 
concerning Soviet bombers. It is probably fair to say that intelligence output was 











 of secret intelligence with its constant monitoring of Soviet Air Force radio networks. 
It was easier to gather air-to-ground (and vice versa) communications from afar than 
to recruit or infiltrate human agents into the Soviet Union. A large air force would 
generate vast quantities of communications and radio was the only way to 
communicate with an aircraft in flight. Even if Soviet military codes could not be 
broken, much data could be derived from the analysis of types of radio traffic and 




Interestingly, a document from a Joint Intelligence Committee branch in Germany 
produced in 1950 reveals that research had been undertaken by the British concerning 
German intelligence’s wartime experience with the Soviet Air Force’s 
communications.43 British intelligence had tracked down a former Lieutenant Colonel 
in the Luftwaffe who had served as the Chief of the Russian section of Luftwaffe 
Radio Intelligence in World War Two dealing with the interception and analysis of 
Russian air communications. The type of intelligence it collected concerned the 
frequencies, call signs and radio nets employed by the Russians. This was subject to a 
process of meticulous collection and revealed the composition and location of units, 
which was extremely useful if the messages could not be deciphered. According to 
this report, the Germans had some success at breaking Russian ciphers and the 
Luftwaffe officer thought that the Russians did not use cipher machines, thereby 
making the messages easier to decode. The use of hand-ciphers would therefore have 
made it easier for GCHQ to attack Russian Air Force communications and derive the 
content of their messages.  
 
 
The work this Luftwaffe officer undertook allowed Russian intentions to be 
determined and for unit strengths at particular airfields to be calculated and then 
passed to the German command in a collated form each day. He found that the best 







 notice the slightest variation in unit behaviour and predict changes in operational 
patterns at an early date. The same officer also revealed that Russian bombers did not 
have radar and that several were shot down during a raid over East Prussia, with some 
intelligence having been derived from interrogating the captured air crews. He further 
viewed Russian Air Force signals procedures to be of a “low standard” and felt that 
their “training was inadequate.”44 He thought that only a few units of the Russian Air 
Force were good and that there had been no radical alteration in signal procedures or 
cipher systems during his time in post. The report concluded that if it had not been for 
the “considerable shortcomings” in Russian Air Force signals security then the degree 
of penetration of their communications security by the German Air Force “would not 
have been possible.”45 
 
 
This report produced in Germany by British intelligence gives some insight into the 
methods that GCHQ is likely to have used to collect signals intelligence on Russian 
bombers during the period. Britain successfully used decoded German Enigma signals 
to plan military operations during the Second World War and it is almost certain that 
SIGINT activity continued against the Soviet Union during the early Cold War.46 The 
comments about poor Russian signal security are likely to have made it relatively easy 
for Britain to gain access to the content of some encrypted Russian Air Force signals 
during the early Cold War, although the extent remains unknown. Improvements in 
Russian communication security could have defeated this, however, as well as the 
activities of any traitors in western SIGINT agencies.  
 
 
This SIGINT document also shows how Britain used Germany, the front line in the 
Cold War against the Soviet Union, in order to glean intelligence from every available 
source. However, returning scientists and former German officers had a limited useful 
life as intelligence providers. A British study of Soviet Guided Weapons noted 








 returning Prisoners of War had “steadily declined.”47 Intelligence on Soviet bombers 
appears to have been sparse and, with the number of returning Germans in decline, 
this same report highlighted how meagre the remaining sources had become. The tone 
of the report suggested that the British were desperate to receive whatever intelligence 
they could about Soviet bombers. Much of the intelligence from German returnees 
apparent in declassified files concerned possible weapons carried on Russian bombers 
rather than information about any aircraft in service or in development.48 
 
 
The 1949 Guided Missile Study authored by the British government, noted that the 
Germans had operational air-to-surface missiles at the end of the war as well as some 
prototypes. The authors had “reason to believe” that the Russians were interested in 
developing this technology and a site at Riga, Estonia was being used.49 Another site 
of air-to-surface activity was thought to be at Khimiki, approximately 20km north-
west of Moscow, although the amount and nature of the activity remained unknown. 
The limited intelligence, which appeared to come from single, uncorroborated sources 
(likely German scientists), was very difficult to check and it was admitted that 
“neither has as yet been confirmed.”50 Even intelligence on guided bombs (a 
technology which would later be used on Soviet nuclear bombers) was limited and the 
report found that “it is conceivable that the guided gravity bomb “Fritz-x” (a German 
weapon) could now be in production” as well as an air-to-surface missile named Hs 
293.51 This was the limit of the intelligence that was available on these systems and 
the report frankly admitted that “there is no evidence available on which to base any 
other predictions” concerning air-launched guided weapons.52 
 
 
The 1949 Guided Missile Report further expressed concern over the Russian 
acquisition of German V-1 technology and the possible launch of this system from 











 the location of the greatest single concentration of German guided missile personnel. 
It noted that in the Second World War the V-1 had been launched from German He-
111 bombers after the allies overran launching sites in the Netherlands and France. 
From September 1944 to January 1945 over one thousand V-1s were launched against 
Britain in this way, demonstrating that although inaccurate, the technology did work 
and the Soviet Union could develop it.53 It is apparent that this information came from 
a debriefed German because the report contained a sketch plan and map of the missile 
factories at Khimki. This suggests that debriefs were undertaken thoroughly and the 
Germans were co-operative (with both the Russians and the British). This basic 
intelligence could provide a basis for future intelligence collection operations, such as 
electronic monitoring and covert aerial over-flights. The material could also serve to 




The authors thought that the Russians were making progress with V-1 development, 
which they felt was impressive as “there is no indication that the Soviets had made 
any beginning on guided missile work before the end of the war."54 They also thought 
that the Russians had received so much information from German scientists that they 
had reached an advanced stage where they could make progress by their own efforts 
and no longer needed their help.55 In the report, British intelligence estimated that 
some 300 German guided weapons experts had been deported to the Soviet Union 
after the war and the locations of 100 had been determined through postal 
intercepts.56 The interception of mail going through to families in allied-occupied 
zones of Germany could yield information on the location of German personnel, the 
work they were doing, and establish their identities for future thorough interrogation 
when they were released from the USSR. 
 
 
The paucity of intelligence about Russian production of long-range missiles that could 








 numbers of missiles) can be produced.”57 They also identified the need for “greatly 
increasing the quality and quantity of intelligence information on guided missiles 
inside the USSR.”58 They admitted that their report was the best assessment that 
could be produced until the “missiles in question pass into service use.”59 This was 
rather optimistic because only limited intelligence could be gleaned from German 
nationals who worked on the programmes and their usefulness to the Russians was 
declining. Once the weapons were deployed on bases in the Soviet Union it could be 
even more difficult to gather intelligence about them because there were no Germans 
present to gather data or make observations. It seems that there were no active 
western human intelligence sources in the Russian Air Force at this time. However, 
there was the opportunity to engage in the technical monitoring of weapons e.g. 
through the interception of electronic emissions or tracking the missiles on radar if 
possible. However, this could only occur if the missiles were being tested by the 
military in operations and exercises and long-range radars could be developed which 
could then only operate from the periphery of the USSR. It was also the case that the 
information derived from German nationals was a German view and not those of 
British or American personnel. Additionally, debriefs of Germans only provided 
knowledge of Soviet exploitation of these personnel and their knowledge. It did not 




The authors admitted that their report and German debriefs provided an “incomplete 
icture” of apparent activity at a few locations in the USSR.”60 The information was 
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also slightly out of date because many of the returnees were only interviewed 
sometime after their return from Russia and British intelligence had received no 
information on the main Russian experimental factories since “the middle of 1948.”61 
Maintaining timely intelligence concerning Soviet bombers and missiles using 













The situation with Russian bombers and air-launched weapons had barely improved 
he 1952 study revealed that British intelligence was using returning German workers 
also contains a very detailed description of the factory so German sources were 
                                                           
by 1952. In a report on guided weapons, British scientific intelligence officers 
concluded that their information concerning the main V-1 Mittelwerk Production 
Plant at Nordhausen in East Germany was old and limited, coming from Prisoners of 
War and returning German engineers.62 They stated that it was “difficult to assess the 
scale of effort being put into Guided Weapons” by the USSR.63 They thought that 
German work was still being exploited to the maximum and that German designed 
weapons were being manufactured in the USSR. They also admitted that “it is not 
known whether any of these weapons are in large scale production or whether native 
Russian weapons have been produced or which projects, if any, have been 
discarded.”64 The authors did point out, however, that the Germans had built 30,000 
V-1s during the war and were “far advanced over all other countries in their 
conception, development, manufacture and operation of guided missiles.”65 This 
could have been of enormous benefit to the Russians and the possibility of mass 
production of air-launched missiles being ready for use against the UK was an 




to monitor the Russian V-1 production facility at Khimki that was known by the 
Soviet designator “Factory No. 456.”66 It estimated that some 1,500 V-1s or their 
components had been found by the Russians in Germany and sent to this factory. The 
report noted that there was “no evidence of large-scale manufacture” but assessed that 











 almost certainly still providing information at that time.68 Interestingly, in Appendix 2 
of this report there is a Top Secret aerial photograph of the factory that is undated.  
 
 
It is unclear if this was taken during an unknown British covert over-flight of the 
SSR as early as 1952 or was from captured German wartime reconnaissance 
e material in The National Archives on intelligence from German returnees is very 




material available to British intelligence. The issue of aerial intelligence is examined 





no indication that any German engineers played a major, or even a minor, role in the 
construction of the first Soviet long-range bomber. Where the German returnees 
appear to have been valuable to western intelligence was in providing information on 
aviation-related factories and testing facilities. They also revealed useful data 
concerning Russian use of, and work on, guided missiles such as the V-1 that had the 
potential to be modified to be nuclear armed and launched from aircraft. This limited 
initial intelligence alerted Britain and the West to the direction of early Russian 
research and their technical skills, which would develop as the Cold War progressed. 
These Soviet weapon programmes were clearly very hard targets. With German 
scientists and engineers eventually gone, there were fewer foreign prying eyes to 
collect even basic information about what was happening in the Soviet Union’s 
research and development facilities. Furthermore, much experimental work on nuclear 
bombers and their weapons took place in remote parts of the USSR where foreigners 
were not permitted. This posed a major obstacle to intelligence collection. This 
situation can be summed up by a JIC paper from 1949 considering a possible Russian 
air attack on the UK by 1957 that stated, “We possess little or no information about 
Russia’s plans regarding the future shape and size of her air forces.”69 That such a 
situation could exist on such an important target during a critical time in the Cold War 








As previously stated, no material has been declassified from SIS or GCHQ 
oncerning their operations to collect information on Soviet nuclear bombers or their 
eapons systems. However, one declassified report from GCHQ does show that 
intelligence did allow an insight into the Soviet military aircraft industry 
nd Annex A of the report showed that the British had established the names of 
ctories with details of which bombers were manufactured in particular locations. For 
c
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Russian aircraft and their supporting industries were targeted for technical intelligence 
collection. A GCHQ report from 195070 reveals that a source of intelligence was 
available derived from intercepting the communications on “the wireless network of 
the Soviet Ministry of Communications.”71 These communications contained 
messages going to and from Soviet aviation factories. It is unclear if they were 
encrypted (i.e. broadcast as clusters of numbers and letters, incomprehensible to 
outsiders), or if they were sent en clair as plain text using telephonic or radio 
communication on an insecure circuit. The report does not reveal what type of 
messages these were because this information is redacted. However, the data revealed 
details of aircraft and instrumentation factories and Russian Scientific Research 
Institutes. The security conscious Russians had assigned codenames to particular 
pieces of equipment and British analysts did not know what they referred to. This 
intelligence at least provided some insight into the equipment carried on Soviet 
bombers and was classified TOP SECRET by GCHQ with the additional code word, 
COPSE, to add an extra level of security. It is unknown what this code name signifies 
but it is likely to refer to a particular source or SIGINT method. It is reasonable to 
conclude that the wireless networks of the Soviet Ministry of Defence and the Russian 







instance, it was determined that Russian Tu-4 bombers (the first one to carry a 







 This information was collated in Annex A of the report into a schematic detailing 
what equipment was supplied to aircraft factories by aviation instrumentation 
factories. This would be useful information for further intelligence collection and 
even targeting in wartime. The intelligence report shows what secret intelligence 
material is likely available and still retained which all fed into the (likely) limited 




Due to the closed nature of Soviet society and pervasive security, it seems that British 
personnel rarely came into contact with Russians so opportunities 
 glean information from human sources were limited. It was clearly very difficult 
                                                           
official and military 
to
for any Russian who was contemplating disloyalty to be able to leave the country, let 
alone contact a western intelligence agency. The issue of dealing with Russian 
defectors to Britain had been examined in 1950.72 This raised the problem of how to 
dispose of and resettle Russian defectors, “in view of the need to increase the number 
of defections for intelligence purposes.”73 The War Office highlighted that there was 
a problem of finding a method to fund defector resettlement and new identities for 
them, noting that the whole activity had to be done without any publicity. Britain’s 
Security Service, MI5, had raised the issue of deserters from the Russian armed forces 
in a meeting in February 1948.74 The department had evacuated Russians from 
Germany and Austria in the late 1940s to be “disposed of” i.e. resettled, in England. 
The meeting concluded that a system was needed to encourage deserters and to find 
them suitable employment once they had been debriefed. It should be noted, though, 
that early deserters were not in the Russian Air Force but were normally infantry 
personnel with limited access to information of intelligence interest. It was also noted 
that once in England “the War Office will have no further concern with them”75 
which suggests that defector handling at this time for military personnel left a lot to be 
desired. The defectors were handled under a government programme known as 











 The meeting noted that it was considered a priority to get all the information out of 
deserters “without undertaking any responsibility for their safety”, except for people 
who were considered “really big fish.”77 Any extraction of Russians from Germany 
was done under a programme codenamed RED CROSS. With a high level of security 
being required, very few people were aware of this scheme.  
 
 
A British Intelligence Division at Herford, Germany also wrote a now declassified 
udy of Russian defectors in 1951.78 It stated that from the middle of 1945 to 1951 
ere had been 213 defectors from the Soviet armed forces, which also included 
defectors were from Germany. No Soviet strategic 
ombers were based there and so none of the defectors could provide information on 






civilians. Of these defectors, 62 were military officers and their main motivation was 
to seek a better life in the West or to escape purges. None of them seemed to defect 
with the intention of providing information to the West. Indeed the report noted than 
in 105 cases Russian servicemen were defecting due to an association with a German 
woman in the Soviet Zone of Occupation in Germany. These men had defected to 
avoid punishment.79 Only seven of the defectors in Germany were thought by British 
officials in Herford to be ideologically motivated. In 1950 there was only one Soviet 
defector, who was a Russian civilian who had been having an affair with a German 
woman and so sought to escape.  
 
 
It should be noted that all these 
b
th
intelligence and military defectors were not intelligence providers but low-level 
refugees who were malcontents fleeing the constant control of the Soviet system. As 
one defector noted, “the idealists in the USSR are in the labour camps”80, so 
apparently there would be few people coming to the West who would betray the 









 This report on defectors was nonetheless considered important enough to be 
addressed to Field Marshal Sir William Slim, Chief of the Imperial General Staff and 
circulated at a high policy-making level. It emphasised to major decision-makers the 
aucity of human intelligence sources and the lack of intelligence on the increasingly 
portant target of the Soviet Union and its strategic weapons programmes. It 
 days of Empire, constantly under attack in hostile 
rritory.81 These impressions are corroborated by the few Air Attaché files from 
viet society under Stalin had 
ervasive surveillance and travel restrictions for Soviet citizens as well as for British 
te rank who could speak Russian for the assistant Air Attaché role.82 The 




suggested that if Russian defectors were not bringing information to Britain then, 
perhaps, Air Attachés behind the Iron Curtain could provide insights into Soviet 
bombers and strategic weapons.  
 
British intelligence collection problems in Moscow 
 
However, contemporary accounts suggest that the British embassy in Moscow was 
like a beleaguered garrison in the
te
Moscow to be found in The National Archives. So
p
diplomats. This ensured that the opportunities to collect intelligence and view 
establishments outside the Moscow area were very limited. Many towns were off-
limits to westerners and a stringent visa regime with “guides” accompanying 




Britain had problems staffing posts in the Air Attaché branch in Moscow as early as 



















 to be a major problem for British intelligence at this time. The intelligence contained 
e Soviet press.”85 He also stated that he went to a cinema in 
oscow and saw a film called “Air Force Day 1949” which proved to be “a very 
aluable source of intelligence.” This appeared to be all he could collect and he went 
because extreme restrictions were imposed. On a visit to Odessa in 1950 the assistant 
Air Attaché was “followed closely” and was twice prevented from leaving the town 
  
within the Moscow Air Attaché’s quarterly reports in the late 1940s and early 1950s is 
also very meagre. Declassified files reveal that they were trying their best without 
much success in a hostile environment. The report for the last quarter of 1949 
contains an assessment of the aircraft seen at the November military parade in 
Moscow. It reported that there were “no new aircraft and only one jet.”83 It is 
important to note however that all the British would see is what the Russians wanted 
them to see. The latter were thereby able to control the flow of intelligence and the 
impressions gained. Knowledge appears to have been restricted to the types of aircraft 
being produced, but there was no detail about capabilities and production rates from 
Soviet factories. The same report also stated that attempts at travel had been 
“particularly unfruitful” and the Soviet authorities had provided no rail or air tickets. 
The Soviet authorities also restricted the Attachés’ travel to where there were Intourist 
hotels (i.e. those set aside for foreign use and controlled by the government) in order 
to curtail their movements. It was also noted that Soviet liaison staffs in the Armed 
Forces Department for External Relations were either unwilling or unable to help 
British personnel.84  
 
 
The Air Attaché in Moscow was reduced to buying books from tightly regulated 
Soviet publishers to obtain information because it was reported “little of value has 
been gleaned from th
M
v
back to the cinema to see the film several times and gathered useful information on 
aircraft “undercarriage construction” and “other technical details.”86 
 
 








 centre by Soviet militiamen.87 Most intelligence on Soviet aircraft at this time appears 
to have been derived from observing air displays and the rehearsals for these events. 
he Russians were keen to keep foreigners away from facilities in the Moscow area 
nd even the airfield at Tushino, near Moscow, where the annual Air Force Day was 
19 Tu-4s in a flypast. He considered this 
ircraft to be “obsolescent” and would make a “poor showing” against western 
ghters.90 This is a pertinent comment because at this time most western air forces 
available on the trans-Siberian air route.92 Flying was often limited to 
ight flights and aisle seats would be issued to British personnel thereby denying any 




held was “out of bounds to foreigners.”88  
 
 
By 1952 the British Air Attaché concluded that concerning Soviet Strategic Air 
Power, “little information has come to hand.”89 He noted that the Russian Tu-4 
bomber was still in production (this was a copy of the American B-29 Superfortress) 
and the Russians were using this as the core of a bomber force that was being built up. 
At the November 7th parade he counted 
a
fi
were being equipped with jet fighters and American piston engine bombers had 




The Attachés did sometimes glean information from the road and air routes that they 
used when they did manage to leave Moscow. Particularly, they were able to note the 
number of airfields seen en route.91 The Russians had placed an “out of bounds” ban 




inspection of the aircraft manufacturing centres of Kazan and Kuibyshev was possible 
















 was a crucial loss. Attachés were frequently followed by obvious security agents and 
sometimes turned out of hotels. One Attaché noted that “diverse types of humanity” 
had followed him.94 When British military personnel met their counterparts from 
friendly countries, the report noted that allies faced the same problems and were 
unable to gather intelligence. Allied Attachés had to limit themselves to attending 
parades, air displays and the occasional visit away from Moscow. The Air Attaché 
noted that “security plays a large part in the planning of fly-pasts” and he contrasted 
this with the openness of the UK’s Farnborough air display with photographs and 
detailed write-ups being available which would give the Russians “most interesting 
information” without even having to attend the show.95 It was also noted that in air 
shows no new aircraft prototypes were seen for security reasons. With the Soviet 
Union being so vast, it was easy for the Russians to conceal research and development 
activity and aircraft deployments. Examination of peripheral information such as the 
number of air engineers being produced in colleges in the USSR may also have 
caused intelligence agencies in the West to exaggerate the size of the Soviet Union’s 
air capability. Aircraft numbers could be extrapolated to produce erroneous 
assessments in the absence of other intelligence sources. 
 
 
Intense Russian security gave the Attachés an impression that the Russians only had 
the Tu-4 bomber in their strategic bomber inventory. Interestingly, in a document 
from 1952 the Attaché refers to “reports of travellers” concerning aircraft in such 
places as Murmansk and the Black Sea, but no indication is given of who they were or 
what they saw. They could have been SIS contacts, tourists or businessmen or British 
erchant seamen; nonetheless the Attaché found the information “valuable owing to 




continued for the rest of the period under consideration with the assistant Air Attaché 
detained in July 1952 for entering a “forbidden zone.” It was considered ironic by the 
Attaché that the Russians would not issue the British embassy with a list of these 









Problems of intelligence collection were encountered even when an occasional high-
level delegation visited the Soviet Union from Britain during the 1950s. This 
continued even in the new period of greater openness after Stalin’s death. In June 
1956 the British Secretary of State for Air, Mr Nigel Birch visited the USSR with a 
delegation of Royal Air Force officers.98 The delegation visited Russian Air Force 
units and factories but no photographs could be taken without Soviet permission. On 
is occasion the Air Attaché from Moscow accompanied the group and it was noted 
at his “previous contacts with the Soviet Air Force have been sparse in the 




extreme.”99 The report noted that the delegation relied on what they observed and 
anything seen could not be taken as a concrete fact about the Soviet Air Force. The 
group were said to be “impressed by the enormous strides” made by Soviet aviation 
and the quantities of personnel and aircraft available.100 It was noted during this visit 
that Russian security was good and the British were only allowed to see so much and 
no more. Soviet personnel only provided general answers to queries posed by their 
British visitors. They concluded during the visit that “little knowledge was gained” on 
the Soviet Long-Range Air Force.  They also noted that in the new post-Stalin period 
of co-existence, the UK could not pass over intelligence collection opportunities when 
they occurred. However, such opportunism could lead to diplomatic incidents such as 
the (unrelated) disastrous Buster Crabb incident that same year when SIS put a 
frogman under a warship bringing the Soviet leaders to Britain in order to collect 
intelligence. SIS had been instructed not to mount such operations but nevertheless 
went ahead with it. The death of the diver and subsequent publicity was a major 
embarrassment to Britain and a source of fury to Prime Minister Anthony Eden.  
 
 
The Secretary of State’s delegation also noted that the most important information 
gained by the Air Attaché did not necessarily come from watching air displays in 
Moscow but through “painstaking observation” of the rehearsals.101 The delegation 








 aircraft at a distance from moving cars. This was apparently the first time that they 
had seen some aircraft types at close hand. The report revealed that some air 
telligence was gained when they flew on to Leningrad because a new airfield was 
bserved north of Moscow. When they met Soviet personnel the replies to questions 
 a position comparable to a major 
ir force in the West. Soviet aviation had high status with substantial resources 




were felt to be evasive. They had little time to view equipment and asking detailed 
questions was said to be “virtually impossible.”102  
 
 
The report from the Secretary of State’s visit also referred to a trip made to the Soviet 
Union by the RAF’s Vice-Chief of the Air Staff in 1956 and incorporated his 
comments. He had also noted that the Russians went out of their way to be friendly, 
but again provided little information. He commented that the Soviet Union’s intention 
was to be a first-class air power and assessed that Soviet bombers were not as good as 
those in the RAF, but they were in service in quantity. His opinion was that the Soviet 
Air Force had progressed from a tactical air force to
a
d
certainly not out of their reach.”103 He judged that the Soviet Union’s long-term 
policy was to have their military aviation “second to none” and the “nuclear 
umbrella” could then be used to allow cuts in Russian conventional forces to free 
resources for economic development. The Vice-Chief of the Air Staff was not fooled 
by the new post-Stalin friendly approach to the UK and thought that the friendliness 
was simply a ruse to try to obtain reciprocal trips for intelligence purposes.104 His 
sweeping overview of the Soviet Air Force and insightful opinions suggests that more 
detailed information was available to him that does not feature in The National 
Archives and that he was not just relying on Attaché reporting from Moscow. 
 
British Assessments of Russian Nuclear Bombers 
 
The first Russian nuclear bomber was the Tu-4 Bull and a British intelligence report 







 was “definitely known” that it could achieve a speed of 199-216 knots at 10,000 feet 
and carry a 20,000 pound bomb load over 2583 nautical miles.105 The British did have 
the advantage that the Russian aircraft could be compared with the known 
characteristics of an American aircraft so assessment was made easier. In 1950 the 
oviet May Day parade had been observed and British intelligence concluded that 
nd that sixty-four had been seen 
 the parade.106 Dylan notes that the Air Ministry thought the production figure was 
eaus and 900 
ctories to produce the aircraft.113 The first test flight of the Tu-4 was as early as July 
947 and it was seen at an airfield the following month.114 This meant that for the first 
                                                           
S
forty Tu-4 bombers could be produced each month a
in
lower but, as he states, “the threat was overwhelming whichever figure was used.”107 
The threat would grow as over 1,000 of these bombers would be built by the mid-
1950s.108 A steady increase in the Soviet bomber force did not however provide 
evidence of imminent Russian aggressive intent or a surprise attack being planned. As 
Dylan notes, the threat as seen by British intelligence was a large and steadily 
growing threat from the Soviet bomber force.109 However, in JIC’s view there would 
be no war until the USSR could seriously threaten the United States.110 
 
 
Zaloga undertook some research on the Tu-4 bomber after the end of the Cold War. 
He noted that the Russians were denied access to the B-29 bomber under lend-lease 
during the Second World War because of the advanced technology it contained.111 It 
is however known that during the war several B-29s mounting raids against Japan 
crashed in the Soviet Union. The Russians thus obtained three copies of this high-
quality strategic bomber.112 The aircraft were dismantled and examined for the 
Russian strategic bomber programme, which utilised 64 Design Bur
fa
1



















 Soviet nuclear strike capability could be developed. The Soviet Union clearly realised 
how strategic bombing had become such an important instrument in war. The Tu-4 
had limited range and would need to refuel before making a return journey from the 
United States and it appears that early Tu-4s did not have this capability. However, 
the possibility existed that the bombers could be used for one-way nuclear bombing 
missions against American cities. In 1949, however, the nuclear threat to the UK from 
the USSR was likely to have been considered as low because the aircraft were 
prototypes and would probably be suffering from technical problems such things as 
with the navigation systems and bomb sights.  
 
 
Nonetheless, Russia made rapid progress with the construction and development of its 
strategic bomber force. The first bomber regiment was formed in 1949 and by 1953 
there were 847 Tu-4 aircraft in service.115 However, British and US intelligence 
assessed that the Soviet Union’s nuclear bomb stockpile was small, with only some 
20-30 atomic bombs in their arsenal, so a substantial nuclear attack could not be 
mounted on the UK.116 It was more likely that these devices would be reserved for an 
ttack on the United States. The limited range of the aircraft also meant that it could 
ot reach most of the United States so the chance of a pre-emptive nuclear strike on 




the West at this time was arguably remote. It was highly unlikely that the Soviet 
Union would attack the United Kingdom without first dealing a substantial 
debilitating nuclear attack on the United States. The Tu-4 was nonetheless considered 
a threat to the UK and in a JIC assessment in 1950 it was stated that “Tu-4 type 
bombers based in Western Russia could operate against targets anywhere in the 
British Isles.”117 However, it seemed to JIC that so long as the USSR’s strategic 
bombing capability was limited, the Soviet Union was unlikely to attack the West.  
 
 
The Korean War, which broke out in June 1950, cast further light on the nature of the 









 was felt that an attack on the UK which would be met by jet fighters could similarly 
result in heavy Soviet bomber losses if they were not escorted by fighters. It could 
also involve the loss of the few nuclear bombs the Soviet Union possessed. The 
British planned to meet this threat and a 1955 British study of the Tu-4 determined the 
type of fuse and attack angle required to destroy one of these aircraft.118 It used the B-
9 bomber as the model to determine the thickness of the aircraft skin and its 
ulnerable points. Notwithstanding such flaws, the Tu-4 was proved an essential first 
Tushino airfield on 13 
ly 1955.120 At the latter event, the Russians engaged in a ruse whereby they used 




step in the Soviet Union’s attempt to obtain an airborne strategic nuclear capability. 
The next phase for the Soviet Long-Range Air Force was the development of the 
Bison jet bomber under the premiership of Nikita Khrushchev. 
 
 
If the Soviet Union was going to mount nuclear attacks against modern air defences 
then it would need a high-speed, high-flying strategic jet bomber such as the 
American B-47 or the British V-bomber. The design bureau chosen for the work was 
that run by Vladimir Myasischev, who was Nikita Khrushchev’s son in law.119 The 
Soviet government wanted an aircraft that could carry a five tonne bomb load over a 
distance of 9,950 miles. Developmental work began in the early 1950s. The four 
engine jet bomber given the NATO designator Bison was first seen at the May Day 
parade in Red Square in 1954 and again at the Aviation Day at 
Ju
te
they possessed far more bombers than they actually had, and that a substantial 
production line was in existence. They were eager to present the Soviet Union as a 
nuclear superpower with an intercontinental nuclear jet bomber capable of rivalling 
the new American B-52 bomber. The ruse fuelled speculation in the United States that 
a “bomber gap” existed.  In fact the Russians only had ten of these bombers in their 
inventory in 1956.121 In 1956 the M4A version of this aircraft was observed 











The Bison programme suffered from Russian inexperience and technical limitations, 
with jet engines incapable of high performance at high speed over long distances.123 
The designers were over-optimistic about what could be achieved and it is reasonable 
to say that they were disappointed, with a substantial quantity of resources being 
wasted on the project. Work on the aircraft was undertaken at the State Aviation Plant 
at Fili, near Moscow, one of the most prestigious in the Soviet Union.124 The first 
prototype produced in 1953 only had a range of 5,500 miles and could not make a 
return trip to the United States. Furthermore no refuelling capability had been 
included in the design so the aircraft was flawed from the outset.125 Despite these 
adequacies, the aircraft was put into production in 1954 and was known to the West 
acy of the Bison’s measurements 
epended upon the quality and nature of the photographs. It was also seen, 
resumably by an Air Attaché, at an experimental airfield at Ramenskoye near 
Moscow in July 1953 in sufficient detail to allow the wings and body to be described. 
Ironically, the report stated that it was similar to the UK’s Valiant bomber so Russian 
                   
in
as Bison A. The aircraft suffered numerous accidents and in the 1960s was taken off 
the nuclear role and used as a tanker aircraft. At its peak in 1962 only 57 aircraft were 
used as bombers and the programme could be considered of limited value due to the 
poor reliability and performance of the aircraft.  
 
 
According to Goodman the first sightings of the Bison bomber reached British 
intelligence in July 1953 but detailed information only emerged in 1955.126 By 1956 
the Air Ministry had concluded that the aircraft was in operational service with the 
Soviet Air Force, even though only a few sightings had been made and several 
variants had been noted. Intelligence on the aircraft appears to have been sparse.127 A 
British intelligence study on the Bison in 1957 reveals that all available intelligence 
on this jet-powered bomber was based on the study and interpretation of 

















 intelligence efforts may have influenced the aircraft’s design.129 The detailed 
information in the report concerning the Bison’s dimensions shows that photographs 
taken had been carefully studied and measured.  
 
 
The Bison production facility at Fili had also been observed according to this report. 
The author was able to say when series production of the aircraft had started in the 
plant and between January 1955 and October 1956 only 2 aircraft per month were 
produced.130 They further stated that output is “now rising” and estimated that 70 
aircraft had been completed by 31 March 1957. British intelligence also records 
information about the six different variants of the bomber. It was noted that the wings 
on the aircraft had been moved forward on some models and there were aerodynamic 
developments. However, insufficient photographic evidence meant that it was very 
difficult to interpret what the modifications meant. Many photographs in the report 
were from air shows but some had also been taken covertly of Soviet airfields and 
search facilities. These images were then used to produce line diagrams of the 
ircraft. This information was also used to determine the best way to attack and 




destroy a Bison.131  Models of the aircraft were made with reflective surfaces and then 
light was shone on them to simulate radar beams and the reflections captured. The 
measurements could then be used to determine the radar-echo area of the full sized 
aircraft to devise tactics to attack them. 
 
 
In 1957 the Joint Intelligence Committee noted that the Bison had an “in-flight” 
refuelling capability because photographic evidence revealed a refuelling probe. The 
Russians were clearly aiming to extend its range but this was likely so as to develop a 
capability to attack the United States. Once again, this intelligence came from 
observation of the rehearsals for the Air Force Day at Tushino airfield.132 The 












 over-flight) that ten bombers were at Soltsy airfield in the north-west Soviet Union on 
16 March 1959.133 It was assessed that a limited bomber capability had been 
developed at this airfield and this was the first report of Bison bombers using it.  
 
 
In his memoirs Khrushchev commented that the Bison “failed to satisfy our 
he Soviet Union clearly struggled with the development of a large, long-range 
rategic jet bomber force but was more successful with the development and 
olev from the early 1950s as a bomber for 
se in theatre operations and was used by the Russian Air Force for many years, even 
featuring in British intelligence reports into the 1970s.138 The aircraft was a twin 
                                                
requirements” because although it could reach the United States on a single flight it 
could not return to the USSR.134 He expressed doubts about whether it could survive 
anti-aircraft fire and the designers thought it could only bomb the United States and 
then land in Mexico.135 The Premier stated that it did not perform well in flight tests 
and a number of pilots were killed in accidents so the aircrew “didn’t have much 
confidence in it.”136 Khrushchev damns the aircraft with the words “in the end we 
decided to scrap the whole project because it was costing us too much money and 





deployment of medium range jet bombers which were produced in large numbers and 
were more likely to be used in operations against the UK. The Tu-16 Badger was the 
mainstay of this medium range force. The Soviet Union is likely to have reserved its 
long-range bombers for attacks on the United States but medium range bombers could 
have been launched in large numbers from bases in the western Soviet Union for air 
attacks on Britain. 
 
 












 engine jet with swept wings and was first seen at the Kazan aircraft plant in 1953.139 
wing a “stand-off” nuclear missile firing capability beyond the 
nge of British radars and surface-to-air missiles. This reflected a Soviet philosophy 
f continual update and improvement and amongst Soviet systems it was felt that 
                                                           
It was of all metal construction and came in several variants. The Badger A was a 
bomber which could carry 20,000lb of bombs and the variants Badger B and C were 
first seen airborne in 1961.140 These later variants carried air-to-surface missiles such 
as the KENNEL and KIPPER which the Russians had developed and could be used 
against land targets. British intelligence noted in a report that although the aircraft had 
been in service since the 1950s there had been no upgrade in aerodynamic 




“Badger has few equals.”141 The aircraft had an assessed speed of 540knots and a 
combat radius of 1650 nautical miles. Whilst British intelligence had some knowledge 
about the missiles carried on board, such as their dimensions, there was little 
information concerning their performance. It was assessed that the missiles could 
carry nuclear warheads in the sub-megaton range over distances from 95-213km and 
would be a useful asset for attacking the UK.142 Whilst Russia enjoyed success with 
its medium jet bomber and coped with the failure of the Bison project, it was known 
that she still sought to develop a long-range strategic bomber which could threaten the 
US as well as the UK. 
  
 
The Tu-95 Bear was the first successful Soviet strategic bomber with a truly 
intercontinental range of some 8,000 miles.143 A version of this aircraft is still used 
today and a Defence Intelligence report on it remains withheld, despite my 
submission of a Freedom of Information Act request. Tupolev had been working on 
this aircraft since 1951. The Bear was a hedge in case the Bison project failed and it 
relied on four turboprops for propulsion whereby jet engines provided rotational 











 Day at Tushino.144 It was in service in 1956 but due to its slow speed and engine 
problems it would be vulnerable to jet fighter and missile attack. It did however 
provide the Soviet Union with a long-range nuclear bombing capability to replace the 
Tu-4 bomber. This capability was however limited because the force was small with 
ly 3 Aviation Divisions deployed at bases in the Soviet Union by 1960.145  
ritish intelligence, through unexplained means, but possibly a U-2 over-flight, was 






The Soviet Air Force also had limited experience in operating strategic bombers, 
which hindered its effectiveness. The Bear did not compare well with the modern 
bombers of the UK’s V-bomber force or America’s Strategic Air Command. In 
wartime, it is more likely that medium range bombers would have been used to mount 
nuclear strikes against the UK. The JIC noted that air-to-surface guided missiles were 
likely to be put on the Bear by 1961 with a range of 350 nautical miles and capable of 
achieving a speed of Mach 2.146 Although the Bear would struggle to penetrate 
modern air defences, it could carry long-range stand-off weapons which could attack 





noted that a medium/heavy bomber codenamed Bounder, which was 200 feet long 
and had a delta wing which was 78 feet wide, had been seen at Fili airfield near 
Moscow.147 It was assessed that this was Russia’s first supersonic bomber, although 
the aircraft was a prototype. Zaloga notes that this aircraft did not get beyond the 
experimental stage due to engine and aerodynamic problems.148 It seems this was a 
Russian attempt to copy the American B-58 supersonic bomber but the project failed. 
The UK could clearly gather limited intelligence about which aircraft the Russians 
were developing and producing but there was very little fine detail about the weapons 
















The Strath Report – Possible Effects of a Soviet Nuclear Attack on the UK in 
1955 
 
British intelligence was using whatever intelligence it could gather to assess the threat 
posed by the USSR’s airborne nuclear weapons. The crucial need to do so was 
emphasised by the mid-1950s through studies for the British government examining 
the impact that a nuclear attack would have on the UK. In 1953 the nuclear Cold War 
changed with the successful Soviet test of a hydrogen bomb. This shocking strategic 
development made it all the more important for the British to understand the effect on 
the UK of such a device delivered by a Soviet bomber. In 1954 British civil servant 
nd scientist William Strath was chosen to lead a committee to examine the home 
efence aspects of the use of ten 10 megaton hydrogen bombs in a Soviet nuclear 









The Strath Committee found that it would be very difficult to determine when a 
nuclear attack would come.151 When it did occur the “devastation caused by a thermo-
nuclear attack would be on such a scale that the UK could not be used as a main 
supply base.”152 The very capability of the UK to continue fighting a war in Europe 
and to protect itself from further attack could well have been terminated. Strath 
estimated that if an attack occurred at night and no civil defence capabilities were 
taken then 12 million Britons would die with a further 4 million being injured.153 In 
London alone there would be 4 million casualties caused by a single bomb on the city. 
Across the UK at least one third of the population would be killed or injured in such a 












 to limit casualties it would involve moving some 14 million people away from ports 
and although they knew that strategic jets were not in production, a prototype Soviet 
ler 
and cities.155 The issue of the survivors of such an attack having to remain indoors 
(presumably in wrecked houses with no power and little food or water) for two weeks 
due to radiation from nuclear fallout was also examined. The picture was painted of a 
country which would collapse following a Soviet nuclear bomber attack. Interestingly, 
a later document noted that there should be “no publicity about the dangers of 
thermonuclear war” until the government could say what protection measures could 
be put in place.156 The conclusions concerning a hydrogen bomb attack on the UK 
were almost too horrific for officials, let alone the public, to contemplate. There was 
no effective defence against such weapons, other than to maintain a nuclear deterrent. 
Norman Brook, Cabinet Secretary, noted that the UK was “extremely vulnerable to 
nuclear attack” and “there is not in sight any air defence system which could protect 
us effectively.”157 However, Strath could be considered a worst case scenario because 
a Russian nuclear bomber would likely carry a one megaton nuclear bomb rather than 
a weapon in the 10 megaton range such as those then being tested by the Americans in 
the Pacific Ocean. The estimated size of weapons used in his report does seem 
excessive. In the light of the Strath Report, the importance of intelligence about the 
Soviet Union’s nuclear bombers was terrifyingly clear as were the consequences of a 
breakdown in superpower relations. 
 
British estimates of Soviet Nuclear Bomber Production 
 
In addition to the intelligence collection problem against different types of Soviet 
bomber, British intelligence also found it difficult to calculate Soviet bomber 
production. In 1949 JIC estimated that the USSR would have 1000 Tu-4 bombers and 
a similar number of strategic jet aircraft.158 It further assessed that there was only one 
factory producing the Tu-4 at a rate of ten aircraft per month, but this would rise to 20 
by the end of the year.159 A bomber force, JIC judged, could be built up in eight years 










 driven bombers could be built but it did not appreciate the problems the Russians 
were having in developing and building strategic jet bombers. The JIC files give no 
dication of how production figures were derived and it seems that estimates were 
wn aircraft factories and 
ompared to what was capable of being achieved in the West. In 1955 when the Bison 
ng 100 heavy bombers in 1958, rising to 370 by 1962.163  
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based on very limited information on productivity at kno
c




JIC assessments of Soviet aircraft production drawn up later in the 1950s and early 
1960s seem more confident that British intelligence had a more accurate view of 
Soviet aircraft production, likely aided by intelligence from the American U-2 over-
flight programme. In 1958 the JIC concluded that there were only two factories 
producing Bison and Bear aircraft and they estimated that some five aircraft were 
produced each month.161 JIC noted that the Russians would need to improve their 
production techniques to increase the number of heavy bombers but there was little 
evidence that they were doing so.162 It had also recognised the technical difficulties 
the Russians faced in producing supersonic bombers, perhaps based on American 




The British do not seem to have been driven by the “bomber gap” mentality which 
was seen in the United States in the 1950s. US intelligence estimates assessed a far 
greater number of Soviet bombers entering service and this served the needs of the US 
air force and aircraft industry. Goodman’s research reveals that the British appreciated 
that “vested interests” with budgetary motives in the United States were inflating the 
figures for Russian aircraft.164  A UK intelligence assessment in 1959 conservatively 














 least 850 medium bombers.165 The heavy bombers posed a limited threat to the 
United States but the medium range bombers posed a serious threat to the UK. 
Despite likely having access to the same intelligence, British and American views on 
Soviet long-range bomber production differed.166 According to Dylan, in 1956 the 
K thought the USSR’s LRAF would have 200 aircraft by mid-1957 whilst the US 
stimated it would be 350. By mid-1958 the UK estimated there would be 400 Soviet 
bers in a Conflict 




bombers, whereas the US thought 600 would be available.167 They appeared to agree 
that a large air force would be built by the USSR but estimates of its size and the 
speed of production differed. The British may also have felt that Russia was taking 
measures to make it appear more powerful than it really was and the Americans 
believed them and resourced their forces appropriately. 
 
 
A JIC assessment from 1962, the end of the period under consideration, stated that the  
Bear and Badger bombers ceased production in 1959 and that for the Bison in 
1961.168 The Soviet Union still had a requirement for a manned bomber force but as 
early as 1960 Sir Kenneth Strong, Director of the Joint Intelligence Bureau, thought 
that bomber production was being “cut down sharply.”169 The JIC also thought that it 
would “give the Soviet bomber another 5-10 years as a strategic weapon.”170 Another 
key intelligence question for British analysts was how the Soviet Union would use its 
available bombers in the event of hostilities with the West and against the UK in 
particular. 
 
British Assessment of the USSR’s Use of Nuclear Bom
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stated in a memo to Sir William Dickson, Marshal of the Royal Air Force, that 

















 their leaders think or would act in given circumstances.”171 This made any assessment 
about the use of air assets extremely difficult. In 1950 the British government had 
even speculated that an attack might be mounted by a Soviet suicide squad detonating 
an atomic bomb in a low flying civilian aircraft over a target such as London.172 The 
issue of limited warning of Soviet attack was still a concern in the early 1960s. In 
1960, Harold Watkinson, Minister of Defence, wrote of the Soviet threat that “we 
would not at best get more than two days indication of forces getting into a position 
om which they could attack” and he even thought that “we might get none.”173 
t there is 
o exceptional political tension.”174 Any air attack would likely emerge from a 
what would happen in a nuclear war. This problem frequently appeared in intelligence 
fr
However, the JIC assessed in 1960 that they did “not expect an attack whils
n
deteriorating global political situation with a simultaneous attack on radar facilities 
throughout the Western world, which would be very hard for the Soviet Union to co-
ordinate due to their number and disposition.175 However, a special British 
government nuclear war study group assessed in 1960 that the UK “is peculiarly 
vulnerable to attack” and thought that the United Kingdom “will be one of the first 
countries to be knocked out.”176 However, they found it difficult to believe that the 
Soviet Union would completely annihilate the UK but instead would seek “to take the 
UK over as a going concern or at least one capable of being restarted, not as a 
radioactive desert.”177 In the event of a nuclear attack the Russians, they thought, 
were likely to “only deliver as many weapons as they considered necessary to cause 
the breakdown of the UK.”178 
  
 
These assessments at the end of the period under consideration show the difficulty of 















 assessments from 1949 to 1962. In 1949 JIC had considered a theoretical Soviet 
invasion of the UK in 1949-50 and concluded that “the effect of the air attack on the 
UK may be serious, it will not be crippling.”179 This of course assumed that the 
Russians did not have the atomic bomb. Once it became clear that the Soviet Union 
had obtained the atomic bomb the JIC examined situations where they might use it 
and concluded that “we have no intelligence on this subject.”180 The subject was also 
examined again by the JIC in 1952 and it concluded that by mid-1953 the USSR 
would have 105-175 atomic bombs which would “most probably” be of the Nagasaki 
type.181 At this time the JIC assessed that the Soviet Union’s Long-Range Air Force 
d three Air Armies with two of them based in western Russia.182 It thought that 
edium bombers posed the biggest threat to the UK and they were based from 




Moscow to Odessa. The possibility also existed that they could do “isolated attacks on 
the US” by “specially selected crews.”183 The JIC felt confident enough to say that 
Russia’s bombing capabilities were “not high by comparison with the West” and they 
doubted their ability to “carry out effective attacks at night and in bad weather.”184  
 
 
A further JIC paper in 1952, during the Korean War and with Stalin still in power, 
stated that the Soviet Air Force would seek to “neutralise the UK as rapidly as 
possible” and to “destroy bomber bases” in the country as well as preventing a “build-
up of US forces” in the UK.185 As the Russian Long-Range Air Force could not 
effectively attack the United States so the JIC thought that the “main Soviet strategic 
air effort would be directed against the UK.”186 Instead of invading the UK, the 
Soviet Union might seek to knock the country out by air bombardment. A JIC study in 
1951 estimated that the Russians had 500 Tu-4 bombers and could attack “anywhere 
in the UK from Belarus to Ukraine.”187 There was also the danger of Russian light 
















 London, bomber bases and centres of population and industry.188 It was further 
assessed that there could be 410 aircraft used in one raid and 73 sorties per day could 
e mounted at a sustained rate which would likely put a severe strain on the UK’s air 
efences.189  






By 1955 the JIC assessed that the UK was still at risk of air raids as a European and 
Commonwealth leader.190 As a bomber base and port for supplies supporting a 
European war the UK was of the “utmost importance as a target.”191 The JIC assessed 
that “the Soviet leaders would make an intensive effort to destroy the UK at the 
outset” of any hostilities.192 It admitted however that “we have no information on 
Soviet planning” and highlighted the problem that “planners might well catalogue 
targets in a different manner.”193 The JIC thought that a surprise attack could be 
mounted against Europe and the UK but not against the USA. It also thought that “the 
Soviet leaders have placed a priority requirement for the creation of an effective 
intercontinental bomber force.”194 The same paper also estimated that “by 1959 the 
Soviet stockpile of nuclear weapons is likely to be large enough to permit them to 




assess the Soviet Union’s intentions. In an earlier study it noted that Soviet security 
had “a high level of efficiency and we obtain little information directly revealing the 
policy and intentions of the Soviet leaders.”195 It also admitted that “we are unlikely 
to obtain adequate direct information of Soviet intentions from secret sources, 






















 target and lack of confirmation of the sparse data it obtained. In the JIC’s own words 
the standard of intelligence for use in a hot or cold war “is much too low.”197 In a 
study of the Soviet Air Force in 1953 the JIC admitted that “we have insufficient data 
on which to base an estimate of the operational capabilities of the Soviet heavy 
bomber and medium jet bomber which we believe are likely to come into service in 
1956 and 1954 respectively.”198  
 
 
Intelligence about detecting an incoming Soviet nuclear bomber attack was also seen 
as a problem by the JIC. It recognised in 1955, however, that “it is not easy to produce 
an H-bomb that can be transported in an aircraft” but that Russian developmental 
work would reduce its weight and complexity.199 The JIC thought that the Russians 
could not attack the UK using a hydrogen bomb dropped from an aircraft “before 
1958 from what we know now.”200 The Soviet Union would however be able to use 
atomic bombs in any attack which could devastate targets in the UK. It was thought 
probable that an actual Soviet bomber attack would only be detected once enemy 
aircraft appeared on allied radar screens.201 Any nuclear attack would likely be 
delivered by aircraft flying at high altitude and the UK would detect them at a range 
of 200 miles with a warning time of 20 minutes.202 However, if radars in northern 
Europe detected the aircraft then the UK could receive a one hour warning.203 There 
as a chance that the Russians might mount a low level attack and the UK could “get 




considered that “this technique is unlikely”204 presumably due to the large amounts of 
fuel low flying would consume thereby making a return journey to the USSR difficult 





















 In 1956 the JIC thought that despite Soviet nuclear missiles coming into service, “the 
main weight of an attack would still consist of manned bombers.”205 It assessed that 
the Soviet Air Force “could despatch bombers so as to catch by surprise targets in the 
UK.”206 However, the United States could only be attacked on “one way” missions 
and Russian bombers would have to deploy from the north and east of the Soviet 
Union. Any attack on the United States (which was likely to be done at night) would 
have to be co-ordinated so that Soviet aircraft penetrated all the radar chains 
simultaneously and the UK would be attacked in daylight.207 The JIC thought that if 
the efficiency of the Soviet bomber force improved and it was kept at a high state of 
readiness it should “be able to carry out at a few hours notice, large-scale attacks on 
all the UK and allied peripheral bomber bases.”208 It further thought that the Soviet 
Union viewed the UK as a target of “the utmost importance” and would seek to 
estroy it at the outset of a war.209 The Soviet medium bomber force which would 




Russia. However, before an attack it could deploy to 110 airfields which lay within 
750-1500 nautical miles from the UK.210  
 
 
British intelligence was aware that the Russians had been developing a low frequency 
navigational system, and at a distance of 1600 nautical miles it was accurate to 3 
nautical miles so it was good enough for nuclear targeting.211 However, the radars on 
the bombers remained an enigma as the JIC admitted that “we have little information 
on such equipment.”212 It judged it more likely that medium bombers would be used 
to attack the UK with the longer range bombers reserved for air attacks on North 
America.213 The initial air attack was likely to consist of 320 aircraft bombing the UK 

















 UK’s air defences.214 This was of course all speculative because no intelligence has 
been released, or likely even existed, concerning how the Russians planned to attack 
the UK.  
 
 
By 1960 the JIC thought that Russia’s electronics had advanced to the point that 
onclusion 
improve from the late-1950s likely because of imagery intelligence from secret U-2 
over-flights of the USSR becoming available. There was no apparent inflation of 
to produce estimates similar to those seen in the “bomber gap” period when 
 Air Force and aircraft industry sought to justify expanding budgets and high 
                   
Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) such as jamming would be employed extensively 
in any attack on the UK.215 This is likely to have come from GCHQ ELINT 
operations involving monitoring Russian electronic emissions. The JIC also noted by 
1961 that missiles would play a large and increasing part in a nuclear attack on the 
UK and “the Soviet government could probably allocate sufficient missiles to attack 
their planned targets in the UK without using aircraft.”216 It was thought “that they 
could still use aircraft to ensure the destruction of individual targets.”217 Soviet 
bombers could be used to penetrate UK radar cover some 30-60 minutes after missiles 
had impacted so it was assessed that there was still a role for Russian nuclear bombers 




In conclusion, British intelligence analysts faced an extremely difficult task in 
attempting to determine the threat from Soviet bombers, their numbers and how an 
attack might be implemented. The primary certainty was that the USSR could 
annihilate the UK in the event of a nuclear war. As the bomber was the only way to 
drop a nuclear bomb on the UK until the late 1950s, British assessment of this subject 
was of crucial national importance. The assessments about bomber production seem 












 levels of aircraft production. However, the UK’s nuclear deterrent was exclusively 
held by the RAF which was an established service rather than a fledgling organisation 
suffering inter-service attack like America’s Strategic Air Command.  
 
 
The JIC also recognised that the UK was very vulnerable to nuclear attack and it 
ould be possible for Soviet aircraft to bomb British cities as the Luftwaffe had done 
s could lead to 
ch an attack but a “bolt out of the blue” was considered unlikely. Britain was 
uilding a nuclear deterrent at this time to prevent such an eventuality (and as a matter 
This chapter highlighted the problems faced by British intelligence whilst trying to 
telligence on Russian airborne strategic weapons. Many books 
w
during the Second World War. The consequences would however be far more serious 
and the UK would struggle to protect itself. However, a Soviet nuclear attack on the 
UK was unlikely until it could destroy the United States in a pre-emptive nuclear 
strike. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s America’s arsenal of nuclear weapons, 
submarines, aircraft and missiles grew to such a formidable level that the Soviet 
Union could never hope to achieve a “nuclear Pearl Harbor.” Any Soviet military 
move against Europe or nuclear attack on the UK would likely result in American 
nuclear destruction of the Soviet Union and the underlying assumption by the JIC was 
that a war with the Soviet Union was unlikely. This did of course assume that 
Moscow’s leaders behaved in a sane and rational way. 
 
 
The JIC’s assessments of possible Soviet air attack options against the UK do seem 
reasonable but are speculative. There was the possibility that hostilitie
su
b
of national pride) but the UK’s striking power was marginal compared to that of the 
United States. The UK could be sheltered under America’s “nuclear umbrella” and it 
is interesting how the factor of the UK being safe from attack so long as the United 
States could not be successfully attacked features prominently in JIC papers. There is 
however the unstated possibility that once the United States could be attacked with 
Soviet nuclear weapons it could be reluctant to use its nuclear forces against the 
USSR so the ‘nuclear umbrella’ could not be guaranteed. 
 
 
collect and analyse in
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 draw attention to the paucity of intelligence available to the British government on 
Soviet nuclear weapons but this chapter demonstrates in detail the problems 
intelligence collectors and analysts faced. This material shows the very difficult 
orking environment these personnel had to operate in and their output has to be 
onsidered in this light. The sparse intelligence sources provided only limited insights 
clear bomber force. This of 
ourse did not provide data about capabilities, intentions or future plans.  
were thought to be vulnerable to attack whilst still on the ground. Advances in radar, 
w
c
into the workings and development of the Soviet Union’s strategic bombers and their 
weapons. It should be borne in mind that we cannot know what information SIS and 
GCHQ were providing to the British government on Soviet bombers at this time. It is 
however unlikely that this will be released in the near future, if ever. It is also unclear 
how intelligence influenced policy makers as political and economic factors play a 
major part in decision-making. German scientists clearly provided limited insights 
into certain equipment and programmes and British Air Attachés tried their best, 
through personal observation, to collect intelligence under the constraints of the most 
oppressive secret police security state at that time. It was only in the late 1950s when 
the U-2 over-flights commenced and more powerful radars were developed that a 




It was reasonably assessed by the British government that the Soviet Union had built 
up a competent nuclear bomber force by the end of 1962. The Soviet Union was 
considered by the JIC as unlikely to attack the UK until it had the capability of 
annihilating the United States in a pre-emptive attack, but that capability would not 
emerge for many years. An attack on the UK was therefore unlikely and the horrors 
explored by Strath and his committee thankfully never became a reality.  
 
 
Meanwhile the advent of Intercontinental and Medium Range Ballistic Missiles meant 
that Moscow had new and more effective ways of attacking the UK. Their 
development also made it likely that nuclear bombers, such as the UK’s V-Force, 
could be destroyed on the ground thereby undermining their value as a deterrent.  
Such systems also posed a threat to other missiles and heralded the demise of the 
UK’s Blue Streak Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile programme, whose missiles 
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 jet fighters and missiles had also made it unlikely that Second World War style 
armadas of bombers would be relied upon to penetrate hostile air space. A new threat 





 CHAPTER 2 – A BOLT FROM THE BLUE: BRITISH INTELLIGENCE 




This chapter examines the threat to the United Kingdom that British intelligence assessed as 
emanating from the Soviet Union’s ballistic missile force; primarily its Intermediate Range 
Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) and Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs). It also analyses 
the considerable problems encountered in collecting intelligence on this target between 1949 
and 1962. Towards the end of the Second World War the UK became the first country in 
history to be attacked with ballistic missiles. This new and terrifying weapon which the UK 
was incapable of intercepting and destroying was made even more potent by the advent of 
nuclear weapons. Ballistic missiles offered the potential for an enemy to deliver an 
undetected and devastating surprise attack from extreme range. With the advent of more 
powerful thermonuclear warheads in the 1950s, these innovations threatened to make the 




Both the Soviet Union and the United States adopted and developed ballistic missile 
technology acquired from Nazi Germany and it became a key component in the arms race. 
For the Soviet Union it offered an opportunity to compete evenly with the West as both sides 
regarded the ballistic missile as a novel technology with enormous developmental potential.  
It also allowed the Soviet leadership to demonstrate how far the Soviet Union had progressed 
after the Second World War, a conflict which showed that they did not have the power to 
strike at the heart of an enemy state except by using land forces. In the early Cold War years 
the West possessed a large nuclear bomber fleet but both sides had sparse missile resources 
so each started from the same technological point to develop their capabilities. Each had 
access to German technology and personnel, and with substantial resources devoted to 
missile projects, Soviet rocket advances would become a key intelligence target for the 
United Kingdom and the United States. The UK encountered similar intelligence collection 
problems against missiles to those it had faced with Soviet strategic bombers as discussed in 
Chapter One. The problem was made more urgent from the mid-1950s by the UK having a 
nuclear deterrent based on jet bombers which became increasingly vulnerable to missile 
attack. The UK was close to Soviet-occupied Eastern Europe, where ballistic missiles could 
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 be based, although the Soviets claimed to have no nuclear weapons deployed outside their 
territory. The UK also did not have a ballistic missile early warning radar until 1963, so the 
possibility of such a deployment fuelled the UK’s fear of potential vulnerability to a pre-
emptive nuclear attack. It is now known that the USSR deployed medium range ballistic 
missiles in the GDR for a short time in 1959 but soon withdrew them.218 
 
 
The UK had limited knowledge of ballistic missile technology at the end of the Second 
World War. Britain’s experience of such systems was as a victim of c.1115 German V-2 
ballistic missiles causing c.2855 fatalities; along with c. 6184 fatalities caused by the V-1 
“doodlebug” from 1944-45.219 The UK struggled to deal with the ballistic missile onslaught 
which fortunately only occurred towards the end of the war. These missiles could neither be 
intercepted nor tracked, their launches went undetected, and there was no way to provide 
early warning of attack. The only realistic defence was to locate and destroy launching and 
production facilities in occupied Europe and Germany. This was possible because such 
facilities were in France and Germany where the UK had some intelligence coverage and 
military assets could attack them. However, to repeat this in the Soviet Union, a country 
further away, and about which the UK knew little, would be extremely difficult. The Soviet 
Union was a closed, secret police state with rigid security surrounding its weapons 
programmes and posed a very difficult intelligence target so every collection opportunity had 
to be exploited. In 1959 for instance, the JIC discovered from a press report that a British 
firm was to build a textile factory at Dnepropetrovsk, Russia. This town housed a Soviet 




The West was also starting its own ballistic missile programmes so not only were both sides 
attempting to learn about each other, they were also trying to  build the weapon systems and 









 fiction.221 As with the atomic bomb, novel weapons technology using innovative scientific 
concepts would require new intelligence collection techniques, such as the interception and 
analysis of telemetry, satellite reconnaissance and a radical review of current intelligence 
sources and methods.222 Little has been written concerning the UK’s efforts to collect and 
analyse data on this topic. Some material on this issue is provided by Aldrich in his work on 
allied intelligence collection as well as Goodman in his study of British intelligence 
collection against the USSR’s nuclear bomb tests.223 These works do not examine the Soviet 
ballistic missile issue in depth nor explore some of the intelligence collection problems faced 
by the UK. Dylan provides the most comprehensive account of the ballistic missile 
intelligence issue from a UK perspective and does some exploration of intelligence collection 
problems but the focus of his analysis is on the history and work of the Joint Intelligence 
Bureau.224   
 
Ballistic Missile Intelligence Problems and the Early Cold War Years 
 
From 1949 to 1962, the Soviet Union’s long-range ballistic missile programme offered a 
unique challenge as an intelligence target. As Allen Dulles, the CIA Director observed, ‘In 
the first decade after the war we had only scant knowledge of Soviet missile progress. 
Drawing boards are silent, and short-range missiles make little commotion.’225 In the Second 
World War, the UK had been able to mount over-flights of hostile territory to examine 
suspected missile sites and production facilities, but in peacetime engaging in such activity 
over the Soviet Union would be a major challenge. During the war, there was also human 
intelligence available from resistance workers who helped build, or worked in, rocket 
facilities. In the early years after the war, there were no reconnaissance satellites, tracking 














 intelligence collection aircraft had not yet been designed.226 The West was still gearing up its 
intelligence collection towards the eastern bloc as the Cold War progressed. The Soviet 
Union was also a vast country in which it would be possible to conceal substantial military 
and industrial infrastructure without other states being aware of it. However, new techniques 
would be developed to intercept and interpret telemetry i.e. electronic data transmitted by 
experimental missiles in flight concerning their speed and performance. Special radars would 
also be designed, tested and constructed in friendly states to track missiles and monitor their 
performance when they were not transmitting data. These, and electronic intelligence 
facilities, were installed in obscure parts of the world to be in close proximity to their targets. 
The intelligence requirements also produced closer intelligence relationships between states, 
and the globalisation of allied intelligence collection, as the quest for vital intelligence 
gathered pace.227  
 
 
As discussed in Chapter One, the Soviet Union in 1949 was seen by the UK intelligence 
community as a sinister and enigmatic security state. It was a difficult place for intelligence 
agencies to operate and much of the testing of ballistic missiles (for reasons of safety and 
security) took place in remote areas of the USSR. The missile systems produced were only 
rarely seen and then only briefly in military parades. Whilst military aircraft would be flown 
from a factory or displayed in fly-pasts in Moscow, few of the missile systems were seen in 
public. If the missile system was not monitored in the experimental stage then it was highly 
unlikely that it would be seen at all before its deployment to secret, remote locations where it 
would be stored out of sight. Despite the technical intelligence innovations that occurred 
during the period, such as more powerful radars and the U-2 aircraft, there was still a role for 
the traditional human agent. However, the problems in collecting intelligence on Soviet 
nuclear bombers recurred with the ballistic missile target. Significantly from 1961 to 1962, 









 he appears to have been a unique case.228 The most important initial information on the 
Soviet ballistic missile programme once again came from German scientists. 
 
German Returnees and Ballistic Missile Intelligence 
 
A key source of intelligence concerning Soviet work on ballistic missiles in the early Cold 
War period was German scientists and engineers who had been taken to the Soviet Union 
after 1945. By the 1950s, many had returned to Germany and, as seen in the previous chapter, 
were then interviewed by western intelligence agencies under the DRAGON RETURN 
programme.229 German ballistic missile knowledge in the 1940s was epitomised by the V-2 
rocket, a system no other state then possessed or even planned. Any personnel who had 
worked on this programme were therefore highly desirable intelligence targets, but it appears 
that the Soviet Union did not acquire anyone of the stature of Professor Werner von Braun, 
who went on to be a key figure in the American space programme. It should also be noted, 
however, that the V-2 testing facility at Peenemunde on the Baltic coast of Germany and the 
underground German rocket factory at Nordhausen both lay inside Soviet-occupied East 
Germany. Both acquisitions undoubtedly assisted Russian developmental work on rockets.  
 
 
The USSR sought to move beyond simply having a V-2 rocket as an artillery system and 
worked towards a long-range system capable of attacking the UK and ultimately the United 
States. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, nuclear weapons were enormous devices, but over 
time they were miniaturised to be able to fit into the nosecone of a rocket. Importantly, 
although released Germans could provide some intelligence, for security reasons they had 
been compartmentalised by the Russians and kept away from purely Soviet developmental 
work. Additionally, by the time they were released back to Germany much of their 
information was out of date.230 The declassified files indicate that they worked on purely 
German projects for the Russians, such as solving technical and engineering problems, and 
had little knowledge of Russian domestic rocket programmes. However, this was apparently 








 nothing and was subject to a thorough study by Maddrell.231 Some material on Russia’s 
rocket programme was also publicly discussed in books by the German scientists as interest 
in this topic gathered pace in the 1950s.232 
 
 
In the late 1940s and early 1950s the UK and USA held a series of conferences on Soviet 
guided weapons attended by rocket scientists and intelligence experts. These sessions, 
designed to pool data and assessments as well as co-ordinating intelligence efforts, showed 
how close the relationship between the two countries had become in the intelligence field. 
This now extended to intelligence on guided weapons. The meetings revolved around 
information provided by German personnel in DRAGON RETURN and this data formed the 
core of what intelligence was available to the allies. There is no mention in the declassified 
files of other human intelligence, covert over-flights or electronic intelligence collection. 
Whether papers on these topics are retained or never existed remains unknown. What 
operations were running produced material with a short useful life and sources would 
eventually extinguish. The final report of the Joint Anglo-American Conference, held in 
March 1949, concludes that “our sources of information are waning” and “activity in the 
Soviet zone of Germany is almost at an end.”233 This likely reflects the fact that few Germans 
would have returned home from the east by this date as the Russians retained them to ensure 
that their knowledge would have less intelligence value if they were debriefed in the West. 
With few Germans present during missile tests and developmental work, this made it harder 
to collect intelligence. In the 1949 conference it was admitted that the value of the returning 
prisoners of war had “steadily declined” and the “meagreness of other sources becomes 
increasingly apparent.”234 The inadequacy of the intelligence available to the allies prompted 
thinking about future collection methods and the conference concluded that western 
intelligence needed “channels into the USSR.”235 They also thought that the Soviet Union 
wanted guided missiles as a matter of priority and would develop their own systems quickly 
to show the world that they could produce modern weapons.236 In 1949 western intelligence 











 the Soviet Union but they knew, likely from German returnees, that the German centre at 
Peenemunde on the Baltic coast had been stripped of equipment.237  
 
 
The Conference had established that some 300 German guided missile specialists had been 
deported to the USSR after the war with 100 of them located by intercepting post as it came 
to their families in the West.238 It was also noted that many of the German engineers and 
researchers were not full scientists but rather people who were involved with testing and 
experiments; collectively though, they had much experience.239 It was also thought that this 
group was not substantial enough to support a large missile development programme. The 
Conference concluded that the USSR was “substantially worse-off than the West” in terms of 
research facilities and really needed such equipment as wind-tunnels and early computers.240 
By interviewing Germans, western intelligence had established that the main missile proving 
ground in the USSR was in the lower-Volga area, near Stalingrad.241 This was useful 
knowledge because it identified an area that could be monitored by radio, radar and perhaps 
covert over-flights. This area was likely chosen because it was desert, near the Caspian Sea, 
sparsely populated and had industrial areas not too far away.242 However, the Conference 
could offer no method to determine how many ballistic missiles would be produced by the 
USSR over five years.243 This was a problem which would haunt western intelligence for 
many years. The Conference appears to have been a useful session for the allies because it 
provided valuable opinions from the Germans and an insight into Soviet exploitation of their 
knowledge. The impression is that allied knowledge was very broad but superficial. 
However, as the USSR’s rocket work was moving further east the Conference concluded that 














 A later Conference in April 1954 benefitted from more Germans having come back from the 
east and being interviewed by western intelligence.245 This gathering established that 
between 1945 and 1953, 150 German scientists had been employed by the Russians on 
ballistic missile work at Bleicherode in East Germany and then transferred to Russia.246 In 
the Soviet Union they were divided between a site called NII.88 at Podlipki some 18km 
north-east of Moscow and the rest were on an island at Gorodomlya some 250km north-west 
of Moscow.247 This again provided western intelligence departments with information on 
sites involved in the Russian rocket programme for further examination. Until 1950, the 
Germans were under the direction of a German named Helmut Groettrup and they were 
mainly involved with theoretical work and limited experiments.248 The impression gained by 
the Germans was that there was a native Russian rocket development programme underway 
concerning a missile named R-14. The Russians sought to improve a German V-2 rocket to 
ultimately carry a 3000kg warhead some 3000km.249 This requirement clearly showed 
Russian interest in long-range missiles and in 1947 the Germans had been brought to the 
secret Russian testing ground at Kapustin Yar to witness rocket tests; some 20 German V-2s 
were launched there.250 This again gave western intelligence some insights into a new 
Russian testing facility. Interestingly, the Russians kept the Germans solely on design work 
and the Germans in turn were keen to do as little as possible to minimise their value to the 
Russians so that they would be sent home to Germany as soon as possible.251 During their 
stay in Russia they met few Russians, rarely travelled and tended to be kept with other 
Germans.252 Ominously, one German source had reported that the Russians saw guided 
missiles as “a bringer of disaster to the capitalists.”253 
 
 
The DRAGON RETURN programme selected key people for further interview and Mr 















 According to his declassified file, he was able to provide additional information on the 
function of each member of staff in the missile programme, thereby identifying further 
personnel for future exploitation. He described the design of the Russian R-10 rocket which 
had a range of 910km and more advanced rockets up to the R-15 version.255 His debrief 
provided information on rocket trials, technical systems and facilities he had visited in the 
Soviet Union.256 Groettrupp also revealed information concerning Mr Korolev, the Chief 
Soviet Rocket Designer and his design bureau at NII.88, as well as lists of Russians in the 
missile team.257 This information could guide future targeting of intelligence assets. 
 
 
Further DRAGON RETURN reports indicated that the Germans “had been quite well treated 
in Russia” and, ironically, they had to sign a declaration before leaving that they would not 
disclose any information about their time in Russia.258 They were paid three to four times 
what Russian engineers received but resented being deported to Russia in October 1946 and 
detained there once the job was finished.259 Apparently the Germans limited themselves to 
their own work and sought no extra knowledge; otherwise there was a danger that the 
Russians would keep them for a longer period on the project.260 The Germans further noted 
the “water tightness of the organisation at all the establishments” and even other Russians did 
not know what went on in other sections.261 This ensured that western intelligence would 
only be able to glean limited information from the Germans and any potential Russian 
defectors would likely only have sparse knowledge of ballistic missile projects. 
 
 
By 1953 the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), in a study of Russian Research and 
Development, confidently stated that concerning Soviet ballistic missiles, “there is in 
existence a planned programme of native developmental work.”262 It thought that the 












 of German war-time projects.”263 By 1959 the JIC noted that all the Germans had departed 
from Russia’s guided missile programme and that “further major new intelligence from this 
type of source is unlikely.”264 The information British intelligence possessed was dated but it 




At this stage only human intelligence sources in Russia could provide really detailed or high-
level information on the Soviet ballistic missile programme. These appeared to be non-
existent because German returnees did not have access to this level of information.  As Dylan 
states, by the early 1950s the British did not have a good understanding of the Soviet Union’s 
missile programme or its intentions.266 This meant that the numbers, types, accuracy and rate 
of development of Soviet ballistic missiles could not be gauged, nor could Moscow’s 
intentions. The threat to the UK was therefore very difficult to assess with any accuracy. The 
substantial output of Soviet industry seen in World War Two however, indicated it’s 
potential. This lent urgency to acquiring intelligence as production rates of ballistic missiles 
increased in the USSR. The intelligence gap concerning ballistic missiles, however, could 
only be addressed through better intelligence sources to generate more data for analysis.  
 
A Russian Defector 
 
The first Soviet defector with real knowledge of its rocketry was apparently Colonel Grigori 
Tokaty-Tokaev (Codenamed EXCISE), who defected to the British from Berlin in the 
summer of 1948. He is described by Dorril as a “godsend” and “a genuine ideological 
defector” who switched sides after a crisis of conscience.267 He had worked on the Soviet 
State Commission on Missile Development as well as lecturing on jet engines and rocket 
technology at the Soviet Air Force Academy at Zhukovsky near Moscow.268 Tokaev had 
some knowledge about policy discussions and strategic rocket programmes from the middle 










 conjecture.”269 Some material provided by Tokaev has now been declassified and it appears 
that he was the last major defector with knowledge of rockets for many years.270 Maddrell 
points out that he may have exaggerated his role in Soviet rocketry and much of his 
information was hearsay; however, it appears to have been accurate and useful hearsay.271 
Even though he was a Soviet defector, much of his information came from his time serving in 
Germany rather than the Soviet Union and he appeared to have been exploiting his German 
wartime experiences and some of his information was unconfirmed. Being in Germany also 
meant that he had little idea about what was happening in the Soviet Union at the time when 
he defected.272  
 
 
Despite his shortcomings, he was likely the only Soviet human source the British had at this 
time so his information was of importance. His debriefs offer insights into Soviet rocketry, 
but Tokaev’s depth of knowledge appears to have been limited and no information was 
provided concerning future plans.273 He was however able to confirm that Soviet missile 
work only started when Germany was overrun and the Russians quickly realised the 
advanced nature of German armaments, thus prompting them to initiate a programme 
quickly.274 Soviet intention at the time was to develop an improved version of the German V-
2 rocket. However, he had no information on longer-range systems or of the resources 
available to the Soviet rocket programme. Tokaev was only able to provide information on 
Soviet rocket projects which used German technology, though this was a useful addition to 
material received from returning prisoners of war. This nonetheless provided a distorted and 
limited picture of Soviet work, but it was all that was available to the UK and the capabilities 
of the Soviet Union’s missile engineers were likely underestimated. After all, the Soviet 
Union subsequently proved able to design and launch its own ballistic missiles, build the first 














 Tokaev alerted the West that Stalin was interested in developing long-range missiles both as a 
high status, modern weapon and to counter superior western air power. He was also useful in 
providing scientific Order-of-Battle intelligence on areas of interest, such as data on a rocket 
research facility in Leningrad and the Kapustin Yar missile range. He had only overheard 
information about the missile range, but provided enough information for it to be located.275 
Tokaev also provided information on the shortcomings of the Soviet rocket programme, 
which lacked trained rocket scientists and equipment such as wind tunnels. He noted how the 
Soviet bureaucracy and high security regulations impeded scientists who expedited work so 
as to avoid being accused of sabotaging projects by slowing down progress.276 His case also 
highlighted to the British the value of scientific defectors, particularly if they had worked at 
the heart of Soviet science for many years and could be persuaded to remain as agents in 
place. Despite efforts being made, it appears though that no such sources existed in the 1950s. 
It should be remembered, however, that Soviet penetrations of British intelligence existed at 
this time. Kim Philby, a senior SIS officer responsible for anti-Soviet operations in SIS and 
later the liaison officer with the CIA in Washington, and George Blake, who betrayed SIS 
operations in the GDR and any other classified data he had access to, would likely ensure that 
if such sources existed they would have had a short lifespan.   
 
 
Although not mentioned in declassified files it emerged in a British newspaper article in 2001 
that a chance may have been lost for British intelligence to recruit another Soviet rocket 
source.277 In early 1950 a Russian named Alexander Orlov entered the British embassy in 
Moscow offering documents on Soviet rocketry including a report highlighting plans for the 
next 15 years. Within four days of the visit, and before any data were passed, he was arrested 
by the secret police and executed a year later according to Soviet secret police files 
mentioned by Warren. His recruitment as a junior member of a highly sensitive research 
centre could have been a great asset to the West. As Oleg Gordievsky, (KGB defector in the 










 Forties and Fifties, it was amazingly little. This would have been a great coup for Britain.”278 
The case, of which the British Foreign Office said it had no record, does not appear in any 
intelligence literature or memoirs. It clearly showed the dangers faced by human agents or 
would-be defectors in the Soviet Union and the pervasive nature of Russian surveillance at 
that time.  
 
Continuing Intelligence Collection Problems 
 
The problem of intelligence collection against Soviet ballistic missiles and Moscow’s 
intentions is a constant theme during the early Cold War. As early as 1949, after a Joint 
Anglo-American Guided Missile Conference, British intelligence concluded that collecting 
intelligence on ballistic missiles was as difficult as determining Soviet intentions. The final 
conference report said that “…short of obtaining access to the proceedings or directives of the 
Politburo, there is no infallible method of determining the aims of Soviet guided missile 
policy”.279 This was reinforced in 1958 in a statement by Major General Kenneth Strong, 
Head of the Joint Intelligence Bureau, examining how the Soviet Union would fight a war in 
the 1960s which concluded  “…there is scarcely any evidence as to how their leaders think or 
would act in given circumstances.”280 Lack of intelligence on high-level decision making was 
also reflected in the dearth of intelligence about Soviet rocket programmes, testing and 
deployments. In 1954 a study of Soviet guided weapons concluded that “information on the 
Russian native development of a ballistic rocket is scanty, but such a project is now known to 
exist.”281 Its progress and performance could however only be the subject of conjecture. The 
same report also admitted that there was a “complete lack of positive information on actual 
large-scale production of surface-to-surface missiles, including the ballistic rocket.”282 What 
form any project would take remained obscure but British intelligence assessed that the 
Russians did not lack the ability to undertake a rocket production and testing programme.283 
This seems slightly better than a previous British assessment from 1952 which concluded 












 course was to assume that a potential enemy could do at least as well as ourselves.”284 This 
seemed to run the risk of the UK “arms-racing” against herself prompted by the problem of 
“mirror imaging” raised in the introduction to this thesis. 
 
 
Technical solutions to the ballistic missile intelligence problem were being considered in 
1954. It was however, found that “Turkey offered little hope of obtaining ELINT information 
on Soviet rocket firings” because interception facilities needed to be closer to the ranges.285 
This would only likely be achieved by aircraft penetrating Russian airspace. The UK Ministry 
of Defence also considered that for ELINT, “the Baltic area might produce the best 
results.”286 It was also noted that GCHQ had a Guided Weapons COMINT programme and 
“they were putting a big effort into this intelligence field” and “had formed a team of ten 
people.”287 By 1957 the situation had improved, likely aided by the U-2 over-flight 
programme which started in 1956, and by developments in SIGINT.288 A JIC report in 1957 
noted that “intelligence independent of German sources continues to increase rapidly” and “a 
large part of the current offensive guided weapons programme is known.”289 It is unclear 
though how this was achieved and what the JIC thought it knew. The JIC did however admit 
that “we do not know the location of all major research and development establishments.”290  
 
 
Interestingly, an intelligence report from 1959 stated that British intelligence could monitor 
static rocket engine test firings which had been “heard since 1953” at Kaliningrad near 
Moscow.291 It had logged 116 firings and there had been “continuous cover” between March-
October 1958 of firings of 40, 120 and 180 seconds. These engine firings “have been 
recorded” but it is unclear if this was done by equipment located nearby, a seismic 














 this facility.292 Such declassified details make it highly likely that much more detail of 
obscure technical intelligence collection operations remains to be released from archives. 
Aldrich notes that the allies used powerful “Over the Horizon” radars codenamed SANDRA 
and ZINNIA. The former was a British system and was based in Cyprus to monitor Russian 
missile tests from 1961.293 During research in The National Archives, I gathered more 
information on this highly-sensitive operation which does not feature in any other literature. 
 
A Special British Project 
 
The British had been experimenting with long-range high frequency radar since 1955 and had 
managed to detect aircraft at ranges of 1000nm.294 From October 1959 until January 1960, 
experimental ZINNIA radar was used in the US under Project BART to track American 
missile launches at Cape Canaveral, Florida from a site in the American north-east.295 This 
was undertaken because the UK did not launch ballistic missiles and a “live” target was 
needed to develop the ZINNIA technology to monitor Soviet missile tests. This novel and 
highly-secret technology, which involved bouncing high-frequency radio signals off the 
ionosphere, offered the potential to see beyond the horizon and monitor targets at extreme 
range. During Project BART the radar was able to detect a Boeing 707 aircraft at ranges of 
1400km and 2300km and ballistic missiles to a range of 1800km.296 ZINNIA technology was 
again developed with the help of the Americans and help and guidance was provided by the 
CIA. Another secret radar system codenamed CHAPLAIN was also developed as a missile 
detection system by the Americans with British participation. Experiments using the system 
were undertaken from Horsea Island, UK and Somerton, UK in 1959 to establish if it could 
monitor activity at Russian missile ranges from a base in the UK.297 A trial was also mounted 
from Slough, UK to aim a radio beam at the Russian missile testing facilities at Tyuratam and 
Kapustin Yar to gather data for when CHAPLAIN deployed operationally.298 The results of 
these secret endeavours are unknown but American personnel visited the Royal Aircraft 












 “yielding limited results.”299 Collaboration on these top secret projects demonstrates the close 
relationship between the two states on missile intelligence. British personnel noted that “our 
modest programme is held in high esteem” and the Chief of the Defence Staff was briefed 
that the “Americans have made information on CHAPLAIN freely available to us only 
because of our own successes with ZINNIA.”300 
 
 
British development of ZINNIA was driven by Air Intelligence’s assessment that there would 
be a serious threat to the UK from Soviet Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles with 2-3 
years.301 The Ballistic Missile Early Warning Station at Fylingdales in the UK was not due to 
enter service until 1963 and the two other stations in the system in Greenland and Alaska did 
not have the range to detect shorter range missile launches against the UK. The ZINNIA 
system could offer a limited basic early warning system to close this temporary vulnerability 
and in an emergency could monitor some Soviet missile sites.302 A version of ZINNIA called 
ZINNIA 2 could detect a disturbance in the ionosphere caused by the passage of a ballistic 
missile and this capability could be exploited for early warning purposes as well as 
intelligence collection.303 ZINNIA 1 was designed by the UK to detect and track aircraft and 
ZINNIA 3 was to track ballistic missiles.304  
 
 
The ZINNIA system was a useful covert capability for aircraft and missile intelligence. It 
used a “continuous wave” of high frequency radio energy directed towards a target area. The 
continuous nature of its signal, rather than regular pulses emitted by conventional radar, was 
designed to obscure its purpose. Using longer range high frequency signals meant that the 
Doppler shift of the returning signal could be examined when the signal was reflected off a 
moving target.305 CHAPLAIN was a similar American system which was used to monitor 
Soviet missile launches and nuclear explosions and the UK used a version of this as well.306 












 developed; events could be picked up 2-3,000 miles away during experiments but their nature 
was unclear.307 By 1960 the RAF wanted funding to urgently deploy a ZINNIA system to 
Cyprus to monitor Soviet missile and aircraft activity. The transmitter was based at Akrotiri 
and the receiver at Pergamos, both in Cyprus. This meant that a justification for it had to be 
prepared and details of the system articulated which have now been declassified. The RAF 
facility was assigned the codename SANDRA and was an operational version of ZINNIA 
3.308 The high frequency transmitter would reflect signals from the surface of fast-moving 
objects at a distance of 1200 miles and it was described as “invaluable to confirm 
information.”309 This could refer to material gathered from electronic intelligence collection 
or other radar sources. The data gathered could reveal the nature of missile firings, their 
frequency and state of development. Tests with SANDRA were reported to be “very 
satisfactory” and the transmitter was “very difficult to detect in use.”310 The British used a 
clever and covert method of aiming the radio beam to bounce on either side of a target and 
some distance away from it so that the USSR would not know that its bases were being 
targeted. When ZINNIA was tested in the US against the Atlantic Missile Test Range, the 
American missile firers had not known that they were being monitored so its covert nature 
was proven.311 The Americans used a pulse radar system and were content to allow the 
British to develop their ‘silent’ system.  
 
 
The Treasury allocated one million pounds to build the facility in Cyprus and the project was 
deemed a success as it allowed disparate data to be fused together, although its nature has not 
been revealed.312 SANDRA was also built because British intelligence thought that 
intelligence “collateral would diminish greatly” over the next couple of years.313 It is not 
clear what this finite collateral material was, whether radar or signals intelligence or even 
material from Colonel Oleg Penkovsky who is discussed in Chapter Four. SANDRA was also 
useful in providing data on the intensity of missile firings which could show whether a 












 that SANDRA could monitor known missile testing facilities and firings being undertaken in 
a particular direction but would not be much use for providing early warning to monitor 
missiles launched from unknown launching bases in the USSR or mobile systems. The 
SANDRA system apparently continued to be used until the 1970s. The CIA’s history of its 
Office of Special Activities also reveals that the special long-range “back-scatter” radar 
system called CHAPLAIN was deployed and operated near Karachi, Pakistan in 1960.314 
This was used to monitor Soviet missile launches covertly with unknown success as much of 
the document is redacted. It is likely that data from this facility would have been shared with 
the UK just as the Americans would have benefitted from SANDRA. Many documents on 
these projects are withheld or redacted and much material is likely still to be released. 
Sensitivity still remains likely because Cyprus is to this day a major intelligence collection 
facility for the UK. 
 
 
In 2014 information was also made public about the secret role of the radio telescope at 
Jodrell Bank in the UK during the Cold War following the death of its founder Sir Bernard 
Lovell and the release of his papers.315 An operation codenamed CHANGLIN (previously 
LOTHARIO and VERIFY) was run from Jodrell Bank in the early 1960s which involved 
Fighter Command installing equipment to use the telescope to transmit radar signals and 
provide warning of a Soviet nuclear attack. It emerged that even before the Cuban Missile 
Crisis the RAF had sent personnel and equipment to the facility every six weeks to undertake 
training and make radar scope observations.316 In an emergency, RAF personnel would have 
been stationed there permanently. Interestingly, many papers have been removed from the 
file and are retained for decades so establishing Jodrell Bank’s exact role in any intelligence 
collection role is not yet possible. It is likely though that this unique facility was used in a 
collection role against Soviet space and missile launches. A memorandum is on the 
declassified file, sent from the Air Ministry to GCHQ in 1962 which mentions “GCHQ 
experimental equipment” being in the operations building.317 It is possible that GCHQ were 
using the telescope to collect radio signals which were bouncing off the surface of the moon 









 engaged in other esoteric intelligence collection activities using Jodrell Bank’s new 
technology.   
 
The Templer Report – Missile Intelligence 
 
British intelligence had difficulty establishing how many ballistic missiles the USSR had 
produced and deployed. In 1958 an intelligence report stated that “there has been no evidence 
which confirms that there are missile sites in the Soviet Union.”318 This did not of course 
prove that they did not exist but highlights the severe intelligence problems faced by British 
intelligence in locating and identifying Russian ballistic missiles. An overview of the 
problems posed by this issue became apparent in the Templer report of 1960 which examined 
the UK’s military intelligence organisation and explored whether the process of intelligence 
assessment should be centralised.319 
 
 
The review conducted in 1960 by Field Marshal Sir Gerald Templer, Chief of the Imperial 
General Staff, was the first study that considered, in part, intelligence collection against 
ballistic missiles. It also examined the general organisation of intelligence collection and 
analysis within Britain’s armed forces. Templer noted that “scientific and technical 
intelligence is increasing in importance both on account of the nature of modern weapons and 
because our intelligence about those held by our potential enemies is largely obtained through 
scientific means.”320 This insightful comment from a leading figure in the British military 
showed how dependant the UK had become on scientific and technical intelligence and the 
recognition of its importance by decision-makers. He further commented that “the assessment 
of the long-range missile threat poses the issue in its acutest form at present.”321 This 
demonstrated the urgency of the problem and the security implications if intelligence could 












 The Templer report generated controversy within the intelligence community because it 
questioned the best way to assess intelligence on ballistic missiles. The Joint Intelligence 
Committee had the Guided Weapons (Scientific and Technical) Working Party, the 
Electronics (JIC sub-Committee) Working Party and the Guided Weapons (Orbat and 
Production) Working Party all reporting to it on ballistic missiles. Templer noted that the 
Joint Intelligence Bureau liked a “group” estimate due to the complexity of the issues and 
also having several parties of experts reporting to it.322 He further found that the Air Ministry 
did not favour a group estimate and regarded themselves as the experts on missile intelligence 
as they “owned” the UK’s air weapons systems.323 The report became more controversial 
when Templer said that “no air force can be expected dispassionately to assess the effect of 
rockets on their very raison d’etre.”324 This comment by an army officer about the Royal Air 
Force implies that the Royal Air Force would underestimate the Soviet missile threat in order 
to prolong the life of its bomber squadrons. This was regarded by staff in the Air Ministry as 
a slur and was totally rejected. As the Chief of the Air Staff’s office noted, “it cannot be 
argued that the RAF feel that the advent of missiles will spell the end of its career.”325 They 
also noted that the process of examining intelligence issues in the Joint Intelligence 
Committee would “expose any bias to challenge.”326 The Air Ministry was not happy with 
the Templer Report and thought that it “treats the problem of missile intelligence somewhat 
superficially.”327 Instead of examining the best approach to ballistic missile intelligence, the 
major participants seem to have spent more time complaining about the content of the report 
and trying to protect their reputations and the needs of their respective services.  
 
 
Correspondence generated by the Templer Report provides insights into the problem of 
ballistic missile intelligence at that time. The Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) noted that the 
main sources of intelligence on Soviet ballistic missiles were “GCHQ, radio-proving flights, 
air photographs, MI6, Air Attachés and Service Technical Intelligence.”328 These were likely 
to have been the same sources that existed from 1949 onwards. However, the validity of this 











 The National Archives but the issue of aerial reconnaissance is dealt with in Chapter Three. 
The issue of SIS’s success in recruiting Colonel Oleg Penkovsky as a human source in 
Moscow is also examined in Chapter Four. CDS thought that the main ingredient in threat 
assessment was “the application to the intelligence of up-to-date professional military “know-
how” and concept.”329 This assumed of course that the data being examined was accurate and 
enough of it was available to make deductions about the target. It should be noted that the UK 
did have some experience with ballistic missiles from developmental work on its own Blue 
Streak ballistic missile system and managing the deployment of American-supplied Thor 
ballistic missiles to the UK from 1959 until 1963. Scientists and engineers dealing with these 
issues would likely have been able to help with British government intelligence analysis.  
 
 
The Joint Intelligence Bureau, after the Templer Report, seemed content with leaving ballistic 
missile intelligence arrangements as they were. They noted that “the bulk of the intelligence 
on Soviet scientific research and development on missiles comes from GCHQ intercepts 
which is processed by Air Intelligence (Tech) and in the past from air reconnaissance (U-
2).330 The loss of the U-2 on 1 May 1960 appears to have terminated this source and showed 
the close relationship between the intelligence services of the two countries. It is also 
unknown whether the GCHQ intercepts were of telemetry, speech communications or 
decoded communications. This reveals the major intelligence sources at this time and Joint 
Intelligence Bureau thought that assessment and analysis were best done by “RAF experts 
liaising with the missile industry.”331 It further noted that “nearly all the intelligence we get is 
on technical development trials and training firings” and precise intelligence was not 
available with any assessments being the product of “opinion, experience and judgement.”332  
 
The Danger of Ballistic Missile Attack and Improvements in Technical Intelligence 
 
By 1958 the JIC had concluded that the Soviet ballistic missile programme was advancing 








 proof that any weapon is in service.”333 This showed the difficulty of detecting if and how 
many missiles existed and where they were based. Any intelligence seemingly had to be 
collected during the research and development phase because collecting intelligence as a 
missile passed through the industrial production phase and later into military service was too 
difficult to achieve through remote observation. This was a serious issue because a later 
report noted that Soviet ballistic missiles featured on the JIC’s “Red List” for the highest 
priority of intelligence targets. The key intelligence requirement was on “bringing to an 
increased state of readiness the strategic missile units in the USSR or in Soviet-controlled 
territory.”334 This would be difficult to achieve as the UK did not know how many missiles 
the Soviet Union had, if they were deployed or where they were based. In 1958 the JIC 
continued to take the view that the defeat of the UK would be a top Soviet military priority 




The JIC further assessed that Russia’s priority was the security of the USSR and to destroy 
the UK’s nuclear bases (aircraft and missiles), the air defence system and the Centre of 
government. Ballistic missiles had a key role to play in this and the JIC thought that the 
USSR would likely mount an “all out air and missile attack on the UK’s will to fight and war 
potential.”336 However, the JIC could not estimate the number of ballistic missiles the Soviet 
Union might use in an attack on the UK; they assessed that it was likely to simply supplement 
an air attack.337 It assessed that by 1961 the USSR was likely to have an IRBM with a one 
megaton warhead and “the scale of ballistic missile attacks might be considerable.”338 The 
danger of attack also included the limited warning time the UK might receive of a Soviet 
ballistic missile attack. A JIC report from 1958 had assessed that if the Soviet Union placed 
650 mile range ballistic missiles in East Germany then the UK might get 24 hours notice that 


















 matched with a nuclear warhead and then deployed to a firing site. The weapon would then 
have to be fuelled with liquid fuel after orders had been given to undertake these actions. 
Monitoring communications or human intelligence would be the most likely means of 
detecting such a ballistic missile deployment. In the event of a ballistic missile actually being 
fired from East Germany there would be less than ten minutes warning of attack. This 
warning would likely have come from radars on the continent.340 The JIC thought that an 
attack would be timed to hit the UK in the early hours of the morning and would likely be in 
April to October so that Soviet air defences would be operating in favourable weather.341 The 
USSR might also have attacked over a holiday period or the weekend when alertness in the 
UK would be at a lower level.342  
 
 
However, the British military did seem optimistic about dealing with an attack by Soviet 
 1958 the Chief of the Defence Staff stated that “today the threat is solely from manned 
                   
nuclear bombers. The Chief of the Defence Staff wrote to the Chief of the Air Staff to 
comment “that the Soviets should feel compelled to face the problems of developing and 
deploying ballistic missiles against the UK is in itself a tribute to the value of our fighter 
defence.”343 It also reflected the fact that advanced technology was being developed by the 
USSR against which the UK could not defend itself and would have very limited warning in 
the event of a missile launch. This also posed a threat to the UK’s bomber-based nuclear 
deterrent because there would be several hours warning of a Soviet bomber attack but likely 
none if ballistic missiles were used. The shorter range ballistic missiles were also the prelude 
to longer-range systems designed to strike the United States. The development and 




bombers”344 but this was a threat the UK was aware of whereas intelligence on Soviet 
ballistic missiles remained limited thereby making its assessment difficult. A JIC memo 









 industrial capacity to manufacture whatever quantity of missiles they may need.”345 
However, there was no evidence of the intentions for their missiles’ use, their production 
rates, locations or the existence of units.346 The JIC concluded that the USSR could develop a 
“complete family of missiles” to take “advantage of complete surprise” in order to destroy the 
West’s retaliatory capacity.347 This was a sombre assessment that the Soviet Union could 
build and deploy systems with the UK having very limited knowledge of them. However, it 
thought that the USSR would be unable to destroy all western retaliatory capacity due to 




By 1959 more intensive technical efforts had been made to collect intelligence on Russian 
                   
ballistic missiles and their testing facilities were being monitored either by radar or SIGINT 
collection.349 During my research I discovered a United States Air Force intelligence briefing 
film which described its intelligence collection methods in 1960.350 This brief states that the 
United States used unspecified low technology capabilities to monitor Soviet missile tests 
before 1955 but in that year it installed powerful AN/FPS-17 radar at Diyabakir in south-
eastern Turkey as well as new ELINT equipment to monitor Soviet ballistic missile tests. In 
1958 the brief states that the radar was upgraded to increase its range from 1000nm to 
2000nm using extra beams to cover the Kapustin Yar missile range. The film states that 
generally all missile firings beyond 600nm range could be monitored. The USAF then added 
powerful radar at Shemya Island in the Aleutian group from February 1959 to monitor ICBM 
and space launches from Tyuratam. The brief revealed that since January 1960 “several 
hundred” missile firings had been made from both locations at various ranges to test 
equipment. Tyuratam was said to have been discovered in “early 1957” and although 
unstated, this was likely to have been through a U-2 over-flight. No ELINT coverage of 
Tyuratam was available until late 1957 but then good coverage was made available of missile 












 also available on any tests made after January 1958 and 21 ICBM tests had been monitored 
revealing problems with re-entry vehicles and components. The Americans assessed that the 
USSR would use experience with shorter-range missile systems to feed into the ICBM 
programme and then make advances. This data was highly likely shared with the UK. 
 
 
The JIC noted in 1959 that the Russians had launched 350 ballistic missiles with ranges of up 
he JIC explored the possibility of the Soviet Union possessing mobile nuclear missile 
systems and thought that missiles with a range of 650 nautical miles could be “securely based 
                   
to 1000 miles and achieved vertical firings of up to 250 miles.351 It noted that “a large 
number of telemetry intercepts had been made” and some data had been intercepted “during 
the motor cut-off phase” indicating that SIGINT was used to collect the intelligence and 
records had been built up which were being interpreted.352 The JIC did not have “reliable 
evidence of surface-to-surface Guided Weapon operational sites.”353 They did however 
assess that ballistic missiles with a range of 700 miles “are, or could be, operational now” and 
noted that in the 1957 Moscow military parade a Russian missile with the NATO codename 
SS-3 SHYSTER was seen and “may have been launched to 650 nautical miles.”354 This 
shows that visual observation by personnel was still important and this material was then 
collated with data from other intelligence sources. The JIC noted that “the appearance of 
rockets on the 7 November parade indicated that some guided weapons now have operational 
status.”355 It also noted that the Russians may have been matching nuclear weapons and 
ballistic missiles as there was a “single indication of surface-to-surface missiles and nuclear 
tests in 1956.”356 By 1955 the USSR had a usable hydrogen bomb but there are no reports 
available concerning British assessments of the possibility or impact of these weapons being 
fitted to ballistic missiles.357 It is unclear how long it took the Russians to reduce the size of a 
thermonuclear weapon to be fitted into the nose-cone of a rocket or if they used atomic 














 in the USSR and moved to previously surveyed launch points in the satellite countries with 
little or no warning.”358 Such a move would make the UK vulnerable to pre-emptive attack. It 
noted that in September 1959 a “reliable source” had observed a Soviet military train at 
Frankfurt/Oder carrying eight long trailers. The agent had photographed these trailers and 
they were assessed as being the same as those carrying SHYSTER ballistic missiles at the 
November 1957 Moscow military parade.359 It is unclear who this “reliable source” was, but 
it appears that either British or allied intelligence services were able to maintain surveillance 
on railway lines either using human sources working on the railways or living in close 
proximity to major transit points.  
 
 
The JIC noted that there had been earlier reports of trailers used for Soviet missiles being 
en in East Germany on another train but there were no reliable pictures of ballistic missiles 
he prospect of an attack at short-notice was viewed seriously by British intelligence. The 
C noted that “we have virtually no chance of intercepting either the policy decision to go to 
se
in East Germany.360 British intelligence was also likely relying on the British Military 
Mission to East Germany (BRIXMIS) to gather some intelligence. The JIC noted that “82 
special wagons” and liquid oxygen wagons had been noted in 1959 and photographs taken in 
the “Zossen Training Area” which could indicate the presence of ballistic missiles.361 They 
calculated that there was enough liquid oxygen present to operate 100 SHYSTER missiles 
and thought that this system was available in “considerable numbers”, possibly 700-800 
depending on the warhead size and weight.362 The presence of trailers and movement of other 
equipment associated with the 650 nautical mile range SHYSTER missile led the JIC to 
conclude that “there are indicators of an intention to equip the Group of Soviet Forces 




















 radars could provide about 90 minutes warning against bombers; but none against 
missiles.”365 A 650 nautical mile range missile could easily hit the UK from East Germany 
and it could be semi-mobile. The JIC thought that deploying this system by road or rail would 
be hard to conceal (perhaps due to agent coverage) but movement by air would be difficult 
for the UK to detect.366 It also admitted that it did not know the “firing requirements” of the 
missile i.e. the facilities needed and preparatory work required before launch, although they 
estimated some 24 hours was required before it could be fired.367 It was also feared that if the 
USSR forward-based ballistic missiles in East Germany then the systems could merge into 
normal Soviet activity and “battle deployment would become harder to detect.”368 An 
increase in their alert state or preparations for a pre-emptive strike would likely remain 
undetected. The JIC also noted that if long-range ballistic missiles remained based in the 
USSR then the UK was “unlikely to obtain warning of Soviet preparations to launch an attack 
with these weapons.”369  
 
 
In 1959 the UK Chiefs of Staff also noted that the Russians’ “missile programme seemed to 
use bombers against the UK unopposed.374   
   
be going well”370 and Soviet forces had been training on missiles with a range of 650 nautical 
miles for two years. Some analysts assessed that the ballistic missile threat “would equal or 
exceed” the manned bomber threat in 1960-61 and that the missile threat would dominate by 
1964-65.371 However, other analysts thought that missiles would gradually become more 
important over a longer period of time and “it was accepted that we could not defend the 
UK.”372 The priority was to become the defence of the UK’s deterrent bases using surface-to-
air missiles or the nuclear deterrent would have no credibility. Rather than defend the 
population, the UK’s nuclear weapons would be defended instead in order to stop the USSR 
from attacking the country in the first place.373 The Chiefs of Staff thought that by 1965 the 















 From 1960 onwards the JIC still continued to pay close attention to Soviet ballistic missiles. 
They assessed that “the Soviet Union is unlikely to start a global war as a deliberate act of 
he JIC also noted the formation of the new military command controlling the Soviet 
trategic Rocket Forces on 7 May 1960. It found that “the responsibilities of the Command 
fissile material to make warheads was unknown therefore making it hard to determine how 
                   
policy” but rather the danger lay in “political miscalculation between the Soviet Union and 
the West” or “incorrect appreciation by one side that an attack had been launched by the 
other.”375 The JIC thought that if a war did start then the USSR would seek to “neutralise the 
UK and to occupy Europe.”376 They further assessed that by 1963 the USSR would have 
sufficient missiles to attack targets in the UK without the use of aircraft although it was likely 
that they would still be used and “bombers would arrive 30-60 minutes after the initial 
missile attack.”377 There was clearly still a role for bombers although the JIC thought that 
submarine-launched ballistic missiles would not be used against the UK but instead would be 
saved for attacks on North America.378 Only very limited information was available on 
Russia’s submarine-based nuclear weapon systems and little information has been 





are not yet clear” although intelligence had picked up that “missile insignia of several types 
have been seen worn by both ground and air force troops.”379 The importance of ballistic 
missiles was shown by the Commander of the new force being made a deputy Defence 
Minister. It was during 1960 that the JIC first observed “the testing of a 2000 nautical mile 
ballistic missile has begun and has provided the first evidence of an IRBM development.”380 
This important milestone would enable long-range rocket attacks to be made on the UK from 
inside Soviet territory. However, the JIC also had to admit in 1961 that “it is not possible to 
give a detailed estimate of numbers, types and yields of warheads in the Soviet stockpile.”381 
Although it knew that progress with ballistic missiles was being made, there was little idea of 
















By 1962 intelligence appeared to have improved on Soviet ballistic missiles and this likely 
flects data provided by Colonel Oleg Penkovsky and early spy satellites. The JIC was able 
 assess that in a nuclear attack on the UK, a 1000 nautical mile range missile was likely to 
oncluded that “it has now become 
ossible to estimate the Soviet missile threat with some confidence, at least up to the end of 




be used and of 200 available launch pads “at least 100 are likely to be targeted against the 
UK.”383 The knowledge of how many launch pads were available to the Russians suggests 
that they had been seen and the JIC estimated that 350 launch pads would be available for 
IRBMs and MRBMs and this number was likely to increase.384 It continued to assess that the 
Russians would seek to destroy bomber and missile bases in a surprise attack and as their 
missiles were inaccurate they would use high-yield warheads in the megaton range.385 The 
JIC now thought that the Russians had enough missiles to allocate one to each target in the 
UK and thermonuclear warheads were fitted to them.386  
 
 
Looking ahead to 1966, the JIC in a report from 1962 c
p
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gathered by satellites or be the product of the Soviet intelligence insider Colonel Oleg 
Penkovsky. The JIC assessed that the Russians had 280-310 IRBM/MRBMs and this estimate 
agreed with that of the United States likely because they were working off the same basic 
data generated by Penkovsky and satellite collection.388 This threat assessment was drawn up 
using information about the probable extent of missile site construction, although it was 















 that Soviet IRBM and MRBMs posed a “very severe threat” to Western Europe’s capacity to 
wage war.390  
 
The Soviet ICBM, Space and Khrushchev’s Statements 
here are few mentions of Soviet ICBMs in JIC papers during the period under examination. 




The UK’s main concern was likely the Soviet programme to develop IRBMs and MRBMs 
because they posed the greatest threat to Britain. These systems were also of interest to the 
United States as well because they would provide the developmental work which would 
contribute to the ICBM programme. Shorter-range ballistic missiles also posed a threat to 
Strategic Air Command (SAC) bases in Europe and Asia. Crucially, by building the ICBM, 
for the first time, a foreign power would have the means to strike deep into American 




felt an increasing sense of vulnerability and an impression was emerging that they were 
falling behind the Soviet Union in terms of science and technology.  This feeling was made 
worse by statements from Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev boasting in public about the 
number and quality of nuclear missiles the Soviet Union possessed. This was the era of the 
“missile gap” as the United States’ intelligence departments and the armed forces inflated 
their estimates of the size of the Soviet Union’s nuclear missile arsenal. Britain did not 
develop a missile gap ‘mentality’ and its intelligence assessments did not seem to be heavily 
influenced by bureaucratic interests and the needs of the military or industry.391 However, 
Russian possession of ICBMs did raise the question about whether the United States would 
use its nuclear weapons in defence of Europe if it risked nuclear annihilation in response? 
This perhaps increased the case for an independent British nuclear deterrent but this 









 British intelligence found that, as with shorter-range missile systems, ICBMs were being 
he JIC further assessed that the ICBM programme was being run alongside the Soviet Space 
                   
developed in remote areas which were difficult to monitor. Again, there were serious 
intelligence collection problems against this target. As far back as 1956 the JIC had assessed 
that the Soviet Union could have completed flight trials on an ICBM that could reach the 
United States in 1960/61.392 In 1957 the JIC noted that two missile firings had occurred from 
the Kapustin Yar missile range in August and September 1957 which were “believed to be 
the start of the ICBM programme.”393 This intelligence came from SIGINT collection 
directed at the missiles’ telemetry, with the interception being done against two systems 
carrying data on channels discovered by western intelligence. ICBMs needed new collection 
and analytical techniques which were then being developed. The JIC noted that “the 
information these (channels) contain has not yet been fully interpreted” so it took many 




programme and had to compete with it for resources. It had “most important intelligence” 
that the “ICBM programme was being slowed up to give priority to space vehicles.”395 It is 
unclear what this source was but it suggested that the space programme was favoured for its 
propaganda value rather than the USSR pressing ahead urgently with the development of 
ICBMs. This assessment conflicted with press reports that appeared in the Soviet Union at 
that time that Russia possessed, and was producing, missiles with a range of 8000 nautical 
miles. Concerning these missiles, the JIC concluded that “our evidence, of which we are 
confident, does not confirm this.”396 It is interesting, as Dylan notes, that the JIC examined 
open source material from academic literature and government sources to glean intelligence 
about Soviet missile programmes.397 In 1959 the JIC assessed that the Russian ICBM did 
have a propulsion system which, in theory, would allow a satellite to be launched and could 
carry a 5000lb nose-cone to a range of 5000 nautical miles.398 British intelligence also knew 











 detached from the missile and carried the warhead to the target.399 It is unclear how this was 
known but it was likely through the analysis of telemetry by GCHQ and the JIC does not 
specify intelligence sources. This failing was a serious issue because without a terminal phase 
delivery system the ICBM would be useless. The JIC further assessed in 1959 that the Soviet 
Union could have a 3500 nautical mile range ballistic missile available in 1961-63 and it was 
likely to have a 1 megaton warhead and be able to land within 3-5 nautical miles of a target at 
that range.400 It thought that such a system could be deployed as a limited “political” threat as 
early as 1959.401 This deployment would enable a message to be sent to the United States that 
the USSR could hit targets there with impunity. There was no evidence however, of large 
scale production and deployment of ICBMs in the USSR, nor any indication of a covert 
build-up for a pre-emptive first strike. 
 
 
By 1960 more data from unspecified sources had become available to the JIC. British 
intelligence concluded that ICBMs with a range of 3500 nautical miles “are in an advanced 
state of development” and “may be in limited series production.”402 There was no Order of 
Battle information available but the JIC assessed that ICBMs could be operational in 1961-
62, although they shared the American view that a few currently available developmental 
missiles could be fired using range crew.403 In terms of quality, the JIC thought that “all the 
types of missile can carry nuclear warheads, and all types are at least as reliable and accurate 
as similar types being developed in the West.”404 British intelligence had noted several ICBM 
firings since 1957 to a maximum range of 3500 nautical miles.405 The JIC estimated that the 
system might be operational by 1961 and even “hundreds” might be available by 1962.406 It 
stated that the American view was that by the end of 1960 ten ICBM prototypes might be 
available for firing.407 Importantly, the JIC admitted that it was still unknown if the nose-














 actually available for use or still bogged down in developmental problems.408 When 
deployed, the JIC estimated that the Russian ICBM under development would have a 3500-
5000 nautical mile range and was fifty per cent reliable after launch and could get within 3-5 
nautical miles of its target.409 It noted however that the prototype missile, which could be 
fired in an emergency, was less reliable and accurate and the JIC did “not envisage ICBMs 
being employed in attacks against the UK or Western Europe.”410  
 
 
British intelligence often appeared to be working with meagre data on ballistic missiles.411 
Comments made by Russian officials or in the Russian media were carefully reported and 
scrutinised. Mr E C Williams, Scientific Advisor (Intelligence) at the Ministry of Defence 
attended a Conference in Geneva in 1958 where he met Russians. He reported to the JIC that 
the Russians had told him that ICBMs were in “mass production” and “in service” as well as 
being “quite accurate.”412 He stated that the Russians knew that they could not match the 
United States with bombers but with ballistic missiles they thought “at last we have a key to 
the American door.”413 The JIC asked Technical Intelligence branches to examine these 
statements.414 By 1962 the JIC noted that a test site at Tyuratam/Baiknonur in the Soviet 
Union was being used for ICBM tests with launches of 3500-6000 nautical miles occurring 
into the Pacific Ocean.415 They admitted that they had no details of how the missiles were 
guided, but speculated it was by radio and they lacked data on the fuel used for Soviet long-
range rockets.416 By 1961 the JIC had access to data provided by Colonel Oleg Penkovsky as 
well as material from reconnaissance satellites. This material helped to end the “missile gap” 
controversy and allowed the JIC to assess that by 1962 the USSR would have 12-20 ICBMs 
available with perhaps 85-100 in 1963.417 It did note, however, that these missiles would be 
vulnerable as they were slow to fuel, were stored on the surface and it would take some time 















 assessments on the missile threat were not as pessimistic as those produced in the United 
States as they generally thought that there would be a longer time lag between testing and 
deployment so posed little immediate threat.419 There was also no evidence that ICBMs were 
in serial production.420 The West also enjoyed overwhelming superiority in nuclear bombers 
so this would serve to act as a deterrent to the USSR. 
 
 
The launch of Sputnik in 1957 did not generate a national security panic in the UK, likely in 
part because of the nation’s experience of German V-2 bombardment in 1944-45 and the 
realisation that any deployment of Soviet missiles in Eastern Europe could make the UK 
vulnerable to rocket attack. This was in contrast to the United States where Allen Dulles, CIA 
Director, called for a period of “national emergency”.421 The JIC recorded that Sputnik 
“demonstrates considerable rocket prowess” by the Soviet Union.422 It also admitted that “the 
Russians are still ahead of the western powers in the development of ballistic rockets.”423 In a 
study of the Soviet Space Programme late in 1959, the JIB concluded that Sputnik was a 
“tremendous technical achievement in all the fields concerned with rocketry.”424 It thought it 
was important though to be cautious in how this was used to measure Russian proficiency 
with ICBMs. The JIC admitted that it was “still in the dark about the engines” and thought 
that the rocket used to launch Sputnik could carry a 5000lb warhead some 5000 nautical 
miles.425 The Russians also used the satellite Lunik II to hit the moon as the first man-made 
object to do so on September 13 1959. However, the JIB noted that hitting the moon was a lot 
easier than hitting a target thousands of miles away from the Soviet Union.426 It could not be 
assumed that the Soviet Union possessed similar prowess with military missile systems. 
Nevertheless, the JIB concluded that the Russians possessed accurate launching systems and 
good components.427 The USSR also launched Lunik III on the second anniversary of the 













 time. Lunik III also photographed the far side of the moon for the first time and this revealed 
that the Russians could track objects and receive data.428  
 
 
These space programmes had good propaganda value but likely delayed the development and 
deployment of Russia’s ICBMs as resources and personnel had to be used on them. The JIC 
noted in 1961, after the Soviet Union put the first man in space, that it was of limited 
importance and added “little in our estimate of Soviet military strength” but showed that the 
Soviet Union could carry the arms race into space.429 Soviet space achievements such as the 
first animal in space, satellite in space, man in space, man-made object landed on the moon, 
satellite in orbit round the moon and photographs of the dark side of the moon were a great 
propaganda victory for the Soviet Union but did not mean that war was more likely or the 
West was heading for any kind of defeat. It did give the USSR propaganda victories and 
created opportunities for Premier Khrushchev to make public statements about rockets which 
were sometimes rash and dangerous.  
 
 
In 1960 Khrushchev announced to the Supreme Soviet that he intended to replace aircraft 
“almost entirely” with rockets.430 The JIC assessed that this was not true but that missiles 
would be the priority for Soviet procurement and further noted that the Soviet leader 
“frequently exaggerates” progress in the missile field to project Soviet power and intimidate 
the West.431 The JIC examined statements made by Khrushchev to the US ambassador and 
the Austrian Foreign Minister at a New Year’s Eve party in 1959 where he stated that 
missiles would be a priority item for Soviet defence spending.432 However, there was no sign 
at this time that the Soviet Long Range Air Force would reduce in size. Khrushchev may 
have boasted that the Soviet Union had 50 nuclear bombs ready for use against the UK, 
though the JIC thought that, if true, most of these would be delivered by bomber and in 1960, 
the USSR would achieve the capability to attack the UK with IRBMs.433 Although 











 off the face of the earth”, they were not able to annihilate the United States at this time. 
Khrushchev referred to missiles as “the centre of gravity” and he thought other arms of the 
Soviet armed forces had lost importance, seeing warships for instance as only suitable for 
“goodwill visits.”434 The JIC noted that Khrushchev, in front of the Supreme Soviet, stated 
that the USSR may “even cease production of bombers and other obsolete equipment” and he 
boasted that there were “more terrible” weapons to come.435  
 
 
The production of bombers did continue though and the statements the JIC examined did 
seem to be Khrushchev’s bombastic rhetoric, but still interesting for intelligence purposes. A 
previous implied threat to the UK from Soviet ballistic missiles during the Suez Crisis in 
1956 had also been dismissed by the JIC as political posturing.436 With an apt reference to the 
problems faced by British intelligence, Khrushchev noted that “the territory of our land is 
vast; we are able to disperse our rockets and camouflage them well.”437 Major General 
Kenneth Strong, Head of the JIB, noted that Khrushchev exaggerated when he stated in 
November 1959 that one Soviet factory had produced 250 long-range rockets per year and 
that their ICBMs would be mobile.438 Statements made by other leading Soviet military 
figures were also analysed by the JIC such as from Marshal Malinovski, Defence Minister, 
who stated that Russia’s nuclear missiles could wipe an aggressor “off the face of the earth, 
wherever he might be” and Marshal Yeremenko, Senior Soviet army officer, noted that his 
troops could “hit any point of the globe.”439 These statements could however be picked up by 
people in the West who were keen for arms contracts and sought to promote the “missile 
gap.” Additionally, there was a psychological effect on the West derived from the USSR’s 
possession of long-range rockets because it threatened to create obsolescence in the West’s 
main strategic nuclear delivery system at a time when vast resources were being put into 














 In his memoirs, Khrushchev’s bellicose rhetoric continued into retirement. He stated that 
“only by building up a nuclear missile force could we keep the enemy from unleashing war 
against us.”440 Missiles were clearly of vital importance to the USSR to “grind our enemies 
into dust” and to “destroy the principal cities of the United States.”441 He also admitted that 
the United States was so far away that “we couldn’t have reached him with our air force”, 
hence the eagerness to acquire nuclear missiles.442 Khrushchev was proud of the nuclear 
advances that occurred during his tenure and thought that Russia’s enemies “knew that they 
had lost their chance to strike at us with impunity.”443 This view was arguably correct when 
some of the discussions amongst the senior American political and military leadership during 
the Cuban Missile Crisis are considered.   
 
The Blue Streak Cancellation 
 
The development of Soviet IRBMs and MRBMs also had policy implications for the UK as 
its nuclear bombers approached obsolescence and Britain’s own IRBM project, Blue Streak, 
had to be cancelled in 1960 in part due to the Soviet missile threat and the possibility of a 
first-strike destroying the missiles in their silos.444 
 
 
The Blue Streak IRBM was Britain’s only ballistic missile project and involved deploying a 
ballistic missile with a 2,500 mile range in underground silos in southern England.445 Each 
missile was to be deployed well away from the others. For this force of some 100 missiles to 
be destroyed, an attack from several hundred accurate Soviet missiles would be required. The 
force could be held at a few minutes readiness for several hours, thereby satisfying the British 
strategic requirement that they could survive a pre-emptive nuclear strike and then be 
launched. This ensured that the UK did not have to “launch on warning” which could lead to 
a catastrophe in the event of erroneous missile attack data being received during a period of 
crisis. Crucial to the procurement issue were assessments of how large the Soviet 











 also had to be noted that missiles based in Eastern Europe and the western Soviet Union 
would have a very short flight time.446 As seen earlier in this chapter, information on all these 
key elements was sparse and subject to conjecture.  
 
 
Harold Macmillan, British Prime Minister, states in his memoirs that the decision to cancel 
Blue Streak was strategic.447 This is also supported by the then Defence Secretary Harold 
Watkinson.448 The issue of Soviet IRBMs is mentioned in passing in other accounts of the 
time discussing the cancellation of Blue Streak, and the impression is given that it was 
terminated primarily on grounds of cost.449 It would have been a hugely expensive project, 
due mainly to the construction of numerous underground silos, assuming that enough 
Members of Parliament could persuade their constituents to accept the missiles in their 
localities. Their acceptance in a locality would of course guarantee their rapid demise in the 
event of a nuclear war. The cancellation decision was contentious with argument and counter-
argument in Parliament and the media either that the project should never have been 
commenced, it should have been halted earlier or that it should have proceeded as the 
missiles were not vulnerable to a pre-emptive strike.450 This also seems to reflect certain 
nervousness in dealing with novel technology which seemed to belong to the “space age.”  
 
 
The UK had first looked at building Blue Streak in 1952, at a time when the first reports were 
being produced by the JIC using data from German engineers about the Soviet rocket 
programme.451 There were doubts about building powerful engines and how to guide the 
system to the point where it was questioned whether a military ballistic missile was 
feasible.452 Only developments in technology and the miniaturisation of nuclear weapons 
would make such systems possible; however, analysis of Soviet progress in this field showed 
that long-range systems and matching nuclear weapons to them was possible. British 













 fighter aircraft which raised questions over the UK’s manned bomber programme so new 
nuclear weapon delivery methods would have to be explored.  
 
 
As more intelligence became available about Soviet ballistic missile programmes in the 
hese factors likely gave added impetus to the negotiations which led to the deployment of 
                   
1950s, so the threat to the UK was being appreciated with the transition made from artillery 
rockets based on the German V-2 to the USSR’s SS-3 and SS-4 ballistic missiles which 
posed a real threat to the UK, especially after the Soviet hydrogen bomb test of August 
1953.453 If a hydrogen bomb with a large yield was fitted to a missile then it severely reduced 
the problems posed by lack of accuracy due to its increased blast effects. Soviet 
IRBM/MRBMs would have to be considered in nuclear weapon procurement decisions and 
they raised questions over the credibility of the nuclear deterrent. In 1954 the Air Ministry 
noted that to discourage such a Soviet attack “it is vitally important that this country should 
develop an offensive missile of its own.”454 Looking forward into the future, British planners, 
although working on sparse data, had to confront the likelihood that the Soviet Union would 
mass produce ballistic missiles and arm them with thermonuclear warheads. Blue Streak 
would enhance the UK’s offensive nuclear capability at a time when ballistic missile 
technology was advancing and the need to deter Soviet ballistic missile attack was increasing. 
Blue Streak was supposed to enter service in 1963, with full deployment in 1965, fulfilling 
the primary deterrent role until 1970.455 However, the USSR, by 1965, would have had 
IRBMs deployed against the UK for several years so there would have been a “window of 





US supplied Thor IRBMs which were based in the UK from 1959-63. It seems that weapons 
procurement and intelligence assessment were not synchronised on this issue. The timescales 
also did not seem to take account of potential developmental problems which plagued major 
British defence projects at that time. As Soviet technology advanced there was a risk that 







 considerable resources had been expended. This had the potential to lead to great uncertainty 
in defence planning and poor decision making. To this was added, as mentioned earlier in the 
chapter, the fact that sparse intelligence was available on high-level Soviet strategy and 
intentions. Such uncertainty led the RAF to consider the vulnerability of their nuclear 
bombers and introduce new procedures to disperse aircraft away from their main bases to 
airfields all over the UK in a crisis and to hold them on a few minutes readiness to launch on 
“Quick Reaction Alert.”456 Blue Streak was also to be deployed in hardened underground 
silos (as seen later in France and the United States) and this policy, combined with new 
tactics for deploying RAF bombers, is a direct effect of intelligence assessments about Soviet 
IRBMs on the workings and deployment of the British nuclear deterrent. The issue of the cost 
of Blue Streak was still being raised but with Duncan Sandys as the Defence Minister (and an 
advocate of missiles) research and development on ballistic missiles continued. 
 
 
It should also be remembered that there was no Ballistic Missile Early Warning radar in the 
the basis for further inaccurate assessments as the West waged an arms race against itself.  
                                                           
UK until 1963 so it is hard to see how a decision to launch Blue Streak could have been 
taken. Consideration would be needed of the missile reaction time, strength of the silo, 
warning time, accuracy and yield of Soviet missiles in order to determine when the UK’s 
missiles should be fired. An attack might not destroy all the Blue Streaks and a retaliatory 
strike could have been launched, but if insufficient data was available on Soviet ballistic 
missile capabilities then the UK’s nuclear deterrent force could be lost. There was, as Cole 
points out, “a complete lack of certainty about the majority of the critical variables 
involved.”457 The key factor in destroying a nuclear missile silo is warhead accuracy and this 
was impossible to determine for Soviet ballistic missiles as the sources did not exist to 
measure it. As previously seen, the SS-3 Soviet ballistic missile was thought to have an 
accuracy of three nautical miles which would make it unsuitable for attacking a missile silo. 
However, the Sputnik launch showed that the Russians were capable of great technical 
achievements so many of the West’s assumptions about their missiles could have been 
wrong. As Cole notes, the UK started to assume that the Soviet Union’s missile accuracy was 








 The Soviet Union would have needed to deploy hundreds of SS-3s and SS-4s against Blue 
Streak silos to guarantee their destruction, depending on the accuracy and reliability of the 
Soviet systems.459 It is now known that the USSR did not have this number of missiles 
available and the JIC did not produce papers on how many SS-3s or SS-4s might be used to 
attack the UK or how they would be deployed.  
 
 
Cole notes that critics of the project within government such as the War Office and the 
dmiralty (rival services to the RAF) sought the cancellation of Blue Streak on grounds of 
s Cole indicates, by 1959 the Air Ministry assumed that after 1965 Soviet IRBMs would 
arry 1 megaton warheads and be able to land within 4-5,000 feet of a target.462 To ensure the 
number of warheads needed to destroy Blue Streak silos and in mid-1959 the British Nuclear 
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cost to free resources for other defence projects.460 The finance issue seems to have 
dominated discussions during the latter phases of the project, championed by the Treasury. 
Challenge would also have been difficult on technical grounds because the JIC and Air 
Ministry had control of the information and expertise on rocketry, silo construction and 
missile vulnerability. The Royal Navy was interested at that time in seizing the nuclear 
deterrent from the RAF by introducing the Polaris submarine system so they had a vested 
interest in cancelling the project. The Chief of the Defence Staff was also Admiral Louis 
Mountbatten, a naval officer and shrewd political operator, who would likely have primary 
loyalty to his own service.461 Despite bureaucratic in-fighting and rivalry, the officials 
involved seem to have carefully weighed the issues and data concerning Blue Streak before 





destruction of the Blue Streak force it would take at least 8 warheads to be fired at each silo 
so the size of the Soviet IRBM force became an issue in the calculations. The Air Ministry 
believed that the Blue Streak force would survive an attack and appeared to believe that the 
Soviet Union would not deploy a large force of IRBMs to mount a saturation attack. The 









 Deterrent Study Group (BND (SG)) was formed under the MOD Permanent Secretary Sir 
Richard Powell to resolve the issue.463  
 
 
The Powell Group considered the vulnerability of Blue Streak and, importantly for the IRBM 
roject, it was assigned terms of reference to work on worst case assumptions.464 Its 
rmation reflected the considerable amount of uncertainty concerning the Soviet threat to the 
ime, 
ould ensure that the UK would have to adopt a dangerous “launch on warning” policy 




deployment of the system and a desire to resolve the Blue Streak issue before an enormous 
financial investment was made in the project. In a field with a mass of assumptions and 
limited data, this was ideal for bureaucratic opportunists who sought to terminate a project. It 
also had authority to overturn the Air Ministry’s huge influence over assumptions and was a 
fresh look at the issue, evaluating the threat from SS-3s and SS-4s. The Committee assumed 
that an SS-3 could carry a three megaton warhead and an SS-4 a 1-8 megaton warhead but 
these yields were unconfirmed and their accuracy was assumed to be no better or worse than 
western missiles.465 Using a three megaton warhead and western levels of accuracy, Powell 
thought that 95 per cent of the Blue Streak force would be destroyed in an attack of 300-400 
missiles. He felt that by 1965 the USSR would have this number of missiles and the Blue 
Streak force could only survive if it was held at 30 second constant readiness (which was 
impossible) and the UK would only get three and a half minutes warning of an attack.466 The 
force stood a greater chance of survival against the SS-4 because it was fired from further 
away and there would be more warning time, but even then if the missile was fired on a low 
trajectory the warning time would be limited and few British missiles would survive.467  
 
 
The potential number of Soviet ballistic missiles, their accuracy and lack of warning t
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possibly of an appalling accident but Powell thought that the USSR might still be able to pre-
empt a Blue Streak launch if the UK used this system. Powell’s conclusion was that Blue 









 only likely be useful if the West fired first as a response to a Soviet land invasion of Western 
Europe for instance.468 However, it is now known that the Soviet Union only deployed 48 
SS-3 missiles and such a small force was a very limited threat to the Blue Streak system.469 
This was of course unknown at the time. The warhead yield of the 608 SS-4s deployed by the 
USSR is still unknown but was unlikely to have been between 3-8 megatons; most Soviet 
nuclear weapon studies put the yield at c.1 megaton.470 The SS-4 is also now known to have 
an accuracy of 1.24 nautical miles, double what Powell was using.471  
 
 
Furthermore it seems that the SS-4 was not designed to attack nuclear missiles in the West.  
 covert attack requires a missile to be fired on a depressed trajectory thereby decreasing its 
nge and if fired in such a way from the USSR it may not have been able to reach the UK. 
ht that it could not survive as a 




There was no evidence that the SS-4 was based in Eastern Europe so the UK would likely 
have had more warning time of an attack as the launch would have been done from Western 
Russia and on a high ballistic trajectory. The UK could therefore have fired its Blue Streak 
missiles on warning rather than firing them before the Russians had used their nuclear 
weapons. Many of Powell’s worst case assumptions appear to have been quite different from 
the Soviet Union’s then capabilities and his report appears to be flawed; it did however carry 
considerable weight. It is now known that in 1965 the Russians had deployed 608 SS-4s so if 
the missiles were accurate and reliable enough then in theory they could have mounted a 
serious saturation raid on Blue Streak.472 The UK Air Ministry appeared to believe that such 
a large force of IRBMs would not be built up. Powell worked on a worst-case basis, but in 
order to maintain high levels of credibility in the UK’s nuclear deterrent this was essential. 
His report was based on inaccurate assumptions but that simply reflected the fragmented 
nature of the UK’s intelligence on Soviet ballistic missiles.  
 
 











 missile as an alternative nuclear delivery system. This system was also to be cancelled due to 
tic missile programme but never produced 
nything to cause a “missile gap” mentality to build up amongst policy makers. Intelligence 
ould not accurately determine how vulnerable Blue Streak was and so the project rumbled 
                   
technical difficulties. Blue Streak was meanwhile cancelled in April 1960 “on the unanimous 
advice of the Chiefs of Staff”, including the Chief of the Air Staff as it was “vulnerable to 
forestalling attack.”473 British intelligence on Soviet MRBMs and IRBMs was seemingly 
inadequate for planning the nation’s nuclear deterrent during the period under consideration. 
The sparse information available ensured that decisions were made on assumptions rather 
than accurate data but this reflected the difficulty of the target that was being monitored. 
Analysts could use western achievements as a basis for assessments but this was dangerous 
because it was unknown how far the Soviet Union had advanced. The launch of Sputnik and 
Yuri Gagarin showed that great achievement was possible from the Soviet Union in the field 
of rocketry with little prior indication that it was going to happen. The limited data available 
on Soviet missiles made planning very difficult and projects could take on a life of their own, 
carried by bureaucratic interests. Worst case scenarios could be used for planning but this ran 
the risk of exaggerating the threats the UK faced.  
 
 
The JIC alerted decision-makers to the Soviet ballis
a
c
on and reflected the interests and assumptions of the bureaucratic players. With Blue Streak, 
the Air Ministry was determined to have ballistic missile technology and the nuclear deterrent 
remain in the hands of the RAF, just as the Navy were determined to have Polaris 
submarines. On balance a submarine-based deterrent was arguably better for the UK to avoid 
a Soviet pre-emptive saturation attack from ballistic missiles in close proximity to the UK. 
Blue Streak would likely have worked and was used to launch satellites later on but would 
have been enormously expensive as a weapon system and soon be obsolete. Macmillan and 
other senior figures thought that Blue Streak could meet Britain’s strategic nuclear needs, was 
modern, prestigious and homemade. To some in Whitehall it seemed preferable to other 
nuclear weapon options available to the UK in the mid-1950s. Thankfully the issue of 
whether it could have survived a pre-emptive attack was never put to the test. The 
cancellation of the project ensured the UK’s nuclear deterrent remained with “vulnerable” 







Research from Russia on Ballistic Missiles  
 
In recent years, some research has been done in Soviet archives on ballistic missiles. The 
ject to security restrictions and those engaged 
 developing these systems have either passed away or are reluctant to disclose information. 
 research it is now known that the Russians had matched a nuclear warhead to 
n SS-3 MRBM in February 1956 under an operation called Operation BAIKAL.476 If these 
issiles had been mass produced and moved forward to Eastern Europe then the Soviet 
                                                           
research is limited because the topic is still sub
in
Podvig wrote a study of Soviet nuclear missiles in 2004 but apparently the original draft was 
seized by the Russian authorities showing the sensitivities of this topic.474 This is the best 
analysis of this subject from the Soviet side in the English language. Zaloga also wrote two 







Union could have threatened the UK much earlier than previously thought. They would not 
have had to wait for the development of IRBMs. Zaloga also noted that Russian programmes 
were driven by the need to innovate and develop because the pace of technical change was so 
great that the Soviet Union would permanently lag behind the West if it always relied on 
espionage and copying western developments.477 On the ICBM programme Zaloga 
recognised the serious technical problems the Soviet Union faced with this new technology. 
The first Russian ICBM codenamed SS-6 SAPWOOD by NATO had to be designed around a 
Soviet hydrogen bomb that weighed 4.5 tons478 and had an unrefuelled weight of 23 tons 
which increased to 267 tons when the fuel was inserted.479 It was a massive object to launch 
which was then tracked on Soviet radar with radio signals sent to it to correct its course; 
when on the right trajectory its internal guidance system would take over.480 These signals 















 ensure that nothing else was transmitted thereby denying additional intelligence so western 
intelligence had to rely on intelligence collected by radar.   
 
 
Western intelligence was correct when it assessed that ICBM activity took place at 
yuratum/Baikonur because it was isolated and sparsely populated. The Russians also used 
lemetry from the missile to monitor its sub-systems in flight, make corrections and 
esetsk in north-
estern Russia, and called it Leningrad-300.487 This facility does not appear in JIC papers 
nd work started on its four remote launch pads in July 1957.488 The base was chosen to be 




determine what went wrong in order to improve their programme.481 This data was 
intercepted by western intelligence agencies. Powerful radars were used to track the flight as 
well as optical sensors.482 According to Zaloga’s research the Soviet Union felt under 
considerable pressure to develop the ICBM as costs rose and the American Atlas ICBM 
programme advanced.483 Zaloga noted that the first Soviet ICBM launch was on 21 August 
1957 from Baikonur to the Pacific and all the systems worked with a dummy warhead.484 
Moscow announced this on 26 August 1957 followed by another successful test on 7 
September 1957 and the launch of Sputnik on 4 October 1957.485 As Zaloga notes, Sputnik 
caused the acceleration of American weapons programmes as the United States was 
humiliated and regarded it as a technological Pearl Harbor.486 It should also be noted that the 
flight of Sputnik across the United States also created a precedent because it allowed future 
flights by US spacecraft across Soviet territory in order to take photographs.  
 
 
Zaloga further notes that the Soviet Union built its main ICBM base at Pl
w
a
close to the United States, allowing missiles to be fired over the North Pole but it should be 
noted that it took some 20 hours to assemble an ICBM there for launch.489 It is likely that 















 15 December 1959.490 It should also be noted that by the end of 1960 the United States had 
142 Atlas ICBMs, 62 Titan ICBMs and 20 Minutemen ICBMs whereas the Soviet Union 
only had four SS-6s ready at Plesetsk.491 There was a missile gap in ICBMs but it was in 
America’s favour and hard intelligence helped to expose that gap just as sparse intelligence 
helped to create it. To the Russians, ballistic missiles were a driving force and showed that 
the Soviet Union had recovered from the war and could overtake the West. During the war 
the Russians could not strike at the heart of Germany and sought to resolve their deficiency in 
long-range strike capability in case of future conflict. 
 
 
Zaloga’s research also highlights an incident which does not feature in any released UK 
government papers. On 24 October 1960 during the test launch of a new SS-7 Saddler ICBM, 
e missile blew up at Tyuratum.492 These missiles were to replace the SS-6 and were lighter 




numbers. The disaster killed Marshal Mitrofan Nedelin, Soviet Assistant Defence Minister 
for Armaments and Strategic Rocket Forces Commander, as well as over 200 other 
personnel.493 Fuel and nitric acid exploding killed many of the missile design team with most 
bodies completely destroyed. The team had been under pressure to test the missile quickly 
before the November military parade in Moscow and an electrical malfunction caused the 
rocket engines to fire and the missile to explode.494 No official announcement was made 
about the disaster until 1989 and it seems that Britain only became aware of it when informed 
by Colonel Oleg Penkovsky (See Chapter Four). Tests of the new missile did not resume until 
1961 so the disaster was apparently a setback to the Russian ICBM programme.495 When it 
was deployed in 1962 the SS-7 was housed in groups of three on the surface (to save on costs 
and on fuel pumps) and remained a vulnerable system until underground silos could be built 
for it in the late 1960s.496 The Soviet Union got the idea for underground silos from German 
engineers who had used hardened firing sites for their V-2 rockets from 1944-45. The cover-
up of the missile disaster shows how effective Soviet security was concerning their missile 














Research by Podvig also reveals that the Soviet Union regarded the SS-3 MRBM as its first 
strategic missile as it could destroy strategic targets in Europe.497 This, and the SS-4 missile, 
rmed the core of the Soviet Union’s theatre nuclear force for many years until scrapped 
fter the INF Treaty in 1988. The JIC papers do not mention it, but in April 1962 the Soviet 
f the Air Staff (Intelligence) wrote to the JIC in 1960 to 
y that “there is no magic in missiles which puts them in a class by themselves requiring 
igence treatment.”501 In this chapter, despite only fragmentary records being 




Union started work on the SS-9 Scarp ICBM which was a very heavy missile with a large 
nuclear warhead and based in a silo.498 According to Podvig, it seems that after the 
construction of the IRBM/MRBM force the Russians sought to concentrate on their ICBM 
assets, developing underground silos and solid fuel for the missiles. He also mentions that the 
early ICBM suffered from the problem of the warhead colliding with the missile body after 
separation during tests which the JIC thought the Soviet Union was experiencing; it was 
solved by reshaping the re-entry vehicle.499 He also notes that the USSR planned a long-
range cruise missile called Burya to be developed in case the ballistic missile programme 
failed but this was cancelled. The JIC was aware of the project but had limited information on 
it.500 Recent research does provide some insights into the problems and policies of the Soviet 
Union concerning ballistic missile development but much remains to be uncovered. Even in 
the UK many papers concerning assessments of ICBMs and other nuclear delivery systems 
by the JIC remain closed and several Freedom of Information Act requests were turned down 








and they posed a very difficult intelligence target. The advent of nuclear missiles in the 















 special treatment and a whole range of new collection methods to deal with them. British 
intelligence struggled to deal with this issue, according to the material that has been released, 
but did not cease its efforts. Intelligence personnel dealt with problems of novel, complicated 
technology that the UK did not possess, and faced a closed secretive hostile state. The JIC 
appears to have made a balanced assessment using the limited information they had available. 
Britain did not get swept up by a wave of “missile gap” hysteria and its assessments of Soviet 
ICBMs and the strategic threat were more realistic than those produced in the United States. 
The assessments do not portray alarm or exaggeration, despite Khrushchev’s rhetoric, but 
instead a realisation of the intelligence problems the UK faced and the dangers Soviet 
strategic nuclear delivery systems posed. The UK still faced a bomber threat during the 
period 1949-62 and ballistic missiles just added another dimension to the hostile nuclear 
attack options the nation faced.  
 
 
Britain collected and exploited the limited information from German returnees because this 
was all that was available at that time to establish the nature of Russian ballistic missile 
rogrammes. New techniques in SIGINT and airborne intelligence collection as well as radar 
ere later devised and this improved intelligence collection. With the enormous technical 
d the cancellation of the Blue Streak IRBM were influenced by the 
K’s view of Soviet ballistic missiles. Before 1963 and the advent of Ballistic Missile Early 
arning Radar, the USSR could have mounted a pre-emptive nuclear strike against the UK 
without detection and likely eliminated most of its nuclear deterrent and population. This was 
 destroy the United States’ 
p
w
challenges that were presented and the secrecy surrounding Soviet developments, it is 
remarkable that useful intelligence was gathered on missile systems under development 
during this most difficult and dangerous time. Recent research shows that there were some 
areas of which the UK remained unaware, such as missile accuracy, warhead yields and 
numbers of weapons produced. However, it is easy to be wise after the end of the Cold War 
and fail to appreciate the enormous problems, outlined in this chapter, that intelligence 
collectors and analysts faced. Much material however still remains in archives to be exploited 
by future researchers. 
 
 
Assessments on Soviet ballistic missiles also influenced policy as the operational deployment 
of British bombers an
U
W
unlikely to have happened though, due to Russia’s inability to
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 nuclear forces as they were deployed globally and securely. Thankfully the deterrent never 
had to be used but undoubtedly the prospect of nuclear annihilation weighed heavily on the 
minds of the Soviet leadership, especially during the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, 
which is examined in Chapter Four as part of the Penkovsky case. It is a matter of speculation 
whether, if the UK possessed no nuclear deterrent, it would have made any difference to the 
security of Europe because it existed under the protection of America’s “nuclear umbrella.” 
The possession of a nuclear deterrent did nevertheless allow Britain to continue to play a 
world role as a senior partner of the Americans. Lack of nuclear weapons would have 
diminished the UK’s perceived role in the world and Europe at that time. The reality of 
imperial greatness was diminishing but its mentality seemed to live on. The bigger global 
picture has to be considered in the Cold War rather than the risks faced solely by the UK. 
Confidence only grew in western intelligence about its knowledge of Russia’s nuclear 
weapons from 1960 onwards due to Colonel Oleg Penkovsky’s material and aerial 
intelligence collection systems. The next chapter will look at the key role played by these 
airborne collection systems. 
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 CHAPTER 3 – LOOKING BEHIND THE CURTAIN: AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE 




This chapter examines the role played by aerial reconnaissance in Britain’s attempts to gather 
intelligence on the Soviet Union’s nuclear bombers and long-range ballistic missiles. The 
Second World War had demonstrated the crucial importance of photographic intelligence in 
wartime and particularly in the battle against German cruise and ballistic missiles. From 1949 
to 1962, various methods were implemented by the United States and Britain to use airborne 
systems to gather intelligence behind the Iron Curtain. Some of these projects would result in 
the loss of aircraft. Others led to the production of systems that did not work, as well as 
spectacular successes. Remarkable, revolutionary innovations such as reconnaissance 
satellites and U-2 aircraft produced an unprecedented quantity and quality of intelligence but 
with risks. The close collaboration built up between Britain and the United States from 1941-
45 would continue into the Cold War with photographic intelligence being shared between 




Britain’s impressive and vital aerial reconnaissance efforts during the Second World War 
involved the adaptation of aircraft such as the Spitfire and Mosquito to the reconnaissance 
role. Also crucial was the systematic skilled analysis and dissemination of intelligence reports 
by experts in dedicated organisations. In the words of Lord Tedder, Marshal of the Royal Air 
Force, it represented “British genius at its best.”502 It should be remembered though that from 
1939-45, reconnaissance missions could be mounted against an enemy just a short flight 
across the English Channel. The Soviet Union after 1945 had the benefit of buffer-states in 
Eastern Europe between it and the allies. Additionally, many of the nuclear weapon-related 
facilities of interest to the UK such as missile testing and developmental sites as well as 
nuclear bomber bases were deep inside the Soviet Union and therefore immune to 
observation from peripheral border areas. It was also unknown how the USSR laid out its 
facilities, such as nuclear missile bases, so identification would be difficult for imagery 






 Despite wartime successes with aerial reconnaissance it was almost certain that, as in other 
intelligence collection areas, the Soviet Union and its nuclear weapon delivery systems would 
be a very difficult target. 
 
 
The Royal Air Force already had experience of covert aerial reconnaissance. Before the 
Second World War the Secret Intelligence Service had used Aerofilms, a company based in 
Wembley, Middlesex, to undertake covert reconnaissance of Nazi Germany.503 Civilian 
aircraft with hidden cameras were flown across Germany on “business trips” in order to 
photograph airfields and factories. The Lockheed 12A aircraft were painted ‘duck-egg green’ 
to blend into the sky on their covert reconnaissance missions.504 The aircraft had to be fast, 
high-flying and stripped of armaments to fly these dangerous operations which operated from 
Heston in west London.505 The British had clearly heeded the advice of German army officer 
General Werner Freiherr von Fritsch who said in 1938 that “the military organisation which 
has the best photographic intelligence will win the next war.”506 Its importance was shown by 
the fact that within one hour of war being declared a Blenheim bomber was flown from RAF 
Wyton, near Huntingdon, to Wilhelmshaven, Germany to photograph the German fleet.507 
Aerial reconnaissance would continue to play a crucial role in the intelligence war against 
Germany and lead to the accidental discovery of the V-weapon research centre at 




However, success against rocket systems in Nazi Germany would not necessarily translate 
into success against the Soviet Union’s weapons systems. The latter were carefully concealed 
in a highly secure, ‘closed’ country and located a considerable distance from the UK in the 
vast land mass of the USSR. Even locating experimental rockets, testing facilities and their 
eventual deployed locations would be a major undertaking and intelligence on the USSR in 










 likely presence of traitors in western intelligence during the Cold War in addition to those 
publicly exposed such as SIS officers George Blake and ‘Kim’ Philby. It should also be noted 
that in the post-World War Two demobilisation, many RAF strategic reconnaissance 
squadrons were disbanded and analytical and technical experts returned to civilian life. 
British reconnaissance systems and methods used during the war had been very capable and 
remained in use for some time. The Mark XIX Spitfire for instance could still undertake high-
altitude reconnaissance missions and remained in service until 1954 and the Mosquito 
bomber, when equipped with a 200 gallon drop-tank had a 2500 mile range.509 However, the 
ample reconnaissance personnel and considerable resources available to the national survival 
effort from 1939-45 were not available in the post-war austerity years. This posed a serious 
problem because to deal with aerial intelligence collection on the USSR, constant innovation, 
investment and imagination would be required.  
 
More Intelligence From Germany 
 
As with intelligence on Russian ballistic missiles, the UK again received crucial early help on 
the Soviet reconnaissance problem from Germany’s intelligence efforts in World War Two. 
Much of its military photographic intelligence material on the Soviet Union was captured by 
the allies after the war with collections discovered at such places as Berchtesgarden, 
Germany which proved to be invaluable. This also revealed the superior quality of allied 
photographic intelligence efforts during the war, such as the fact that the Germans did not use 
stereoscopic photography.510  
 
 
Research done by Aldrich and documents released to the National Archives highlights the 
importance of this material in the early years of the Cold War, notably a covert operation 
called DICK TRACY.511 Aldrich notes that inter-service rivalry in the United States, 
whereby the other services resented the formation of a separate United States Air Force 
(USAF) in 1947, pushed air intelligence closer to the British as the new service sought 
collaborators.  The USAF looked to the UK for support and the use of airfields in East Anglia 








 increased joint planning and sharing of intelligence between the two countries.512 The role of 
the UK as an ‘unsinkable aircraft carrier’ ensured that it had a good bargaining asset to secure 
intelligence co-operation with the United States. The expansion of atomic arsenals also 
ensured that there would be co-operation on target and aerial intelligence which exploited the 
DICK TRACY product.  
 
 
In the DICK TRACY operation from June 1945 onwards, Britain and the United States 
aterial was still emerging and being added to this archive for years after the war. In March 
1954 the RAF received German photographic material from “two gentlemen of a European 
                   
shared captured Luftwaffe photographs of the USSR produced during German operations on 
the eastern front.513 This material was used by the allies for over 20 years and was circulated 
under the designator GX. The product was brought from all over Europe for analysis and 
sorting at Pinetree in Essex at the Anglo-American Central Interpretation Unit.514 The haul 
contained valuable maps and photographs covering the Soviet Union all the way to 
Siberia.515 The Luftwaffe had mounted over 8000 sorties to collect this material and 
produced some 800,000-1,000,000 prints providing unprecedented intelligence on the Soviet 
Union.516 Such was the volume of material that it was still being sorted at the RAF’s main 
reconnaissance intelligence centre at Nuneham Park, Oxfordshire from 1947 to January 1949 
with key material being forwarded to air intelligence in Whitehall.517 The Air Ministry 
bought special cameras to photograph much of the collection before it was sent to the United 
States. In May 1957 the collection was moved to the Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence 
Centre at Brampton Park, Cambridgeshire.518 This operation was a major intelligence coup 
and provided critical photographic intelligence on the USSR as late as 1960 on a scale not 

















 country” which proved to be of “considerable intelligence value to the British.”520 Who 
provided this material and its nature remains unknown but it was of areas “where no other 
coverage is available.”521 Activity like this served to cement the UK/US intelligence 
relationship and also extended to locating German intelligence analysts who had studied 
imagery of the Soviet Union with a view to undertaking debriefs with them.522 It should also 
be stressed that co-operation was needed between the UK and the United States because 
much of the intelligence material was buried or stored in the British zone of occupation and 
former intelligence personnel were located in these areas.523 The British noted that the 
Germans also obtained much of their intelligence on the Russian Air Force from multiple 
sources such as wireless intercepts and interrogations of prisoners of war.524 They tended to 
use photo reconnaissance missions when targets were out of range or there were no 
communications to intercept.525  
 
 
Some intelligence was also passed to Berlin by the Finns during the war and the Germans 




be gathered on aircraft and factories.526 This of course was an advantage denied to the West 
in the Cold War. After 1943 improved Russian air defence and limited reconnaissance assets 
available to the Germans meant that air intelligence collection activity decreased.527 The 
Germans used photo reconnaissance to check other intelligence sources on the Soviet Union 
because agents’ reports were of no use for intelligence work on its order of battle.”528 The 
Germans apparently suffered from the same problems that the British had with penetrating 

















 The Early Post-War Years 
ir power was a central component of Cold War strategy and the air intelligence co-operation 
rld War continued throughout the Cold War. Aldrich notes that 
 1946 a formal secret deal was agreed on the sharing of global imagery between the British 
nnaissance aircraft were shot at 




formed during the Second Wo
in
and Americans with conferences held on targeting to discuss how to destroy facilities of 
interest in wartime.529 One of these conferences was held at RAF Benson, Oxfordshire on 4 
October 1950 and the cover of the programme even shows a cartoon of a British 
reconnaissance aircraft pulling back the Iron Curtain to get a better view of the Soviet 
Union.530 A priority of these sessions was to examine ways to obtain photographic evidence 
of the ability of Soviet Long Range Aviation to attack the UK.531 Details of the over-flights 
and peripheral air collection missions undertaken at this time remain sparse. There is little 
material in the National Archives and it is likely that much has either been destroyed or not 
committed to paper at the time. Aldrich notes that in the early 1950s, the United States 
discovered that the British were undertaking photographic reconnaissance missions around 
the Caspian Sea with operations run from Crete and aimed at gathering intelligence on Soviet 
missile development.532 He also speculates that Sweden may also have been used for these 
missions because reports had been received of Soviet experimental rockets flying over the 
country and crashing on its territory.533 By 1950 the Americans were also running 
reconnaissance missions in Europe and on 8 April 1950 a US Navy PBY-42 Privateer aircraft 
was shot down off Latvia by the Russians. This was the first casualty of the programme.534 
Aldrich states that this aircraft was launched from the UK but my research shows that it was 
actually despatched from a base at Wiesbaden, Germany.535  
 
 



















 or number of any allied over-flights of the Soviet Union at this time remains obscure but it 
he dangers of mounting sensitive aerial intelligence collection operations can be seen by the 
ln bomber over East Germany in March 1953. This was the 
nly time an RAF aircraft was destroyed by the Russians in the Cold War. Aldrich highlights 
Russians had pursued the aircraft and destroyed it. The Russians stated that the Lincoln had 
                                                           
appears that the UK was prepared to break international law by mounting illegal over-flights 
for intelligence collection. For instance, in 1950 the RAF mounted a special reconnaissance 
operation for naval intelligence collection over Valona Bay in Albania in order to photograph 
Russian submarines.537 Approval for this mission was sought from the Prime Minister and it 
was judged acceptable due to the absence of Albanian air defence radar and fighter 
aircraft.538 Whether approval would have been given for a regular programme of over-flights 
by the UK against the Soviet Union in the early Cold War is unclear and the danger of 
provoking war would likely have been uppermost in allied minds. However, Dino Brugioni, 
former senior CIA photo-interpreter, notes that the USAF was undertaking over-flights of 
Siberia in 1952 to photograph airfields.539 Due to the secrecy of such operations there are few 
surviving records and because different American military commands were involved in over-
flights, it is very difficult to determine the scale and nature of allied aerial intelligence 
activity at this time. If any imagery was produced it was difficult, according to Brugioni, to 
determine where it had come from and the veil of secrecy on this topic still remains.540   
 
The Lincoln Bomber Incident 
 
T
shooting down of an RAF Linco
o
this obscure and tragic incident but it remains unclear if the doomed flight was an intelligence 
collection mission.541 On 12 March 1953 an RAF Lincoln bomber was on a training sortie 
from RAF Leconfield, UK to Germany. For reasons which remain unclear, the aircraft flew 
50 miles inside East German airspace. The aircraft was intercepted by a Russian MiG-15 
fighter and shot down resulting in the deaths of its seven aircrew.542 The aircraft crashed back 
over the border near Boizenburg in West Germany and it was noted that ammunition from the 
















 opened fire first but this was denied by the British who determined that the aircraft was not 
even carrying ammunition in its guns.544 It appeared that the aircraft was over the GDR due 
to a navigator over-compensating for an easterly wind which then resulted in its destruction. 
The British decided that in future all training aircraft were to be fully armed when flying over 
Germany with guns loaded and cocked but should fly no closer than 10 miles to the inner 
German border.545 Interestingly on the same day this incident took place, another Lincoln 
bomber strayed 30 miles into East German airspace some 45 minutes earlier which Aldrich 
does not mention.546 The second aircraft was not shot down but was instead escorted out of 
the GDR’s airspace. It does seem a coincidence that two bombers with experienced war-
veteran crews should both over-compensate for the easterly wind in broad daylight and fly 
into the GDR within one hour of each other on the same day. Aldrich is likely correct to say 
that allied SIGINT facilities in Germany were tracking the flights and the Russian response, 
but it remains unclear if the aircraft deliberately flew into the GDR to generate an air defence 
response for intelligence collection purposes. If they did, it was a terrible price to pay to 
collect intelligence and showed the dangers that were potentially faced by allied aircrew 
engaging in aerial intelligence collection. At this time the United States also experimented 
with the use of unmanned high-altitude balloons to access the Soviet Union’s airspace, with 
no risk to life. This programme could reduce the problem of confrontation and it was another 
opportunity for the UK to covertly participate in airborne intelligence collection efforts, 
revealed here for the first time.547  
 
British Involvement in the Covert Balloon Programme 
 
From 1950, the CIA and the USAF experimented with novel high-altitude balloons to gather 
agery in a covert photographic programme against the Soviet Union. Balloons provided a 
 concealed because sophisticated 
unching bases were not required. This classified programme was known by several 
and recovery devices and would drift from Europe eastwards across target areas. The camera 
im
stable platform for photography and their origin could be
la
codenames such as WS 119L, MOBY DICK and GENETRIX.548 The hydrogen-filled 









 could take 500 photographs from 40-60,000 feet in daylight.549 When the balloon reached the 
Pacific Ocean a beacon would activate and an aircraft be despatched to meet it. A radio signal 
would be broadcast to burst the balloon and the camera package would drop by parachute to 
be retrieved in mid-air by an American aircraft or by boat if it landed in the sea.550 Despite 
the danger of Russian reaction and protest, President Eisenhower approved the project and 
during 1954-55 the United States undertook tests in the UK, the results of which were briefed 
in the White House.551  
 
 
Declassified files on this obscure, important and highly secret operation described as “USAF 
Special Meteorological Experiments” show that experiments were mounted from Edzell, 
Scotland from December 1954; approved by the Secretary of State for Defence and the Chief 
f the Air Staff.552 The latter noted that these operations had a “very high priority” and the 




Edzell and had “indoctrination” into the project in the United States as well as practical 
training on balloons in Hawaii for 30-60 days.554 It was also stipulated that there was a “high 
degree of secrecy attached to these experiments.”555 The first experiments from Scotland 
were conducted from 29 November 1954 to 6 December 1954 with eight balloons released, 
but only one launch was successful, later being picked up in Okinawa.556 This showed that 
balloons could operate from the UK, transit the USSR and then be successfully recovered. On 
24 January 1955 there were eight more balloon launches from Edzell.557 The British 
government also asked the Americans if there had been any Russian reaction to the operation 
because there were concerns that the balloons could be tracked by radar and traced to their 
point of departure.558 In a letter of 4 August 1955, the operation in the UK was assigned the 
codename GRAYBACK and was to be run from a former Royal Navy Fleet Air Arm base at 


















 The Americans agreed to supply 100 personnel and all the equipment for the operation with 
the RAF supplying 73 staff.560 All the launchings needed approval and were determined by 
weather conditions at the time. This was an urgent project and the RAF had to be ready to 
begin operations once it was approved by Washington.561 Security was paramount but the 
lly reaching altitude and going east.568 Only one balloon passed over Russia and 
                   
base was in a remote location and required five million cubic feet of hydrogen per month to 
maintain operations.562 Gas could be supplied from a plant in Scotland without attracting 
attention. The Americans wanted no press releases about the activity. Any photographs taken 
or released concerning the activity had to be solely of the balloon and not the gondola it 
carried which contained the camera and electronic intelligence equipment.563 There was also 
to be no mention of the flights being long-range and personnel had to maintain that the 
balloons were solely for the collection of data on local weather. Any press enquiries were to 
be told that it was an RAF/USAF experiment to explore atmospheric conditions above 
40,000ft to examine clouds, wind and turbulence with the data sent by radio to a ground 
station.564 The operation at Evanton was only one small part of the entire operation and a 
memorandum noted that the USAF were also running similar operations in Turkey, Germany 
and Norway and planned to launch 600 balloons from the UK.565 Such was the secrecy 
surrounding the operation that the Royal Navy was not told the true nature of the operation on 
its base; a memorandum noted that the Admiralty is “unaware of the true nature of the 
proposed operation.”566 It also noted that the Americans wanted to launch 3000 camera-
carrying balloons from 1 November 1955 and sought to launch them all from the UK but 
weather conditions meant that other countries had to be used.567 The British government was 



















 most UK balloons failed near 8000ft.569 GCHQ also had an involvement in the project during 
955, monitoring any Russian air defence reaction and tracking signals from the balloons, but 
 programme and launches from the UK were terminated 
n 29 February 1956. The Americans asked the UK to ensure that, despite its termination, 
crecy remained paramount on the project.575 The RAF noted that 461 launches of balloons 
                                                           
1
it could only do so at short-range.570 A report to Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Intelligence) 
noted that “the whole operation was a fiasco” with eight balloons having been launched, two 
ended up in the North Sea and the rest burst on ascent.571 In January 1955, all eight balloon 
launches failed due to weather conditions in the UK; in the United States they had been 
successful, leading a senior officer to speculate that “large scale balloon launchings from the 
UK with the existing equipment are unlikely to be successful.”572 By 1956 the project’s 
codename had changed from GRAYBACK to Project 119L and some $68 million had been 
spent on 3500 balloons.573 Lack of success in the UK meant that sites were examined in 
Germany, Turkey and Norway.574  
 
 
The poor success rate, complaints from the Russians and platforms such as the U-2 starting to 
enter service meant that the balloon
o
se
were undertaken from sites across the world, with 88 being launched from Scotland over two 
years with half of the programme’s balloons having reached Russia; 42 having been 
recovered from the Pacific Ocean.576 The RAF were disappointed that the recovery rate was 
only 10 per cent of all successful launches when it had been thought that it would be three 
times that rate.577 Peebles states that some 379 balloons actually crossed the Soviet border 
and of these 235 were lost with only 44 gondolas having been successfully recovered in the 
Pacific, only one of which originated in Scotland.578 Limited information is available on the 
























 “pictures of excellent quality” were received but it is unclear if there were valuable results.579 
It was often difficult to establish where the balloon had gone and what it had photographed 
and most of the retrieved pictures were from balloons launched in Turkey meaning there was 
scattered coverage of European Russia and Central Asia. However, at least some areas were 
photographed which were not covered by German wartime photographs or from post-war 
reconnaissance flights along the Soviet border.580  
 
 
Overall it appears that only limited intelligence was produced by the balloon programme but 
it showed that Britain and the United States could work together on a covert aerial collection 
rogramme and maintain its secrecy. The project seems to reveal desperation to gather 
telligence, trying any available method until technological progress produced a more viable 
led information on covert deep penetrations of Soviet 




system. Russian reaction to aerial intrusion was tested and knowledge gathered concerning 
high-altitude photography and equipment retrieval. All of this proved useful in the U-2 and 
satellite reconnaissance programmes. The Russians did however protest about the balloons, 
showing that they could detect and resented high-altitude espionage.581 Captured balloons 
were also put on display in Moscow as part of a propaganda exercise to expose US 
“aggression” against the Soviet Union; there is no indication that the Russians knew where 
the balloons had been launched from.582 This exhibition of western espionage, eerily 
replicated after the downing of the U-2 aircraft in May 1960, seemed designed to undermine 
Eisenhower as a peacemaker and to show that Russia would protect its secrets. At about the 
same time as the balloon programme was being undertaken, another covert operation was 
being planned in Washington and London. This one involved the dangerous use of fast jets 
undertaking over-flights of the USSR.  
 
Covert British Over-flights – Operation JIU-JITSU 
 









 subject.583 The problem faced by Britain and the United States was that if they had to attack 
ussia’s strategic nuclear forces they would need to do so from high altitude and likely in 
s 
 American equipment, they had the drive and political approval to undertake more 
azardous missions into the Soviet Union. This data could then be passed to the Americans to 
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poor weather or at night, thereby making visual identification of airfields or missile bases 
extremely difficult. Electronic navigation aids did not extend far into the Soviet Union so 
targets would have to be recognised from radar images used by navigators.584 The problem 
was how to obtain such images. President Truman had prohibited Strategic Air Command 
from overflying the Soviet Union to photograph radar screen images of potential targets.585  
 
 
Due to post-war cuts in the RAF the British were still using propeller-driven aircraft such as 
the Mosquito and the Spitfire for photo-reconnaissance. However, if they could obtain acces
to
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avoid White House restrictions, allowing a greater understanding of Russian nuclear forces 
and installations in European Russia. This would then allow the production of target plans for 
wartime use. According to Lashmar, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to ask the British 
for help. In austere times, the British were likely to be keen to prove their value as a useful 
and trusted partner in the Cold War “special relationship.”586 Propeller driven aircraft such as 
the Lancaster or the Lincoln would not suffice but modern American jets with advanced radar 
equipment could be loaned to the RAF to undertake the missions. Lashmar notes that the 
British Joint Services Mission in Washington had been in discussions with the Americans 
about over-flights but only a few very senior people knew about it.587 In the UK Air Chief 
Marshal Cochrane, Vice-Chief of the Air Staff was put in charge of the operation with 
Squadron Leader Micky Martin of wartime ‘Dambusters’ fame tasked to select personnel to 
form a top secret unit to run the operation.588 When Lashmar undertook his research the 
project was still classified but some material has now been released to the National Archives 














 The aircraft chosen for the covert over-flights was the American RB-45C Tornado which was 
fast, high-flying and could be refuelled in mid-air thereby extending its range. Some of these 
aircraft were already temporarily based in the UK at RAF Sculthorpe, Norfolk with the 91st 
trategic Reconnaissance Wing. This unit undertook mapping of Western Europe to update 
that the mission took place from 17/18 
pril 1952 and consisted of three simultaneous over-flights in the Orsha and Poltava areas of 
e Soviet Union; refuelling over Denmark was provided by the Americans.599 The Air 
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intelligence records and to aid planning but stayed 100 miles away from the Eastern 
European border.590 Any covert over-flights using these aircraft would take place at night 
because if radar pictures were taken then natural light was not needed. The RAF sent nine 
men to join a secret unit based at Sculthorpe which needed pilots, co-pilots and navigators. 
They were subsequently sent to the United States for training on the RB-45C.591  In October 
1951 as well, Winston Churchill returned as Prime Minister, a wartime leader the RAF 
apparently found more amenable than Attlee and who subsequently authorised the covert 
over-flights from Sculthorpe.592 A trial run was undertaken on 21 March 1952 in the Berlin 
air corridor to test Russian reactions to a medium jet bomber flying at high altitude transiting 
sensitive air space but it is unclear what the reaction was or if GCHQ detected any alert being 
raised.593 The following month, a crew was briefed at Bomber Command Headquarters in 
High Wycombe to be told the real nature of its mission by the Commander-in-Chief of the 
RAF.594 Three missions were planned to the Baltic States, one to Moscow and one to 
Ukraine.595 A cover story was also provided in the event of a crash or if an aircraft was shot 
down stating that it had got lost and flown into the Soviet Union. False navigation charts 
were also provided as corroboration.596 The aircraft also had RAF markings painted on them 
with any American insignia having been removed.597  
 
 
Declassified papers show that the object of the first mission was, in the view of the Air 



















 Ministry concluded that “valuable results were obtained” and that 20 out of 35 suspected or 
known Long Range Air Force bases were identified.600 The over-flights also provided 
knowledge of Soviet air defences whose reaction time was slow. The Russians also appeared 
to have no night-fighter capability.601 The aircraft were flying at 40,000 feet and Russian 
fighters could not reach them despite attempts to upgrade Russia’s air defences. This was 
crucial knowledge in the event of an atomic war occurring. The RB45Cs got back safely with 
one aircraft having done a ten and a half hour mission. The photographs of the radar screens 
were taken to be analysed and the crews received Air Force Crosses for bravery, which 
required no citation to be written.602 According to Lashmar the Russians had detected the 




The declassified file also reveals that a second JIU-JITSU mission was planned for April 
1953.604 The British wanted the Americans to undertake it but there was no political 
uthorisation forthcoming when the British Foreign Secretary discussed it with President 
ruman.605 The President thought that it was “not propitious” due to the political situation in 
might not last if Soviet air defences improved and an early decision on future missions 
a
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the aftermath of Stalin’s death but he would review it with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 
Air Force.606 An American scientist also visited the United Kingdom at this time to see if the 
new Comet jet aircraft could be used for deep-penetration missions against bomber bases.607 
The Americans were concerned that the intelligence material they had was “confined almost 
solely to old German photographs.”608 The Air Ministry was alert to the fact that it had to 
gather as much intelligence as possible because in wartime there would not be the time to 
collect enormous amounts of intelligence. It noted that “this information can only be obtained 
by previous air reconnaissance” and can be made “by night at the present time with slight risk 















 needed to be made because the “no moon period” would only last from 26 April – 1 May 
1953 and the mission had to be undertaken in complete darkness.610 If it was not undertaken 
in the spring then a delay would occur until winter 1954 and the RAF even considered doing 
an independent over-flight mission with a new Valiant bomber.611 Conversations were held 
on this topic between the US President, Prime Minister Winston Churchill and the British 




Eden’s concerns about a second mission were of the “grave political repercussions which 
might result from a mishap.”613 A second mission was considered more dangerous because 
additional time would be spent over Russian territory and it would go deeper into the country, 
otably around the Moscow area.614 The first mission was primarily to collect intelligence on 




mission was to collect intelligence for a general atomic attack on the Soviet Union and not for 
special attacks on its bomber bases, which had been important for the defence of the United 
Kingdom.615 The feeling appeared to be that responsibility for a general atomic attack against 
the Soviet Union rested with the United States and it should take the risk for collection on 
this target. Eden could not understand “why it is thought right, that in the interests of 
collecting intelligence for this offensive, we should accept risks which the Americans will not 
accept.”616 He also saw a danger that each operation alerted the Soviet authorities and 
“increases the possibility that the Soviet government may conclude that the western powers 
are definitely planning to attack them and may therefore make them decide to attack the 















 According to Lashmar, a second mission, scheduled for late 1952 was cancelled apparently 
due to a possible security breach.618 However, the mission was re-instated on 28-29 April 
954 with three longer routes than the previous operation and the whole undertaking was 
onitored by GCHQ to test Russian reactions.619 This mission was approved by Winston 
lligence. A support paper in the 
eclassified file on the missions emphasises that British aircraft in wartime would have to 
ttack Russian bomber bases at night with no fighter escort.625 This could only be done if 




Churchill who asked to be informed when it was being undertaken.620 Even if the primary 
mission of obtaining photographs failed, at least intelligence would be gained about Russian 
communications and air defences which would be useful to the allies. The aircraft had RAF 
markings; no serial numbers and the longest route went 1000 miles into Russia and covered 
some 30 targets.621 The Soviet air defence system went on alert during the second mission 
and one Russian commander even ordered his pilots to try to ram one of the RB-45Cs.622 One 
British pilot also recalled encountering anti-aircraft fire on the return journey.623 A 
handwritten (undated) file note states that it would be several days before the mission could 
be declared a success because radio and radar traffic would need to be examined.624 It is 
unknown what intelligence was collected or how successful the final mission was; no other 
missions were undertaken in this series as far as is known. 
 
 
These controversial and highly dangerous missions were considered important to the British, 
who were prepared to take extreme risks to gather inte
d
a
they had radar pictures taken previously, without snow on the ground; otherwise days would 
be lost gathering intelligence in the crucial early stages of a war.626 It argued that there was 
“a strong military necessity for this radar reconnaissance to be undertaken in peace” when the 
nights were not too short.627 It also appreciated that the Americans would not do it for 

















 radar.628 Interestingly, the paper also noted that three “special flights” using slow transport 
aircraft on a moonlit night had previously flown over Russia with no reaction noted.629 This 
is likely to be a fleeting reference to allied agents being parachuted into Russia. The support 
for the over-flight operations has a tone of “now or never” because Russian air defences were 
advancing and it would become difficult and risky to run such missions in the future. It also 
noted that Fighter Command could not hope to defend the UK against a Russian air strike and 
attacking Russian bomber bases was “the most effective means of reducing the scale of attack 
on this country.”630 Such was the sensitivity of the issue that it was noted in a memorandum 
between the Chief of the Air Staff and the Secretary of State that it is “highly undesirable to 
discuss a matter of this extreme secrecy in Cabinet.”631 
 
 
Very few papers have been declassified concerning the JIU-JITSU operations but it is clear 
that the flights were an enormous gamble which needed approval at the highest level. They 
perhaps reflect the character of Churchill whose wartime experiences gave him an acute 
ppreciation of the importance of intelligence. What would have happened in the event of an 
ircraft crashing in the Soviet Union can only be imagined and perhaps it would have led to 
over-flight 




the U-2 over-flight programme not being undertaken? There was also a risk at this tense time 
that a group of allied aircraft might have been mistaken for a pre-emptive nuclear attack on 
the USSR or the missions could have been betrayed by Russian sources in western 
intelligence. However, the extreme security measures surrounding the project likely 
prevented leakage of information. New Russian fighter aircraft and radars being introduced 
as well as the RB-45C becoming obsolete prevented further missions but the advent of the 
British Canberra bomber raised new possibilities for covert aerial reconnaissance. 
 
The British Covert Mission To Kapustin Yar 
 
In his work on aerial espionage, Lashmar wrote about a clandestine mission allegedly 









 mentioned by Robert Amory, retired CIA Deputy Director of Intelligence in the 1950s, who 
oral history project.633 This assertion had 
riginally appeared in a book on the CIA published in 1968.634 In particular, doubts have 
 by the Truman administration; instead the RAF flew a mission from 
ermany to the target and “got some fair pictures.”638 He further asserted that the British did 
ot want to do it again due to the high level of risk and the Russians having detected the 
                                                           
was interviewed for an American University 
o
been cast about the credibility of this allegation and debate ensued about which aircraft or 
squadron flew the mission and why no official documentation or statement by the participants 
has been released.635 Doubts have been cast about Amory’s memory and if he was confusing 
the alleged over-flight with Operation JIU-JITSU as well as technical information about 
which camera system might have been used. Pocock reviewed Lashmar’s evidence and after 
an examination of RAF operational record books in the National Archives could find no 
flights which matched this alleged covert operation.636 However, such a sensitive operation 
would likely, like Operation JIU-JITSU, be Top Secret and concealed for security reasons so 
would be unlikely to feature in operational record books or RAF station flying logs which are 
limited to secret level. 
 
 
Amory and Lashmar pointed out that western intelligence was aware of the Kapustin Yar 
facility from debriefs of German returnees and it was a national priority to secure intelligence 




flight but then making no public comment.639 The Canberra was an ideal platform for such a 
mission having set the world altitude record at 63,668 feet on 4 May 1953.640 Lashmar 
thought that the single operation referred to by Amory was called Operation ROBIN but my 
research reveals that ROBIN was the codename for a US supplied 240 inch focal length 

















 from 46,000 feet at a range of 40-50 miles.641 Such a camera would be unsuitable for direct 
overhead photography and it could photograph from a greater distance without overflying the 
site. Operation ROBIN instead appears to have been a programme of cross-border 
photography using a Canberra aircraft to photograph denied areas but does not seem to be the 
cover name for a covert operation to photograph the Kapustin Yar missile testing facility.642 
In the ROBIN project nine aircraft sorties were flown along the German border to photograph 
East Germany from 1954-55 but there is no mention of any aircraft entering Soviet 
airspace.643 However, many papers on this project, which used a powerful American camera, 
are retained and a special mission may have used the programme as cover.   
 
 
With no written records available in the UK and the aircrew from the time gradually passing 
away, it seems unlikely that hard evidence about Amory’s alleged over-flight would emerge. 
Lashmar does note however that Soviet aircrew from the era recall attempting to intercept 
anberra aircraft inside Soviet airspace.644 Colonel Aleksandr Orlov of Soviet military 




all the time” using aircraft “especially the English Canberra.”645 A Russian fighter pilot, 
Lieutenant Mikhail Shulga also recalled intercepting a high-flying Canberra near Kapustin 
Yar in the 1950s but it was flying at such altitude that his engines stalled and he could not 
reach it.646 After publication of his book Lashmar received letters from readers alleging that 
Canberras had taken off from the UK painted black or sky-blue with minimal identification 
for secret missions but these reports are unconfirmed.647 However, it has been well quoted 
that on 24 June 1956 Premier Khrushchev said to General Nathan Twining, Senior United 
States Air Force Officer, who was visiting Moscow for the Armed Forces Day, that the 

























 This circumstantial evidence implies that a covert over-flight was indeed undertaken of 
Kapustin Yar by the British in the early 1950s to undertake photography. During my research 
two stronger pieces of evidence came to light from the United States. Dino Brugioni, former 
senior CIA imagery analyst wrote a book about photographic reconnaissance which mentions 
is experience of the Kaputin Yar mission.649 He notes that the CIA was under pressure to 
 Yar flight.655 The CIA noted that the 
AF had mounted Operation ROBIN since 1952 which involved using Canberra aircraft for 
igh altitude reconnaissance operations because they had been fitted with more powerful 
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complete National Intelligence Estimate 11-6-54, “Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs 
in the Field of Guided Missiles” which was due in October 1954 and aerial images were 
required of Kapustin Yar.650 According to Brugioni the USAF was preparing for the mission 
but the RAF flew it instead in August 1953 as part of a burden-sharing reconnaissance 
effort.651 Robert Amory apparently informed a few CIA officers about the mission, which is 
still shrouded in mystery, but it was apparently undertaken in daylight using a 100-inch focal 
length camera and flew from Giebelstadt airfield in West Germany.652 Brugioni asserts that 
the aircraft approached the range but did not overfly it and was damaged by gunfire from 
Russian aircraft and had to land in Iran.653 Brugioni interpreted U-2 imagery of the site later 
on and requested the 1953 images taken by the British but was informed that they were 
“badly smeared and of no value.”654 Brugioni was the second American official to mention 
the covert British mission to Kapustin Yar and later on in my research some American 
documentary material emerged to confirm the flight.  
 
 
In 2013 the CIA released its official history of the U-2 program which had previously been 
released in heavily redacted form. The new document reveals British involvement in the U-2 
over-flights and some details of the RAF’s Kapustin
R
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Avon-109 engines and fuel-filled “wet wings.”656 This extended the aircraft’s range to 4,300 


















 half of 1953 the RAF sent a Canberra aircraft to Kapustin Yar but it was chased by Russian 
fighter aircraft and nearly shot down.658 The CIA mused that either a traitor had revealed the 
flight details to the Russians or it had been detected on radar.659 The Americans found out 
about the flight in the summer of 1953 and the British formally confirmed it to Washington in 
February 1954.660 Despite the close relationship between the two states, this was such a 
sensitive operation that the Americans were only told about it months later and do not seem 
to have been involved in its planning. American personnel received a more in-depth briefing 
on the operation in the UK from 22-23 March 1954 and then reported back to Washington.661 
The CIA authors stipulate that there was no evidence that the United States was involved in 
the operation and few people in the United States knew about it.662 This is the only official 
document which has been released which confirms this operation which presumably had to 
be authorised personally by Prime Minister Winston Churchill. The attack the aircraft 
suffered might explain the smearing of the photographic product and it seems to have been a 
considerable risk for possibly little gain. Nobody states that further missions were undertaken 
to Kapustin Yar but this remains a possibility. The Canberra was a very competent and useful 
intelligence platform and Riste speculates that RAF aircraft deployed to Norway in the 1950s 
may have been used for collection against the Soviet Union.663 Norwegian radar personnel 
noted that “British pilots took greater risks” in intelligence collection and flew directly at 
Soviet radar stations to test their reactions when gathering ELINT.664 It is unclear if any 
covert over-flights were taken in north-west Russia but the presence of the Soviet nuclear 




Additionally, a report produced by Air Intelligence in 1954 speculated about the purpose of 
several strange facilities in the Moscow area.665 The Air Ministry had identified 19 
unidentified complexes in the vicinity of Moscow in July 1954. One had been observed by a 















 British personnel was being used to supplement aerial reconnaissance at this time.666 In 
September 1954 the crew of a British Hastings transport aircraft delivering supplies to 
oscow was also briefed to try to observe these complexes, utilising a routine delivery for 
telligence collection.667 The file contains diagrams and locations of 19 complexes of 
rmation on bomber or nuclear missile bases may also 
ave been gathered in the same way. Diagrams were produced from material “sketched from 
emory” obtained through “oblique views” as well as grainy black and white photographs of 




unusual layout and the buildings and roads were reportedly seen by “various observers” 
which is curious because some of the complexes on the map appear to be many miles from 
Moscow.668 Analysts looked at the size of the living accommodation to determine the number 
of staff at each location and a “source has supplied some very useful details.”669 It is unclear 
what, or who, the source was but they noticed smoke “changing colour before fading away” 
coming from one complex as well as possible air venting from a bunker.670 Information on 
two sites came from the USAF which appears to have used its transport deliveries to Moscow 
to photograph the sites from aircraft windows with images available on the file.671 A human 
source known as “the observer” was also questioned but it is unknown who they were or their 
nationality.672 The UK likely had human intelligence sources in the USSR who remain 
unknown or who were later betrayed. 
 
 
The Air Ministry also sought to have travellers flying from Stalingrad and Voronezh to 
Moscow look out of the port-side of their aircraft approximately 30 minutes before landing at 
Moscow.673 British intelligence could not determine the purpose of these facilities but 
speculated that they were missile related. It seems they were air defence installations but it 
shows the supplementary use of ordinary air travel to gather intelligence and of unknown 
human sources to verify the data. Info
h
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roads in forests photographed through cockpit windows.674 It is likely that more intelligence 














 intelligence coup came in 1955 with the advent of the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft which, it 
has emerged in recent years, had covert British involvement.  
 
The U-2 Programme and British Involvement 
 
The U-2 has held a fascination for the public since it first appeared in the mid-1950s and 
achieved spectacular notoriety when an aircraft was shot down over the Soviet Union on 1 
May 1960 thereby wrecking the superpower summit in Paris that year. The CIA’s own secret 
internal history of the aircraft has gradually been released since 1998 and allows a fuller 
picture to be drawn about the aircraft, its significance and the UK’s secret role in the project. 
Numerous works have been produced on the U-2 but my research had the benefit of being 
able to access Welzenbach’s virtually un-redacted CIA internal study of the programme, 
in 2013.675 Further information concerning 
e UK’s involvement in U-2 operations emerged in March 2016 when the internal history of 
ns into its airspace and 
vealed they could detect and track high-flying foreign objects in their airspace. The key 
uestion was if President Eisenhower was willing to take the risk to mount illegal over-flights 
into the sovereign air space of another state at a particularly dangerous and tense period in the 
Cold War. A cost and benefit analysis had to be undertaken to weigh damage to international 
s against the possible intelligence yield. Eisenhower, with his military background, 
                   
including its British aspect, which was released 
th
the CIA’s Office of Special Activities (OSA) was declassified.676    
 
 
The U-2 was a remarkable piece of aeronautical engineering and was in essence a jet 
powered glider designed to operate at 70,000 feet to perform imagery and electronic 
intelligence collection over the USSR. At this altitude it was beyond the reach of Soviet jet 
fighters, anti-aircraft guns and the earliest type of Soviet surface-to-air missiles. Initially it 
was also unclear if it could fly above Soviet radar cover but any Soviet protests received 
about over-flights would reveal their detection capabilities. The balloon over-flight project 














 was involved in some of the key decisions of the Second World War and so was well used to 
making such judgements. Interestingly, in 1955 he had proposed the Open Skies initiative to 
Khrushchev, whereby both sides would be allowed to fly reconnaissance aircraft over each 
other’s territory to examine factories and military facilities to prevent surprise attack and 
increase knowledge of strategic capabilities. Khrushchev rejected the proposal as a “bald 
espionage plot against the USSR”677 but in the light of the U-2 project it can be seen that 
Eisenhower could offer this as a statesmanlike, but cynical, gesture for world peace knowing 
that the U-2 was entering service and could provide unprecedented access to intelligence on 
Russian military facilities whether the Russians agreed to the proposal or not.678  
 
 
With pressure mounting on American intelligence due to the on-going debate about the 
“bomber gap” and the “missile gap”, the need for hard intelligence on the Russian target 
became more acute and risks needed to be taken to gather it. In his memoirs, Eisenhower 
noted the “critical importance” of determining what equipment and capabilities the USSR did 
and did not have.679 The covert balloon project had gathered data on weather in the upper 
atmosphere which helped in the design of the U-2 and cameras had been developed which 
could perform at high-altitude. The Hycon-B camera carried on the U-2 had five times the 
resolution of cameras used in the Second World War and Kodak had developed a special thin 
film which allowed 10,000 feet of film to be carried for longer reconnaissance missions.680 
The organisational skills, imagination and resources of the CIA, combined with the technical 
rowess of the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation resulted in the first test flight of this innovative 
ircraft on 4 August 1955.681 It also led, due to its unusual shape and enigmatic aura, to the 
p
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Despite its technical brilliance, the U-2 suffered from limited range and could not operate 










 conditions to take off and fly straight and level both at its operating base and over the target 
area. The literature on the U-2 is rife with stories about how difficult it was to land the 
aircraft due to its glider-like wings which kept it aloft. The aircraft was also notorious for 
having its engine stall due to “flame-outs” at high altitude and if it went too fast or slow it 
could go into a dive and lose its wings so it had to be flown at precisely the right speed to 
avoid “coffin corner” as it was known by the pilots. All of this had to be borne in mind by 
isenhower if he was to approve flights over the Soviet Union; even if the aircraft was not 
ot down, there was always the danger of an accident and losing an aircraft or pilot over 
 that Prime Minister 
nthony Eden had to agree it.684 Richard Bissell, CIA Deputy Director Operations, was in 
verall charge of the U-2 programme and in spring 1956 he visited the UK to meet Prime 
and four aircraft and pilots were sent to Lakenheath starting on 29 April 1956, with all 




hostile territory; a nightmare which would become reality in May 1960. 
 
 
Limited range and lack of proximity of Soviet reconnaissance targets to the United States 
meant that foreign bases had to be used for U-2 operations and during the programme 
Turkey, Germany, Iran, England, Pakistan and Japan were all used as forward operating 
bases. The first overseas operating base where the U-2 was to be deployed was in the UK, 
reflecting the close relationship which existed between the two counties; US Strategic Air 
Command already had a base at Lakenheath in Suffolk.683 Allen Dulles, CIA Director, had 
discussed the U-2 deployment to the UK with British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd on 2 
February 1956 and although he was in favour of the project, emphasised
A
o
Minister Anthony Eden to secure the use of the base to install a special aircraft hangar 
there.685 Bissell emphasised the value of the intelligence which could be collected by the U-2 
and played down the danger which existed. Correspondence declassified in 2016 also reveals 
that Bissell did not emphasise the danger in order to “minimize the incentive on the part of 
the British to try to maintain a tight control over operations.”686 The special relationship had 
limits as the U-2 was an American aircraft working to an American government department. 
Bissell also met the SIS Chief on his visit and the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff was also 












 known under the CIA cover as “Detachment A”.687 As the unit was “provisional” it meant 
that it did not have to report to a higher command thereby ensuring it was more secure and 
run on a “need to know” basis, operating under cover as a unit providing a weather 
information service concerning the upper atmosphere.688 The new aircraft naturally attracted 
the attention of aircraft enthusiasts with the magazine Flying Review noting unnervingly a 
few months later that “it is possible that U-2s are flying across the Iron Curtain taking aerial 
photographs or probing radar defences.”689  
 
 
Bissell wanted the first over-flights of the USSR to be undertaken from the UK and some 
practice missions were undertaken over Eastern Europe.690 However, the politics of the Cold 
War overtook the CIA’s planning activity. Eden was attempting to improve relations with the 
USSR in the post-Stalin years and SIS had mounted a dangerous clandestine mission in 1956 
to use frogman Commander Lionel “Buster” Crabb to gather intelligence by diving beneath 
the Russian warship in Portsmouth harbour which had brought Khrushchev and other Soviet 
leaders to the UK on an official visit. The political fallout from this debacle, the unauthorised 
nature of which infuriated Eden, resulted in his writing to Eisenhower demanding that any 
over-flights mounted from Lakenheath should be postponed.691 The possible delays to the 
planned flight schedules were unacceptable to Bissell and prompted him to seek a new base 
r the aircraft. A U-2 had also recently triggered an air defence alert in the UK with RAF 
ghters being scrambled to try to intercept it as an unidentified aircraft.692 Bissell was also 
fo
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reportedly unhappy that the State Department had told Eden that there was only one U-2 
aircraft at Lakenheath when in fact there were four.693 To avoid further problems and to start 
the over-flight programme against the USSR, the decision was taken by the CIA to move the 
aircraft to Wiesbaden, Germany on 11 June 1956.694 Some intelligence literature gives the 
impression that Eden banned U-2 over-flights from being launched from the UK or expelled 
the U-2s, but it was clearly American eagerness to start their covert operation and their 












 the move. My research in The National Archives did not reveal any documents about U-2s at 
Lakenheath undertaking over-flights or British involvement in these covert operations due to 
the extreme sensitivity of the topic. Further security concerns later prompted the Americans 
to again move the U-2s from Wiesbaden to a base at Giebelstadt in West Germany.695  
 
 
Covert U-2 over-flights of the USSR launched from Germany finally started on 4 July 
1956.696 All missions depended upon Eisenhower’s personal authorisation of the route and 
weather conditions at the base and the target. The first mission covered Leningrad and 
notably the bases where Bison bombers were thought to be located, clearly showing the 
importance of Soviet nuclear bombers to western intelligence.697 On 5 July another over-
flight of the USSR was undertaken covering more alleged Bison bomber bases as well as the 
Fili aircraft plant where the bomber was built and Ramenskoye airfield where it was tested.698 
The operation also covered the Kaliningrad missile plant and the Khimki missile facility 
which had both been mentioned in debriefs by German returnees.699 These missions clearly 
mphasised the importance of Russian missile and bomber facilities to western intelligence 
nd the potential threat they posed. The over-flights also included the Leningrad and Moscow 
The U-2 could fly at extreme altitude and the CIA initially thought that the Russians could 




areas which likely reflected the CIA’s intention to undertake the highest risk missions early 
on in the programme as these would most likely cause offence to, and provoke a reaction 
from, the Russians. Interestingly, the cancelled American balloon programme had yielded 
information about Soviet air defence radars and the weather which was useful to the U-2 
programme.700 It had also provided data concerning Russian fighter aircraft intercept 
altitudes and reaction times. The CIA had noted Russian protests and sought to cancel the 
balloon programme lest it prejudice the White House against the U-2 over-flight programme 
in the future.701  
 
 














 unexpectedly, the Russians lodged protests about the initial U-2 over-flights thereby 
confirming that they could be detected and tracked, much to the CIA’s consternation.702 
However, the Russians did not appear to know what sort of aircraft it was and described it as 
“a twin engine USAF medium bomber” or even a Canberra.703 This could be denied because 
the U-2 was not a bomber, had only one engine and was not even a military aircraft as the 
programme was run by the CIA with civilian pilots on contract. Russian protests caused 
Eisenhower to halt further over-flights; meantime analysis of the pictures obtained by the first 
U-2 missions was found to be “generally good.”704 The results showed that at nine Soviet 
bomber bases there were no Bison aircraft and subsequent missions would show that the 
bomber gap” was a myth.705 The images were held in a secure room in the United States 
ith only the chosen few with the right security clearances being allowed to see them.706  
 In 
arly 1958 the UK was pressed by the Americans to train RAF personnel to fly the U-2 and it 





Russian protests and the U-2’s operational stand-down from flights over the USSR caused 
Bissell to seek other ways to run missions without seeking White House approval. The UK 
was again his first choice to help in this matter and the 2013 release of the CIA’s history of 
the U-2 provides new detail on this. The UK had previously hosted a U-2 detachment and 
received imagery from the aircraft since September 1956 in a special UK control system 
which was later merged with the American one.707 In spring 1957 Bissell decided that the 
political risks of the programme could be reduced by using non-US personnel thereby 
increasing the over-flights’ plausible deniability.708 At a meeting on 6 May 1957, Eisenhower 
approved the use of foreign personnel and CIA Director Dulles and Bissell met SIS and RAF 
Intelligence personnel shortly afterwards to discuss it.709 Eisenhower also consented to the 
resumption of U-2 over-flights and ten were undertaken in the second half of 1957.710
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 the CIA.711 British participation in the over-flights was originally to have been codenamed 
KEEPER but this was later changed to OLDSTER.712 
 
 
Four British officers were trained at Laughlin Air Force Base in Texas to fly the U-2; one, 
Squadron Leader Christopher Walker died in a training accident over Texas in July 1958 
generating media interest.713 British participation in the programme caused the CIA to change 
the over-flight programme codename from AQUATONE to CHALICE.714 By November 
1958, the RAF had three pilots and a flight surgeon in place in Turkey with the agreement of 
the Turkish government. Prime Minister Harold Macmillan formally agreed to RAF 
personnel over-flying the USSR on 27 August 1958 whilst retaining the right to approve or 
veto the flights.715 The aircraft were not permitted to have RAF markings on them and the 
pilots had to pose as civilians. Eisenhower formally agreed the co-operation and Bissell was 
elighted that he now had an additional source of over-flight authorisation to facilitate 
perations “at times or under circumstances beyond the scope of authority accorded by US 




political authorities.”716  
 
 
This process was to make over-flight approvals easier because each decision was made 
independent of the other state.717 Eisenhower liked the system because it would confuse the 
USSR over which nation approved the over-flight and spread the risk if an aircraft was 
lost.718 He also saw it as a natural extension of the special relationship which had developed 
between the two countries and key individuals during the Second World War.719 The British 
also benefited because the U-2 could be borrowed for use in the Middle East where the UK 





















 the UK and any operation became the responsibility of the British Prime Minister and fell 
under his authorisation.721 Eisenhower saw the relationship as “two complementary programs 
ther than a joint one.”722 From the newly declassified record in 2013 it is now known that 
 late 1959 and early 1960, the RAF ran two “highly successful” missions over the USSR 
vided clues about the locations of other missile 
tes. However, despite “excellent photography” no missile facilities were found but a new 




covering missile testing facilities at a time when Eisenhower had not authorised a mission for 
six months.723 The rest of the UK’s activity consisted of 27 missions over the Middle East 
over two years.724 In the UK, RAF participation in the programme was described as “high-
altitude weather sampling” and a U-2 was sent to RAF Watton in Norfolk, described as an 
“Experimental Meteorological Research Unit” in May and October 1959 to fly weather 
missions to reinforce this cover story.725    
 
 
Eisenhower only started to authorise more over-flights in 1959 after the “missile gap” 
controversy gathered pace.726 Prime Minister Macmillan was adamant during the programme 
that no over-flights would take place during his visit to the USSR, during State visits or 
international meetings.727 Revealed in 2013, the first mission he authorised was Operation 
HIGH WIRE flown on 6 December 1959 from Pakistan to Turkey and covered the Russian 
nuclear bomber base at Engels and the Kapustin Yar missile range, which produced 
“excellent” photography.728 The second mission was Operation KNIFE EDGE which was 
undertaken on 5 February 1960 and overflew the Russian ICBM test facility at Tyuratum, 
which was not covered by Operation HIGH WIRE.729 This mission also had to photograph 
the USSR’s rail system which usually pro
si
b
protests which meant they either went undetected or the Russians chose to remain silent.731 




















 to the fateful mission when Gary Powers and his U-2 were brought down by a Russian 
surface-to-air missile on 1 May 1960.732  
 
 
The final U-2 over-flight mission, codenamed Operation GRAND SLAM, was the most 
ambitious and longest U-2 mission ever undertaken. It involved the first transit right across 
Russia, at the limit of the aircraft’s range, flying from Pakistan to Norway to photograph 
several installations. Interestingly, Welzenbach notes that the American Air Technical 
Intelligence Centre had assessed in spring 1960 that there was a “high probability of 
successful intercept at 70,000 feet” by the new Russian SAM-2 Guideline missile of a U-2 
aircraft.733 The desire to collect intelligence on important targets, generated by pressure in 
Washington, likely overcame good judgement so the twenty-fourth, longest and deepest 
penetration of the Soviet Union ended in disaster and the collapse of the Paris Superpower 
summit on 16 May 1960. When news of the shoot-down was released RAF personnel were 
vacuated from Turkey immediately to protect information concerning the UK’s 




aircraft according to the official record.734 Interestingly, when captured U-2 pilot Gary 
Powers returned from captivity in Russia he revealed that his interrogators never asked him 
anything about British involvement in the U-2 programme.735  
 
 
Macmillan first heard about the U-2 shoot-down only on 7 May 1960 at Chequers as a result 
of a speech made by Khrushchev, rather than being informed by the Americans.736 He 
thought that “the Americans have created a great folly” and noted the pilot “had not poisoned 
himself (as ordered).”737 He also admitted in his diary that the “UK had done some successful 
ones (with aeroplanes which the Americans gave us”) and referred to the operation as 
Exercise OLDSTER.738 This was the British codename for its participation in the U-2 














 noting with relief that “nothing has yet come out about British flights into Russia.”739 A 
British MP, Stephen Swingler, did however allege that British pilots had been engaged in 
over-flights but this generated no official or major media reaction.740 Macmillan’s sense of 
lief seemed apparent and British involvement in the U-2 programme remained hidden for 
any years, not even being raised in Powers’ trial. Macmillan’s feeling was however 
e deployed.744 It could not say if a conventional or nuclear weapon would be used in 
n attack on a U-2 base but assessed that the latter was more likely due to the inaccuracy of 









In June 1960 the JIC was asked to examine the aftermath of the U-2 shoot-down following 
threats made by Soviet leaders to attack bases which supported U-2 operations.742 In a speech 
made on 30th May 1960, Marshal Rodion Malinovsky, Soviet Defence Minister, threatened 
to attack airfields where the U-2 was deployed and this was amplified by a speech made by 
Khrushchev on 3 June 1960.743 They stated that “crushing blows” would be inflicted on bases 
in the UK, Italy, France, Pakistan, Turkey and Norway through the use of rockets. The USSR 
clearly knew some of the bases that were involved in U-2 operations but did not mention 
Japan or the United States. The JIC said that if an attack was launched then it was aware that 




been launched but Moscow would need to be confident that a conflict would not turn nuclear 
if the USSR attacked a western base.746 The danger of miscalculation in this situation was 
considerable because US nuclear doctrine was based on “massive retaliation” and one bomb 


















 The JIC considered that a Soviet rocket attack on a U-2 base would cause minimal damage if 
done conventionally but would have a severe psychological effect on the West; Russia would 
likely view it as a half-way position between global war and doing nothing.747 The JIC 
assessed that the threat of a Soviet attack was a bluff, made for rhetorical effect and to deter 
future intrusions by reconnaissance aircraft.748 The JIC also noted that the Russian 
government was “angered and disturbed” that the U-2 was able to reach Sverdlovsk and the 
extent of the information it obtained.749 It felt that Moscow was “determined that these flights 
should not be resumed” and its dramatic threats were to deter other missions but the JIC was 
not certain if the aircraft had been hit at maximum altitude and if there was a risk to other 
flights.750 The threat was also to frighten allies into not providing U-2 bases and Norway and 
Pakistan had already spoken to Washington about the U-2 being on their territory.751 The 
reats were also thought by the JIC to be for consumption by the Soviet population showing 




enemies.752 It concluded that Moscow might consider destroying a reconnaissance base as a 
“show of force” without triggering a global war but its main objective was to prevent over-
flights, frighten the West and separate the United States from allies.753 The Russians likely 
thought they would not have to carry out their threats but there would be an issue if their bluff 
was called.754 The fact that this JIC paper was produced shows the tension that existed at the 
time between East and West and how real the threat of conflict or miscalculation was. It also 




The partial declassification of the CIA’s internal history of the Office of Special Activities in 
March 2016 yielded further information about British involvement in the U-2 programme. 
Both governments received the entire output of all the missions mounted over the USSR 













 independently.755 The RAF base at Kinloss in Scotland was also allocated as an emergency 
operating base for the U-2 before or during hostilities with the USSR if Turkey or another 
location could not be used.756 Such was the closeness between the US and UK on this project 
that the British were allowed to base an RAF liaison officer in the CIA project office in 
Washington.757 This was unprecedented and the first incumbent, Wing Commander Norman 
Mackie, was instructed to behave as a “patriotic American” and not a British subject.758 
There were American sensitivities about his presence due to the number of sensitive projects 
 his office, notably the development of satellite reconnaissance capabilities. 
roposed by the 
mericans to be launched from Pakistan to overfly Sary Shagan, a missile testing facility in 




Interestingly this new documentary release reveals that the British government deceived the 
President of Pakistan about the nature of British U-2 operations from the base at Peshawar, 
Pakistan. The British High Commissioner in Islamabad sought permission from Pakistan’s 
President for U-2 flights from the base but maintained that the missions would be for the 
peripheral gathering of electronic intelligence.759 In fact the British missions were covert 
over-flights of the USSR as mentioned earlier. It is also revealed for the first time that British 
personnel remained in the U-2 programme after 1960 and the codename for the UK’s 
participation in it was changed from OLDSTER to JACKSON.760 RAF involvement 
consisted of over-flights of the Middle East and training in order to maintain a capability for 
emergency, wartime use. It was also revealed for the first time that further U-2 over-flights of 
the USSR were considered after 1960. In 1962 a JACKSON mission was p
A
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intelligence collection mission was given the codename Operation ADVENTURE. The RAF 
was due to give a presentation to Macmillan about the proposed operation on 10 July 1962 
but the US postponed it, preferring a different collection method.762 It is unclear if the RAF 
were to fly this mission or US personnel were to be used. It is important to note that not all 
















 along the USSR’s periphery by the RAF in Operation OLDSTER were electronic intelligence 
collections.763 The U-2 could operate at extreme altitude and collect signals across a wide 
area and range of frequencies. The new documentary release shows that on 9 June 1959 a U-2 
flying on electronic intelligence collection duties at 65,000 feet intercepted missile telemetry 
from a Soviet ICBM during a launch.764 This consisted of thirty seconds of crucial data 
broadcast eighty seconds after its launch allowing analysts to draw conclusions about the type 
and size of its engines.765 Further information was collected on the launch of a Soviet lunar 
probe on 2 January 1959, all of which would have been shared with the UK.766 The extent of 
the U-2’s electronic collection activities remains unknown. 
 
 
In conclusion, the U-2 operation was a highly risky and bold programme which reflected the 
extreme tension that existed during the Cold War and the remarkable use of technical 
capabilities to gather intelligence for policy makers. British involvement showed that the UK 
was prepared to share the risks and saw the collection of intelligence on Russian nuclear 
bombers and missiles as a top strategic intelligence priority.767 British personnel were given 
access to U-2 product, flew covert missions, regularly visited the United States and 
subsequently briefed Macmillan and senior officials on the output.768 Whilst there is nothing 
about this in The National Archives it is fair to say that U-2 intelligence is almost certain to 
have influenced defence policy and planning at this time but its total contribution cannot yet 
be judged. It will also likely have swelled the list of nuclear targets for Britain’s growing V-
rce carrying the nuclear deterrent. In the words of Dulles, former CIA Director, in terms of 




thought that the U-2 “proved that there was neither a bomber gap nor a missile gap” and the 
aircraft “changed intelligence collection forever.” 770 Eisenhower had to suffer having his 
reputation for honesty damaged when the United States was caught engaging in aerial 
espionage and the U-2’s cover-story about being a weather aircraft was found to be 















 of the Cold War or led to greater trust between the superpowers but it seems likely that the U-
2 made a major contribution to western and global security. The aircraft did demonstrate 
American technological ingenuity and skill and may therefore have helped enhance the 
nation’s deterrent posture. The last words on the U-2 programme should perhaps be left to 
Eisenhower who wrote in his memoirs that “I know of no decision that I would make 
differently, given the same set of facts as they confronted us at the time.”771 He used to ask 
people who questioned the wisdom of the U-2 programme if they would “be ready to give 
back all of the information we secured from our U-2 flights over Russia if there had been no 
disaster to one of our planes in Russia?”772 He never had an affirmative answer. 
 
 
In July 2015 the CIA declassified its internal history of HT/AUTOMAT, its Photographic 
Intelligence Center which provided additional information about the U-2 programme.773 This 
study emphasised the importance of the July 1956 over-flight of the USSR because its 
priority was to photograph Russian nuclear bomber bases.774 The mission allowed nuclear 
weapon storage facilities at nine bases to be seen for the first time and not one Bison bomber 
was found.775 This allowed the myth of the bomber gap to be exposed in the first intelligence 
reports issued using the flight’s imagery in the winter of 1956-57.776 The delay in issuing 
these reports was caused by intelligence support the intelligence centre had to give during the 
Suez crisis and the photographic interpreters not knowing what to look for at the Soviet air 
bases because they were unfamiliar with the facilities.777 The missions did however allow 
nowledge to be built up which would aid future analysis. Bomb stores were identified at 
veral bases and politicians could see that the U-2 had a unique capability to penetrate the 




secrecy surrounding Soviet nuclear weapons.  
 
 

















 imagery derived from twenty-seven over-flights of the USSR mounted from July 1956 to 
May 1960.778 It is highly likely that this material would have been shared with the UK 
although the report does not state this and it contains many redactions. It notes the importance 
of U-2 missions mounted over Central Asia under Operation SOFT TOUCH which provided 
the first views of Soviet missile testing facilities.779 The study highlights that this material 
occupied imagery analysts for many years as they sought to glean intelligence about Soviet 
ballistic missiles. In August 1957 the first reports on Kapustin Yar and Tyuratam were issued 
and the HT/AUTOMAT history contains photographs and analyses of these facilities.780 This 
is likely to have been extremely useful to the British government and could be added to radar 
nd SIGINT data. Interestingly for the first time, the study reveals that the CIA had 




imagery.781 This dangerous covert programme could have helped to plan future U-2 missions 
and locate particular installations in the south-west of the USSR. It is unclear if the covert 
photography was undertaken by aircrew or CIA operatives flying as passengers on the 
aircraft. It also raises the question of how many more covert operations concerning the U-2 
and other over-flight programmes have yet to be revealed and whether this data was shared 
with the UK. However, only a few months after the U-2 shoot-down Eisenhower had to cope 
with another incident involving reconnaissance aircraft which had British involvement. 
 
The RB-47 Affair 
 
In 1960 the Americans had RB-47H Stratojet reconnaissance aircraft based with Strategic Air 
Command at RAF Brize Norton in Oxfordshire. On 1 July 1960 one of these aircraft had to 
fly a mission to Murmansk in order to collect electronic intelligence.782 It was a twelve hour 
mission and at no time was it to enter Soviet airspace. As the aircraft was starting to turn 
north away from the Kola Peninsula in north-west Russia it was attacked by a Russian fighter 
and shot down by cannon fire.783 The aircraft had to be abandoned but only two out of six 













 Moscow.784 The Russians attempted to generate the same outrage which had occurred during 
the U-2 affair but in this case the aircraft was in international airspace. Eisenhower had 
spended U-2 flights after May 1960 but in July 1960, electronic intelligence flights along 
 Soviet Union continued.785 The United States was not informed that the 
ircraft had been shot down for 10 days and at first thought it was lost by accident. 
ur times 
 1959, each time to within 25 miles.791 The United States noted that it photographed these 
ircraft rather than shooting them down and on three occasions the aircraft came within five 
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the periphery of the
a
Eisenhower knew by radar tracking that the aircraft had stayed at least 30 miles from the 
Soviet coast and was heading away from the Soviet Union when it disappeared.786 The 
United States released a statement stating that the aircraft was over international waters and 
Eisenhower saw it as a “deliberate and reckless attempt to create an international incident.”787 
Washington further threatened “serious consequences” if it was repeated and Eisenhower 
found it “difficult to discover any logical motive for the barbaric Soviet actions.”788  
 
 
Eisenhower was determined to continue such missions, using the UK and other countries as a 
base because of their value and to assert the right of the West to use international airspace.789 
The aircraft was likely destroyed because the Soviet Union took a robust stance against 
aircraft going into what it considered to be “sensitive areas” with Russian pilots facing 
sanctions if they did not shoot down intruders. This policy was revealed through interviews 
undertaken by Lashmar with Soviet air commanders of that era.790 Despite the indignation 
the USSR attempted to generate about the incident at the United Nations, its call for a UN 
Security Council resolution against the United States was rejected. Cabot Lodge, US 
ambassador to the UN, did a presentation using a chart showing where the aircraft was and 
further revealed that Russian aircraft had penetrated US airspace twice in 1960 and fo
in
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 Macmillan strongly defended the right of the United States to fly aircraft in the Barents Sea 
and wrote to Khrushchev to tell him so.793 The delay in reporting the shoot-down by Moscow 
was likely to see if the Americans released another false cover story, similar to that used in 
the U-2 incident which the Russians could use for propaganda purposes. According to 
Ambrose, Eisenhower was so annoyed by the RB-47 shoot down that he said to Christian 
Herter, Secretary of State, that if the aircraft was destroyed over international waters they 
would “break relations.”794 The aircraft was destroyed over international waters, as Ambrose 
points out, but the American evidence was from secret radar coverage of the crash area and 
US intelligence did not want to reveal their surveillance capabilities.795 Lodge was able to 
disguise the source of such knowledge when he appeared at the UN. At this time, Khrushchev 
lso threatened the UK with “great danger” for allowing “aggressive actions” by the 
mericans from a British airfield.796 This seems to have been an attempt to drive a wedge 




between the allies and to deny the Americans forward operating bases for electronic 
intelligence collection aircraft. His efforts failed and Eisenhower thought that Khrushchev’s 




The RB-47 affair showed the dangers attached to reconnaissance operations at this time and 
the close relationship in intelligence that the UK had with the United States. Political 
sensitivities were paramount as Macmillan was concerned about the cover-stories for 
intelligence flights. The Foreign Office noted to the British Embassy in Washington that 
Macmillan “is anxious to do this in a way which will neither upset the Americans nor imperil 
security.”798 The British were kept aware of the details of US electronic intelligence flights as 
“the programmes of these flights are agreed each month in Wiesbaden between the USAF 
and the RAF.”799 During the RB-47 shoot-down the “technical department” of GCHQ had 

















 American intelligence collection and almost certainly benefited from the intelligence derived 
om these missions. The JIC noted in a memorandum to Macmillan that “the Russians will 
various platforms. Little has been released to The National Archives and Freedom of 
 all rejected. Referred to as “Radio 
fr
take any opportunity we may give them to shoot down our aircraft…if they think they can get 
away with it.”801 This showed the extreme risks that were taken in mounting airborne 
intelligence collection operations although the JIC noted that missions were covered by 
stringent safeguards and subject to final Prime Ministerial approval.802 Each operation would 
be examined in the prevailing circumstances and the Government Legal Advisor had advised 
that the operations were acceptable under international law.803 So long as hostile territory was 
not over-flown or its airspace violated then it would not be considered as espionage but the 
dividing line between this and reconnaissance was very fine.804 The JIC also noted that after 
the U-2 and RB-47 shoot-downs, cover-stories were “no longer likely to carry much 
weight.”805 This was even more difficult when crews were captured and interrogated. 
Interestingly, the JIC noted that American intelligence operations were done on a greater 
scale and “as far as we can discover they have not been as cautious as we have since the U-2 
and RB-47 incidents.”806 This suggests that the United States was not totally frank with the 
UK about its intelligence collection activities so it was not possible to say what operations 
were run from bases in the UK and how they were undertaken. It also suggests that the UK 
was more cautious following the shoot-downs because it was unknown if the USSR had 
introduced a new policy of destroying reconnaissance aircraft coming near its airspace. As 
Macmillan noted to the Foreign Secretary “it seems to me that these incidents may become 
very dangerous.”807  
 
Airborne Electronic Intelligence Collection 
 
Despite the danger involved in electronic intelligence collection operations they had to be run 
as a means to collect technical data and augment photographic material. It is unclear what 
data was collected but it is likely that some data on bombers and missiles was collected by 











 Proving Flights” it is known that the RAF used Canberra, Comet and Washington aircraft to 
fly close to Soviet border areas. Declassified material indicates that Russian radars were 
investigated near the Baltic and Barents Seas but the comment is recurrently made that Soviet 
territory was not penetrated.808 However, if war was imminent then over-flights would be 
permitted to “obtain intelligence which other methods, up to that time, have been unable to 
produce.”809 The priority was intelligence on airfields, missile bases and targets vital to war 
otential.810 Interestingly, the report noted that “a small number of special sorties will be 
rmation relating to nuclear weapons.”811 The 
rgets are not listed but would require sorties penetrating Russia by 2000 nautical miles. In 
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necessary at the highest priority to secure info
ta
peacetime electronic intelligence collection operations were conducted by the RAF against 
the Soviet Union along the Iranian border, Turkey and the Black Sea as well as the Baltic, 
where aircraft were not allowed to get closer than 30nm to the Russian coast.812 Aircraft such 
as Washingtons and Canberras would operate in pairs at night with the latter approaching the 
Soviet Union’s airspace whilst equipment on the Washington would monitor any Soviet air 
defence reaction.813  
 
 
In 1957 Macmillan was adamant that all electronic collection flights over Turkey to the Black 
Sea had to be done under cover of darkness and needed Turkish approval with the UK 
Foreign Office needing to know the dates which it could change or cancel if it wished.814 In 
the first six months of 1956 it is now known that 36 intelligence flights were planned on 13 
nights with a further 27 planned from October 1956 to March 1957.815 The flights were 
conducted when there was no moon and they “provided intelligence which cannot be 
obtained by other means.”816 The Chief of the Air Staff mentioned to the Secretary of State 
for Defence that he “may care to let the Prime Minster and the Foreign Secretary know how 

















 correspondence from the Air Ministry notes that these flights are the “prime source of 
accurate information on the order of battle and development in the technical field, particularly 
uided weapons.”818 Despite the benefits from these flights the Foreign Office banned them 
r a few months after the Commander Crabb “frogman incident” in 1956 and wanted RAF 
ain classified. 
where Russia’s launch of Sputnik had established a precedent of over-flying another state’s 
g
fo
aircraft to “keep well away from Soviet territory.”819 The potential intelligence yield from 
these missions prompted their resumption a few months later under Eden but only with risk 
assessment and political approval.  
 
 
By 1959 many “Radio Proving Flights” were undertaken in daylight when there was more 
Soviet air activity and the collectors could be concealed amongst other air traffic.820 These 
aircraft would fly 60 nautical miles parallel to the Soviet coast at 40,000 feet, and not towards 
it, in order to monitor radio and radar transmissions after the Foreign Office had approved the 
mission.821 However, there was the possibility of ‘special missions’ because “proposals for 
individual penetration flights will be handled between ACAS(Int) and the Chairman 
(JIC).”822 This suggests that the Soviet Union’s airspace may have been entered on occasions, 
perhaps to monitor nuclear weapons’ tests. A JIC memorandum notes that “UK operations 
are mainly aimed at strategic electronic intelligence”823 suggesting that more important high-
level communications were monitored by certain flights. However, the details of the targets 
and what was gained from these missions rem
 
 
The fact that electronic intelligence and other airborne missions continued after the U-2 and 
RB-47 shoot-downs shows the importance of their work and the risks that the British and 
American governments were prepared to take to acquire intelligence. Macmillan in classic 
Edwardian understatement noted that they were “no doubt disagreeable to the victims.”824 













 territory in 1957. The potential of intelligence collection from space had also attracted the 
British government’s attention. 
 
Intelligence Collection From Space 
 
The British government was acutely aware of the inadequacy of reconnaissance assets for 
ealing with a vast, secretive landmass like the Soviet Union in the post-war years. The 
efence Policy Research Committee noted in 1954 that “we are strongly impressed by the 
he political problems of aircraft over-flights and avoiding 
etection but thought that satellites, high-speed aircraft or rockets might provide a 
d
D
present day disparity between the knowledge of the enemy we need for military planning 
purposes, and the amount that we actually possess.”825 Aerial observation of the USSR had 
been limited to a narrow strip around the periphery of the country and they sought to 
“investigate machines which attract little attention, possibly by using speed and height to 
reduce the chance of detection.”826 A later report from 1955 stated that intelligence was 
inadequate for providing “the location and description of strategic targets.”827 It also admitted 
that “there are large areas of the Sino-Soviet bloc about which we have virtually no 





The UK’s work on reconnaissance satellites was however limited to theoretical work and no 
space-borne intelligence system was developed or deployed by Britain during this time. The 
Air Staff, under Operational Requirement 9003, examined development of a satellite 
reconnaissance system in 1962 and considered it feasible to survey the Soviet Union at a 
resolution of 25 metres using a single television satellite or several film satellites.830 The 
Royal Aircraft Establishment concluded that the major targets would be missile sites and 
airfields but the satellite would need to be able to see objects a few feet across.831 The cost of 
















 although at that time the United States had established a working system. The UK 
government did examine the idea of a “satellite-borne listening device” which appears to 
have been an electronic intelligence collection system.832 The ideal system was thought to be 
ne that combined signals and imagery collection and that information could be obtained 




would be designed so that its nature and existence could remain undiscovered and any 
downloads of data would have to be undertaken over friendly countries to prevent 
interception.834 The paper looked at the problem of developing cameras, film retrieval and 
protection from radiation which would be very expensive and time-consuming to overcome. 
It did however recognise that satellites were a good reconnaissance vehicle offering 
endurance, predictability, speed and invulnerability.835 The coverage they offered was wide 
and the craft lay beyond the sovereignty of a state and their early warning capability helped to 
provide a deterrent. However, daylight was needed for imagery and the cameras suffered 
from poor resolution and were vulnerable to cloud cover.836 An examination of all the 
problems indicated that the UK could not develop its own satellite reconnaissance systems 
but could assist with analysis of American material, provide ground stations and launchers.837  
 
 
In 1960 the UK sought to be involved in the American MIDAS satellite system which was 
part of the early warning system to detect a Russian nuclear attack but could provide a limited 
intelligence collection capability via space-borne infra-red sensors.838 The UK was to have 
provided a “readout” communications station at Kirkbride in Cumbria manned and paid for 
by the RAF.839 There would have been eight satellites operating at an altitude of 2000 miles 
which could detect the flame of a rocket engine 90 seconds after launch.840 The theory was 
good but the technical problems experienced in the United States were enormous and the 
system was never operationally deployed.841 It could have helped to monitor Russian missile 

















 were detected on radar in the event of a nuclear attack. As Professor Sir Solly Zuckerman, 
Chief Scientific Adviser to the Government said “the simple fact is that MIDAS does not 
work.”842 This project showed that the UK was eager to join the United States in any space 
roject which offered intelligence collection opportunities. The greatest potential for 
ns a US satellite reconnaissance system called LANYARD.844 This letter discusses 
e “Accessibility of the LANYARD take to the British” and reveals that analysts at the UK’s 
agery intelligence centre (JARIC) had been receiving satellite products for some time, but 
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During research, no British document from the JIC or other government department’s files 
was found stating that the UK knew about the American satellite reconnaissance programme 
or was receiving its output. There is a possible oblique reference to it in a report issued after 
the U-2 shoot-down which commented on the loss of intelligence. The JIB noted that “a 
substitute for this lost source of intelligence might be available by the end of the year.”843 
With the U-2 having been lost in May 1960 and American experiments with satellite film 
capsule retrieval becoming successful in August 1960, this is likely a reference to the 
programme and confirmed that the UK knew about it. Another confirmation came from a 
document declassified in 2013 from the American National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) 




the tone of the note implies that the UK had not yet been told about the new LANYARD 
system.845 Renowned intelligence historian Richelson states in his notes that the UK had 
received imagery from the US satellite programme since its inception in 1960.846 
 
 
Assuming that the UK had early access to the US satellite reconnaissance programme, the 



















 should be noted, as Aldrich points out, that even before photographic intelligence satellites 
were successfully launched from August 1960, the US Navy had launched even more 
secretive electronic reconnaissance satellites.847 The existence of these systems called GRAB 
and POPPY was only revealed in the 1990s but it is unknown if the data they collected was 
shared with GCHQ. 
 
 
Several studies have been written on the first US photographic reconnaissance satellites due 
to declassifications of documents by the NRO and the detail is beyond the scope of this 
esis.848 However, Bissell notes that Eisenhower thought that reconnaissance satellite 
evelopment was “a national security objective of the highest order” and the success of the 
aking and frustrating” as well as “hideously expensive.”852 The first 
ccessful retrieval of film from a reconnaissance satellite was achieved on 18 August 1960 




CIA’s U-2 project led it to be a key responsibility of the CIA.849 The CIA hid the 
development of reconnaissance satellites, under the codename Corona, inside the Discoverer 
programme which was a civilian satellite research and development programme.850 The 
operation was run under very tight security and suffered numerous setbacks with rockets 
exploding and camera capsules not deploying. It was only on the thirteenth attempt in August 




square miles of the Soviet Union.853 Once the techniques of mid-air recovery of film capsules 
using aircraft, inventing better cameras and stronger polymer photographic film had been 
refined, intelligence could flow regularly and be shared with the UK. The United States had 






















 vibrations and would orbit the earth over the poles at an altitude of 100 miles photographing 
swathes of the USSR.854  
Discoverer XIV flew for one day and made eight passes over the USSR which resulted in the 
production of 130 pages of analytical text being issued seven days after the mission.855 This 
one satellite mission gathered more material than all the previous U-2 over-flights of the 
USSR combined and covered areas which the aircraft could not reach.856 It also could not be 
shot down and cause international incidents. However, satellite cameras only had a level of 
resolution of 25 feet whereas the U-2 could see objects two feet across. With further technical 
development, by the late 1970s Corona could see objects only five feet across.857 Ironically, 
when Khrushchev visited the USA in 1960, his train passed close to the Corona launching 
site in California.858 There is no indication that the United States thought that the USSR had 
knowledge of the programme. The CIA was able to assess “with high confidence” the 
number and types of missiles the USSR possessed and expel the idea of “a missile gap” 
because Russia’s missiles were based on the surface rather than underground, thereby making 
of interest.”863 The material produced by the satellites would have been of great use to the 
                   
them vulnerable to surveillance.859 Further developments in February 1962 such as mounting 
two cameras on the satellite meant that targets could be photographed in stereo so more 
technical information could be obtained.860  
 
 
By the time Discovery XVIII was launched in 1961 a thin, strong film was being used 
(developed by Kodak), which allowed 39lbs of film to be carried so more pictures could be 
taken and longer missions run.861 The UK is likely to have had access to the product arising 
from these developments. By 1962 however the “cover” of “scientific missions” was wearing 
thin so after 18 April 1962 all launches were described as “secret air force missions” and no 
details of launch times and dates were released.862 Until the end of 1962, only seven Corona 















 UK because, as Bissell points out, it was bombers and missile bases which were the highest 
priority and the CIA was able to image locations anywhere in the USSR and provide 
intelligence on numbers, types as well as technical information on aircraft and missile 
stems.864 Bases such as Tyuratum and Kapustin Yar which required constant monitoring 
ould also be covered regularly instead of relying on dangerous sporadic U-2 over-flights. 
installations but facilities such as Kapustin Yar and Tyuratum were not included in German 
s due to their locations and post-war construction. The Soviet Union also built new 




Satellites were ideal for repetitive and extensive coverage of a country and flew a regular 
orbit and path with less risk than a U-2 mission, so good in fact that Corona continued in use 
until 1972.865 Peebles notes that the CIA was able to state with confidence in September 1961 
that the USSR only had 10-25 ICBMs and 250-300 MRBMs, shorter range systems being of 
particular interest to the UK.866 Satellite imagery was able to confirm the locations of missile 
bases and the type of systems based there because the USSR normally laid out bases in a 
particular way thereby making identification, and targeting for attack, easier.867 The CIA 
assessed that there were 75 MRBM missile bases with at least 200 missiles in a belt from the 
Baltic to the Ukraine by the summer of 1961; very useful information to the UK for threat 
assessment and targeting purposes.868 This information also had the potential to allow attacks 




Aerial reconnaissance was demonstrated to be a crucial method for collecting intelligence in 
the Second World War and fostered a close relationship in this area between the United 
Kingdom and the United States. This continued into the Cold War as seen by the sharing of 
the DICK TRACY material which revealed that Germany was again a key provider of 
intelligence on the Soviet Union arising from its wartime intelligence collection activities on 
the eastern front. However, this material was limited and the United States in particular had 
an interest in the Far East and Siberia, which were not covered by German intelligence 
collection activities. German material did provide insights into potential targets and military 
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 literature from Lashmar and Brugioni reveals that Britain and the United States mounted 
covert over-flights of the USSR in the early Cold War in addition to the U-2 programme. 
owever, it is unclear to what extent the records of these missions have been retained, 
ted in the first place.  
dertaken in the early 1950s because they were 
ighly sensitive and illegal. The US may have continued with occasional over-flights of the 
SSR with the UK perhaps receiving the data. For instance, the March 2016 release of the 
                   
H
destroyed or even exis
 
 
The use of intelligence collection balloons launched in the UK to overfly the Soviet Union 
again shows the close relationship in covert operations that existed with the United States and 
the lengths that the intelligence services were prepared to go to in order to collect intelligence 
on the Soviet Union. Whilst not a success, this programme helped to gather information on 
the Soviet Union’s air defences and to develop high-altitude photography in preparation for 
the U-2 programme. The later use of loaned American aircraft by the RAF in Operation JIU-
JITSU showed the extreme risks the UK was prepared to take to gather information on targets 
and the Soviet Union’s nuclear delivery systems. There was a risk that Moscow could have 
misinterpreted this operation as a pre-emptive nuclear attack but the Prime Minister was 
willing to authorise it on two separate occasions in the UK’s quest for intelligence and to 
demonstrate solidarity with the Americans. The later solo flight of a Canberra over Kapustin 
Yar, whose existence is supported by the 2013 release of the CIA’s history of the U-2 
aircraft, again shows the extreme risks the UK took to collect intelligence. There is no 
evidence that more such missions were un
h
U
CIA’s Office of Special Activities history reveals Project BLACK KNIGHT which was 
mounted on 18 December 1956.869 This covert operation involved three US Strategic Air 
Command RB-57D reconnaissance aircraft mounting intelligence collection over-flights of 
the Soviet Far East as a unique operation. It can only be guessed what was collected if any 
more such missions were flown and what revelations may emerge in the future.     
 
 
The best aerial intelligence pre-1960 came from the U-2 aircraft and this daring programme 
again had covert British support, proven by declassified CIA material building on research 





 was no “bomber gap” and provided information on ballistic missiles and aircraft which could 
target the UK. This undoubtedly helped to form the intelligence picture of the USSR and 
influenced policy, but British files give no indication from the time of what material was 
produced or that over-flights were being undertaken. It likely enabled more targeting 
materials to be produced and confirmed locations and status of military installations. The U-2 
also performed signals intelligence, which is rarely mentioned, but it is unclear what 
technical data were collected. It is important to note that only 23 over-flights were undertaken 
of the USSR and much of the country remained out of range so its coverage was limited but 
better than what had gone before.  
 
 
The advent of satellites revolutionised aerial intelligence collection and the sole declassified 
RO paper I discovered proves that the UK received output from this innovative programme 
obscure target. Little progress had been made in human 
telligence and a real benefit would have been “an agent in place” in Moscow. In the 1950s 
ch an asset was simply an unattainable dream until the remarkable and dramatic case of 
N
but did not have all the technical details of the systems. The UK’s own efforts in this field 
were limited to studies and by this time it was apparent that the major technical means of 
intelligence collection would be built and funded by the United States. Britain declined 
relatively both economically and militarily so could not bear the increasing costs of large-
scale intelligence projects. However, the UK could still provide bases and analytical support 
and act as a useful “second opinion” on intelligence issues. Britain also gained access to 
aerial intelligence coverage of the entire Soviet Union to monitor targets such as airfields and 
missile bases which could threaten it. Satellite coverage also proved there was no “missile 
gap” which had so gripped the United States and highlighted Britain’s more nuanced analysis 
of the issue. Despite the breakthroughs that aerial reconnaissance provided, the Soviet Union 
remained a closed country with its military facilities, nuclear weapons delivery systems and 
higher leadership still a hard and 
in
su
Russian army officer Colonel Oleg Penkovsky achieved notoriety around the world and shed 




 CHAPTER 4 – AN AGENT IN PLACE: THE PROBLEMS OF HUMAN 





Intelligence gleaned from intercepted Soviet electronic transmissions and from overhead 
systems collecting imagery provided valuable but only partial information on Russian nuclear 
bombers and ballistic missiles. Ideally, a well-informed and trained human source in close 
proximity to such weapons could yield intelligence which was not broadcast through the 
ether or exposed to observation via photography. Such a person is potentially in a position to 
close gaps in knowledge on current and future production plans, quality of equipment, 





A human agent can provide expert first-hand views from inside a target country or 
government and may also be in a position to act as an ‘agent of influence’ to help steer policy 
in a particular direction or even sabotage programmes. They may comment further on such 
things as key personalities, internal politics and problems with secret programmes; 
intangibles which technical intelligence may not cover. The source can also be tasked to try 
to collect data from outside their area of work and as a trusted employee with likely a wide 
range of contacts in the closed world of Soviet government, may be in a position to collect 
and pass on gossip concerning areas beyond their remit and security level.  
 
 
To the CIA and SIS, having such an asset in the USSR seemed an unrealisable dream due to 
stringent Soviet security and the enormous problems of handling such an individual based in 
Moscow. However, in 1961 the dream turned into reality in the form of Soviet army Colonel, 
Oleg Penkovsky. This chapter will focus on the difficulty of recruiting and “running” an 
agent in the USSR, showing the enormous problems surrounding human intelligence 
collection on the Soviet target. It will also examine the neglected area of what material 
concerning Russian long-range ballistic missiles and nuclear bombers he passed to the West 
as well as his observations on these forces. My research drew upon declassified material from 
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 his CIA and SIS debriefs in London and Paris and secondary literature. No 
reports or manuals that he passed to the West have been declassified.  
official Soviet 
e methods used to service and communicate with an intelligence asset in the USSR. 
he case revealed the identities of British and American intelligence personnel and showed 
at the UK engaged in espionage, despite official denials that SIS even existed. 
 also highlighted the key role that SIS played in the case through Penkovsky’s debriefings 
rtray the western 
owers as engaging in sinister plots against the USSR. The CIA and SIS were portrayed as 
ctively recruiting “degenerate” Soviet citizens who were willing to betray their country and 
bombers and ballistic missiles in the light of Penkovsky’s Moscow-insider views. In this 
 
 
Much has been written about Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, an officer of the GRU (Soviet 
military intelligence), who approached western intelligence in 1960 offering to work as an 
agent inside the Russian military in Moscow. Some material is a myth and his status as a 
Cold War secret agent has reached legendary proportions as more material on his case has 
been revealed in recent years. Much of the secondary literature focusses on the glamorous 
and clandestine field of the tradecraft used to “run” him as an agent. Some of it would not 





and covert meetings with its personnel in Moscow. Further exposure came from the arrest, 
trial and imprisonment in 1962 of British businessman (and secret SIS courier) Greville 
Wynne who acted as a link between SIS and Penkovsky.  
 
 
The joint “show-trial” of Wynne and Penkovsky in Moscow publicly linked the British 
government to espionage and followed the similar earlier trial of U-2 pilot Gary Powers. 
Moscow used the Wynne and Penkovsky case as a propaganda ploy to po
p
a
using people like Wynne as ‘pawns’ in a bigger, more dangerous game. The case was also 
used by Moscow to justify the oppressive security measures then in place in the USSR.  
 
 
Despite many of the myths which exist about Penkovsky, his intelligence did play a key role 
during the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962. A unique aspect of the case is that 
intelligence from a single, key human source was used by decision-makers during a Cold 
War crisis. It is also interesting to try to determine what the JIC thought about Soviet nuclear 
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 chapter I will explore the problems in running Penkovsky as a covert human source in the 
USSR because it highlights the enormous ingenuity and skill required to succeed in this 
ndertaking. Using memoirs and declassified CIA documents I will also assess what material 
oncerning Soviet ballistic missiles and nuclear bombers he passed to the West.  
fs with western intelligence agents. 
his interesting, best-selling work was “ghost-written” by a CIA officer in 1965 and released 
s a ‘journal’ Penkovsky had purportedly secretly written in his Moscow flat over several 
 and 
estern espionage because the USSR clearly had enormous military capabilities, aggressive 





With Penkovsky, it is often difficult to separate fact from fiction, which is of course a 
perennial problem in the “wilderness of mirrors” as the intelligence world is sometimes 
described. It is important to emphasise that some material written about him is a myth, 
repeated by authors until it became accepted unquestioningly as “fact.” Ironically, this is also 
a problem in intelligence assessment. In 1962 the UK government neither confirmed nor 
denied allegations of espionage so any errors of fact remained uncorrected and events 
surrounding the case were subject to speculation.  
 
The Literature Concerning Penkovsky 
 
An early work on the Penkovsky affair was his published “memoirs” which were actually 
constructed by the CIA using the transcripts of his debrie
T
a
years. It was then reportedly ‘smuggled’ to the West for publication after his demise. The 
document was officially sanctioned by the CIA as useful, factual anti-Soviet material.870 The 
book was used by the American government to alert the world to the danger posed by the 
USSR’s government, nuclear weapons and extensive intelligence collection apparatus. It 
provided derogatory insights into the Soviet leadership, its lifestyle, personalities and 
hypocrisy as well as details of its military capabilities and aggressive nature. The memoirs 












 Greville Wynne also wrote his own rather boastful (and factually dubious) memoirs in 1967 
which provided a personal (and not officially sanctioned) view of the case, seemingly to the 
annoyance of the British government.871 Penkovsky does not feature highly in the major 
works on the Cuban missile crisis but mainly inhabits the “spy” literature genre which 
emerged from the 1980s onwards. In academic works on international relations and Cold War 
istory he is often relegated to a footnote. At his trial, the emphasis in Moscow was on 
ortraying Penkovsky as an immoral degenerate and drunkard with nothing being said to the 
he quality and quantity of his information 
n topics that western intelligence then urgently needed and the fact that he survived in the 
o years, acted as a magnet for conspiracy theorists. 
 he was such an immoral, unstable character, why was he in the GRU and why did the KGB 
h
p
press or audience of “concerned Soviet citizens” about his GRU membership or Soviet 
nuclear or military information having been compromised. It was only in the 1990s that the 
CIA declassified documents on his case and a greater appreciation of his importance during 
the Cold War could then be made.  
 
 
Additionally, and to add complexity to the case, t
o
centre of Soviet power as an agent for tw
If
not detect him earlier and remove him? Was he left in place to sow disinformation to the 
West, either wittingly or unwillingly? Additionally, some western intelligence officers 
thought he had been planted on the British and Americans from the start of the operation. 
Former MI5 counter-espionage officer Peter Wright expresses doubts about Penkovsky’s 
bona fides in his infamous autobiography, Spycatcher, which the UK government failed to 
suppress in the 1980s.872 Further studies commenting on Penkovsky are eulogies which also 
highlight his bravery and the sterling work done by SIS and the CIA in successfully running a 



















New and insightful official disclosures about Penkovsky were gained in the early 1990s when 
t to The National Archives.  
r 
the CIA made an unprecedented release of hundreds of pages of debriefs and internal 
correspondence about its handling of the case into an electronic archive.874 This provides the 
most detailed exposition of a Cold War spy case to be made public and is an incredible asset 
to researchers. For this chapter all of this primary source material, including declassified 
Soviet military articles produced by the General Staff as well as transcripts of Penkovsky’s 
debriefs with the CIA and SIS in Paris and London were examined. The voluminous, high-
level internal CIA correspondence on this case was also analysed. These unique papers, from 
which information on Soviet nuclear weapon systems can be gleaned, offer a remarkable 
insight into the running of a major espionage case in the Cold War as well as, for the first 
time, documentary references to an operational SIS case. No similar operational material has 
been released by the UK governmen
 
 
The problems and tensions between the CIA and SIS are revealed from Penkovsky’s 
recruitment to his detection. This plethora of documents makes this the most well 
documented Cold War espionage case ever to enter the public domain. The release also led to 
the publication of what is arguably the most thorough (but hyperbolically titled) book written 
on the case by Schecter and Deriabin875 (the latter also edited The Penkovsky Papers). The 
case was further examined by Corera in his 2011 study of SIS876, drawing on the CIA 
archive. In 2013 the latest book on Penkovsky was produced by Duns and offers a new theory 
about how Penkovsky was detected, drawing on interviews with KGB personnel.877  
 
 
Recent academic work was also undertaken on Penkovsky in 2014 by former CIA operations 













 in Wales in 2012.878 His work examines the tradecraft used by SIS and the CIA to run the 
enkovsky case as well as relations between the two organisations and differences in 
t the Bolsheviks.879 He later 
aintained that his father had disappeared when he was a child and stated that his mother had 
id that he was dead. However, when the KGB made enquiries about Penkovsky’s 
n a key 
otivator in his treachery.880 Penkovsky’s family had owned land in pre-revolutionary 
ussia and its loss and their reduction in social status may also have caused him to resent the 
Communist Party. A bourgeois lifestyle and assets may disappear but their mentality can live 
on and foster resentment which could be accentuated by every perceived personal ‘slight’ and 
                             
P
operational techniques. He identifies weaknesses in tradecraft as the main reason for 
Penkovsky’s demise. None of the studies cited above examines what material was passed to 
the West by Penkovsky concerning Soviet bombers and ballistic missiles. I would like to start 
by briefly examining Penkovsky’s background and recruitment because this whole saga was 
initiated by one man, in the right place at the right time. It reveals the quirky hand of fate in 





Penkovsky’s future troubles apparently started from the time of his birth in 1919 because his 
father was a serving officer in the Tsar’s army who fought agains
m
sa
background and family (because he needed to be ‘vetted’ to deal with westerners and was 
travelling abroad), the death remained unproven and ensured that Penkovsky was 
ideologically ‘suspect.’ It was considered by the KGB that his father could still be alive and 
living in exile, perhaps with an anti-Soviet émigré group, so effectively Penkovsky’s career 
progression was halted. This ensured that after he joined the army, and despite a successful 
war in the Red Army’s artillery, it was impossible for him to reach the rank of General or be 
posted abroad permanently. This would deny him a key, prestigious rank and the privileges 





















During Penkovsky’s war service from 1939-45, a senior Russian Army officer, General 
Sergey Varentsov, acted as his patron and helped him to advance his career.881 Penkovsky 
later married a Lieutenant-General’s daughter and he was one of the youngest Colonels in the 
Red Army, being wounded in action during the conflict. A close relationship to such an 
individual as Varentsov, who headed the Red Army’s artillery branch, gave him access to a 
network of other senior officers. They in turn could help his advancement and be used as 
unwitting sources of gossip and access to intelligence when Penkovsky decided to contact 
western intelligence. Penkovsky, through Varentsov, was acquainted with General Ivan Serov 
(KGB Chairman and later GRU chief) and via him to Premier Nikita Khrushchev. Perusal of 
IA debriefing notes indicates connections to numerous prominent Soviet figures and senior 
 interest to western intelligence. It is curious that with his 
ackground, his access to these social circles had not been restricted but conversely, being 
C
officers who would be of
b
close to such people may have made the KGB reluctant to take action against him.  
 
 
Penkovsky would have become known to western intelligence in 1955 because he was posted 
to Turkey as an undercover GRU officer, the acting Military Attaché, following special 
training in the prestigious Frunze Military-Diplomatic Academy (an intelligence training 
school) which his patron helped him to enter.882 He had problems with his superior in 
Turkey, a general who was later appointed as the full-time Military Attaché in Ankara. 
Penkovsky thought his superior was stupid, sub-standard and, as he considered himself to be 
of high-intelligence, deeply resented his superior. Penkovsky later reported him to the 
Supreme Soviet, via KGB channels, for an operational intelligence transgression which later 
saw the general dismissed. Reporting a GRU senior via KGB channels to Moscow was a 
major faux pas as the rival civilian intelligence organisation was seen as an “enemy” and this 
act was regarded as treachery by his colleagues and nobody would likely want to work with 
Penkovsky. In a CIA debrief, Penkovsky admitted having contacted Turkish intelligence 






 remove and to undermine his superior.883 This was his first contact with western intelligence 
and an early act of treachery.  
e acts of 
etrayal and contact (albeit anonymously) with western intelligence long before his approach 
 the CIA. Penkovsky was clearly a disgruntled military intelligence officer with significant 
 
 
It is noteworthy that Penkovsky was very status conscious, needed praise, approval and 
resented someone else taking the top position in the GRU in Turkey. He knew that a general 
would take the post eventually yet seemed to take this as a personal ‘slight’ when it occurred. 
By his own admission he was vain, egotistical and spiteful, often seeking revenge if he felt 
that he had been let down. He was also clearly impulsive and rather unstable; an individual 
who liked the ‘limelight’ and would not share it with others. Such a ‘prima donna’ did not 
think through the consequences of his actions and sowed the seeds of his own destruction. 
There is extreme arrogance in his actions and in his debriefs Penkovsky came across as 
reckless and a gambler; supremely confident in the rightness of his actions and his ability to 
handle any situation by correctly calculating risk. This would give him the courage to act as a 
spy but not to do so safely and eventually his luck would run out. This was clearly a person 
who would not take advice or orders and would pursue his own course, regardless of the 
consequences. It is also significant that the Turkish incidents were his first furtiv
b
to
access to secrets and his report of a superior via KGB channels to Moscow for misconduct 
was done even though it would make him a pariah.884  
 
 
Unsurprisingly, he was recalled to Moscow but used his connections through his patron 
Varenstsov, to get on a missile course at the prestigious Dzerzhinsky Military Academy in 
1958.885 He spent a year at this institution learning about the latest developments in Soviet 
rocketry and missiles; a good source of valuable information for a future defector.886 As a 
student he had access to classified libraries and started copying material with a view to giving 
the data to the Americans at some stage in the future.887 After graduation, Penkovsky was 









 This organisation was responsible for sending Russian scientific delegations abroad with a 
view to collecting intelligence and dealing with incoming foreign groups to prevent them 
om collecting intelligence.888 Penkovsky had been assigned to the Army Reserve (another 
erceived slight) and was working at GNTK when he decided to approach the Americans and 
y background but his survival likely 




offer to work for them. This decision would have far reaching consequences for him and the 
West.  
 
Penkovsky Approaches the West 
 
Penkovsky was not sought out in Moscow or abroad by western intelligence services and 
‘pitched’ for recruitment but rather attempted through non-official contacts to establish a 
communications link with the Americans. Any approach to him in Moscow by western 
intelligence would likely have been detected due to pervasive Soviet security and sparse 
contacts existing between Soviet citizens and westerners. His official work made him well 
placed to act as an agent because he retained access to classified material, could speak 
English and he interacted with foreign visitors, both official and private. It is also curious that 
he could speak English and it is unclear from the literature on the case, where and when he 
received tuition in the language. He was also one of the few Soviet officials who could travel 
abroad in Soviet delegations. This again does seem unusual because he was clearly 
temperamental, vengeful and insubordinate and had been sent home from Turkey after 




Penkovsky’s first approach to the United States occurred in August 1960 when he intercepted 
two Russian-speaking American students in the street in Moscow; he had previously 
encountered them on a train journey earlier in the week.889 To convince them he was genuine, 
he revealed classified information, in English, concerning the 1960 shoot-down of the U-2 
and RB-47 aircraft which could only have come from an intelligence insider.890 He asked 














 Cox, agreed to do so at considerable personal risk because Penkovsky could have been part of 
a KGB ‘sting’ operation to entrap an American.891 From the embassy, the packet was sent to 
the CIA in Washington with a personal letter from Penkovsky offering to work for the United 
States and some clues as to his identity.892  
 
 
The CIA believed that the approach was authentic but had the problem that it had no 
ablish contact with Penkovsky via the clandestine method 
e proposed. Llewelyn Thompson, US ambassador to Moscow had prohibited CIA operations 
ial in Moscow to forward 
nother letter to the US embassy. He attempted to pass information on Soviet ballistic 
issiles but the Canadian, fearing entrapment, gave the material back to Penkovsky.895 The 
                                                           
personnel in Moscow who could est
h
from being run from the embassy.893 This was an enormous constraint because the CIA had a 
seemingly willing, highly-placed Russian agent and no means to contact him. It did however 
insert an agent into the embassy in autumn 1960 under the codename COMPASS but he, 
through fear and surveillance, was unable to establish workable contact with Penkovsky.894 
The CIA was running a risk that Penkovsky would become frustrated and might decide not to 
pursue a covert career with them and an intelligence bonanza would therefore be lost. This 
situation shows the extreme difficulty in running human intelligence operations in Moscow at 
this time and the operational immaturity of the CIA. The Penkovsky case would be a major 
learning exercise for all the participants.  
 
 
Penkovsky was indeed feeling frustrated and, with nobody from the CIA having contacted 
him by early 1961, approached William Van Vliet, a Canadian offic
a
m
diplomatic signal the Canadians forwarded from their embassy to their foreign service in 
Ottawa also actually named Penkovsky as “Pankovski” and noted that he wanted to defect, 
had financial problems as well as likely being a “disgruntled citizen” and “dangerously 
talkative.”896 His second approach also meant that more people knew about Penkovsky’s 












 speculate that if there were any Russian intelligence sources in the Canadian government they 
might hear about Penkovsky’s attempted treachery. Also, if the Russians were intercepting 
and decoding Canadian diplomatic radio traffic, there was enough information in the 
diplomatic signal to identify him. His approach was also likely discussed inside the Canadian 
mbassy which, if the rooms were bugged, would further alert the Russians that they had a 
otential traitor. The Canadians passed details of Penkovsky’s latest approach to the CIA.  
tails of Penkovsky’s approach to SIS who may have 
ssumed that he was a CIA asset who had lost communications with his handlers. The British 






Penkovsky was clearly determined to make contact with the CIA and in mid-December 1960 
it emerged that he had approached a British businessman in Moscow called Mr Merriman.897 
In his hotel room, he tried to pass documents to Merriman and gave him a telephone number 
which he asked the Americans to call. Merriman refused the documents but approached the 
American embassy in London and gave them this information; he was later interviewed by 
the CIA.898 With nobody having successfully contacted him, Penkovsky made another 
attempt to establish contact with the Americans by approaching British commercial traveller 
Greville Wynne who was visiting Moscow in the spring of 1961.899 The exact intelligence-
status of Wynne is unclear, but his extensive travels in the Soviet bloc would likely have 
made him of interest to SIS. He passed de
a
in




Co-operation between SIS and the CIA was considered the best approach to running the case 
because Penkovsky had approached both countries and the British knew that he had been 
issued a visa to visit the UK as part of a scientific delegation in April 1961.901 Penkovsky had 
also suggested in a letter sent via Wynne that he would like to work for both countries.902 












 and Joe Bulik representing the CIA and Michael Stokes and Harold Shergold representing 
SIS.903 In a small team personal relations are crucial and throughout the case relations rose 
and fell. Mid-1961 was also a difficult time for both intelligence services because the CIA’s 
Bay of Pigs operation had just failed spectacularly and SIS officer George Blake had been 
jailed for an unprecedented 42 years for spying for the KGB. An intelligence success was 
crucial to repair reputational damage to both services in their respective capitals.  
 
 
Penkovsky could not approach foreign embassies in Moscow directly and would have to 
assume that he was being watched at times because of his GRU service, the debacle in 
Ankara and on-going doubts about his background. The Americans had secreted agent 
COMPASS in their embassy for several months but he had not been able to get instructions to 
Penkovsky. The use of “dead drops”, whereby information was left in a secure space and 
retrieved later, was not thought feasible in Moscow because there was such intensive 
surveillance on westerners that the drop sites would be detected and raided and any personal 
meetings in the city could be observed and Penkovsky lost.  
 
 
There was always the danger that Penkovsky could have been planted on the West to pass 
disinformation because Russian intelligence likely appreciated the West’s desperation for 
information on nuclear weapon delivery systems. The UK also had run the “Double-Cross” 
stem in the Second World War whereby German intelligence agents in the UK were used 
cial times. SIS likely feared they could fall victim to a similar ploy run 
om Moscow. After the George Blake case they may have wondered how many more assets 
received because it could be all the human intelligence they had on the USSR, apart from 
for instance. Even intelligence from such groups was 
se they were vulnerable to manipulation and penetration by the KGB. A new 
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to sow confusion at cru
fr
and operations had been compromised or how many more traitors existed in the West. After 
Blake’s treachery the KGB would likely have a good insight into the UK’s intelligence gaps 
and vulnerabilities and so could devise fiendishly clever operations to confuse London and 
Washington. If Penkovsky was sent to the West then the KGB may also have calculated that 
SIS and the CIA would be prepared to take risks and want to believe any intelligence they 






 high-quality Soviet source would also enhance the prestige of an intelligence service and 
provide customers with useful products thereby enhancing the department’s status. It would 
also make Penkovsky’s product more likely to be believed, because the intelligence agencies 
would want to believe it. If he was eventually exposed as a deception operation then it would 
cause more humiliation for SIS in front of Whitehall. No doubt the CIA and SIS considered 
these issues. Only the agent’s product and the case officers’ assessment of him, which could 
e checked against other sources, would establish his bona fides. However, in intelligence 
ork, topicality is always suspicious and when supply precisely meets demand and 
to his so that he could meet the 
roup unobserved.904 There were 50 hours of meetings over several days planned around 
enkovsky’s ‘normal’ duties in London.905 The transcripts for these sessions reveal that the 
b
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Penkovsky approached the West rather than the other way round, there would be lingering 
suspicion. Also, his approaches to the West did not seem to have been detected by the 
normally pervasive and alert KGB.  
 
 
When Penkovsky came to the UK in April 1961 he was met at the Mount Royal Hotel in 
London by the joint SIS/CIA team. Declassified CIA documents reveal the elaborate 
precautions taken to book a hotel room for the team close 
g
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team sought information on his background, job, motivation and what he could provide. This 
also gave the team a chance to determine whether he was authentic because he was away 
from his home territory and alone with a foreign intelligence team with no way of knowing 
what areas he would be asked about and could hardly decline to answer their queries. His 
reactions and demeanour could also be closely observed by experienced case officers. The 
debriefing of Penkovsky was a team effort and seems very impressive when a detailed 
reading is done of the declassified papers released by the CIA. The sessions were held in 
Russian and led by a CIA officer who was a fluent Russian speaker. Co-operation between 
the British and Americans was vital because the CIA clearly didn’t have assets to manage 
Penkovsky when he was back in Moscow whereas the UK did have personnel there who 
could retain contact. The translation, processing, analysis and dissemination of his material 
would also be an enormous task which would require a joint effort. The CIA officer who co-









 intelligence queries to put to Penkovsky each day so Defence Intelligence analysts could ask 
him about ballistic missiles and nuclear bombers.906 Penkovsky was given training in covert 
photography and espionage tradecraft and SIS helped obtain gifts from his ‘shopping list’ for 
colleagues in Moscow.907 These items such as cosmetics, cigarette lighters and clothes could 
be used to ingratiate him with senior officers and contacts so allowing further intelligence 
collection opportunities. However, a cascade of expensive gifts which exceeded his budget 
could be another security concern if anyone got suspicious about their origin or funding.  
 
 
The team seemed to realise that Penkovsky felt he had an important mission in life and 
worked to boost his already inflated ego. He had expressed a desire to be “your soldier”, 
orking for the West. The decision was taken to grant his wish and obtain British and 
merican army uniforms in the rank of Colonel and to photograph him wearing them.908 
w
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When Penkovsky went back to Moscow a team was established in Washington to process his 
material with SIS officer Michael Stokes as the deputy leader.909 The British appeared to 
believe totally that Penkovsky was a bona fide defector but the CIA still had some doubts 
about the case at this early stage.910 Co-operation between the UK and USA was apparently 
good in their first major venture in ‘running’ an agent in the USSR. However, cosy debriefing 
sessions with wine held in a hotel on friendly territory were one thing, managing such an 
operation in the hostile environment of Moscow would be quite another. With sparse assets 
available, the CIA had to rely on SIS to help in a very hostile surveillance environment to 
ensure that instructions were passed safely to Penkovsky; intelligence materials passed back 
securely to London and Washington and the KGB remain oblivious to the operation.  
 
 
To maintain contact with Penkovsky in Moscow, SIS used the wife of the SIS station head, 
Ruari Chisholm. Janet Chisholm had children and her normal domestic routine in Moscow 
could be used as cover for meeting Penkovsky such as family walks in the park, attending 











 Penkovsky’s ‘street agent’ and could pass instructions to him or receive material in return 
such as notes and microfilms. Material was taken back to the British embassy and then by 
diplomatic courier to the UK for SIS to examine and disseminate. This avoided customs 
checks or anyone being arrested at border crossings. However, a risk existed in this ploy. 
Ruari Chisholm and his wife had served in Berlin in the 1950s at the same time as SIS traitor 
George Blake; he was acquainted with them and no doubt compromised their identities to the 
KGB.912 Her “blown” identity, which SIS were aware of, would mean that if she was placed 
nder close surveillance then her covert liaisons with Penkovsky could be observed and lead 
 his downfall. This was further security vulnerability for Penkovsky and Janet Chisholm 
in a car 
om the airport to the centre of Moscow. Wynne could then pass any material to SIS at the 
ritish embassy. Wynne and Penkovsky had a legitimate reason to meet and Penkovsky 




would only have a legitimate reason to travel to a few places in Moscow in her normal 
routine, thereby making the KGB’s surveillance task easier. This decision perhaps reflects it 
being the “least bad” option available because “dead-drops” and “safe-houses” were likely 
considered too dangerous to use in Moscow at this time. SIS and the CIA were also still 
developing their techniques for running covert human sources in the USSR in the early 1960s 
so it was a ‘learning exercise.’  
 
 
SIS may also have felt that the KGB had neither the resources nor desire to follow a 
diplomat’s wife walking in the park, with children in tow, on a Sunday jaunt. SIS may also 
have calculated that the KGB would think SIS unlikely to use a ‘compromised’ individual in 
broad daylight in the middle of Moscow in crowded areas close to government buildings to 
support an intelligence operation. However, Penkovsky could still be contacted by Wynne on 
his trips to Moscow with microfilms and instructions being exchanged on the journey 
fr
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could get him through customs without any searches by using his official Soviet government 
pass. This was a good technique which kept the flow of information going from Moscow to 
London without the KGB being aware of it or witnessing the exchange of information. 
















 Tsvetnoy Park, Moscow on 2 July 1961 and this venue was used several times, disguised as a 
chance encounter.914 Some books maintain that Penkovsky used dead-drops for 
communications but declassified CIA records show that this was not the case. His 
communications with the British were always through personal contact involving passing 
packets of sweets or cigarettes containing microfilms and notes to Janet Chisholm. Necessity 
seemed to determine these risky face-to-face meetings which ostensibly seemed to be chance 
encounters. Use of the same venue such as a park or entrance to a building could also have 
attracted KGB attention and meetings in central Moscow occurred close to several Russian 
government buildings.  
 
 
In July 1961 Penkovsky came to London again with a delegation visiting the Earl’s Court 
exhibition centre and he travelled to Leeds and Birmingham where covert meetings occurred. 
This provided opportunities to review intelligence material sent on microfilm via Janet 
Chisholm and Greville Wynne and to determine future tasking. This was an essential part of 
e intelligence cycle and would also enable questions to be answered arising from customers 
oncerning nuclear bombers and ballistic missiles. These questions could arise from 





assumptions being challenged, material being unclear or data being checked against other 
intelligence sources such as SIGINT. It would also allow rapport to be built with the agent 
and training to be given in tradecraft techniques. Penkovsky stayed in a hotel in Kensington, 
close to the Russian embassy and was met at nearby SIS ‘safe-house’ in Kensington. This 
again was a point of vulnerability because many Soviet officials would be in the Kensington 
area and the possibility of Penkovsky being seen by Russian security officers would be high. 
There was also a chance of him being followed to a meeting and the distance from the hotel 
to the ‘safe-house’ was so short that it would be hard to detect any surveillance. As a GRU 
officer working abroad and one whose parentage was under scrutiny, who had come home 
from Ankara “under a cloud”, it is reasonable to assume that he would attract some level of 
KGB scrutiny.915 However, proximity meant that Penkovsky could visit the SIS ‘safe-house’ 
when he had time during the day and it would be normal for him to be seen walking around 







By the time of his second London visit, the team seemed to completely trust Penkovsky. The 
CIA’s desire to administer a polygraph or “lie-detector” test had been dropped after SIS 
objections which had gone up to Sir Dick White, the Chief of SIS.916 Such a test could shatter 
faith in the agent and damage his morale. Transcripts of his debriefs reveal that he was very 
keen to be trusted and be the “greatest secret agent ever” in order to “save the world” with 
almost messianic zeal. His credibility was such that his reports had their own codenames and 
were being sent to the White House and circulated in Whitehall.917 Also, in the meetings with 
Penkovsky it is noticeable that SIS and the CIA showed him hundreds of photographs from 
llied security agency files of known and suspected KGB and GRU personnel. Penkovsky 




Russian intelligence operations by compromising human assets. If Penkovsky was a planted 
agent it seems unlikely that he would have revealed this data because it would operationally 
damage Russian intelligence for years to come, help western security and represent a colossal 
waste of resources for Moscow. The Russians would also be suffering a severe loss with no 
apparent gain. Further, this activity would potentially allow Western intelligence to learn of 
the motivation, vulnerability as well as personal circumstances of numerous Soviet military 
and intelligence personnel. This in turn could lead to the development of many more 
Penkovskys in the future as his operational life (as is that of all spies) would be finite.918 If 
recruitments were made, they remain secret and it is possible that some of his colleagues in 
Soviet rocketry may have been targeted, thereby yielding more information on nuclear 
delivery systems. Shortly after his return to Moscow he was sent abroad again with a 
delegation to Paris in September 1961, which afforded another opportunity but generated the 
security problem of meeting in a third country. Whether France could be seen as friendly or 
unfriendly territory is of course subject to long-running debate.  
 
 
The CIA recognised that in Paris the British had assets such as safe-houses, personnel and 













 UK.919 This was another British contribution to the joint running of the case and 
demonstrated that although the United States had the U-2 aircraft, satellites and other 
chnology, in the low-technology, traditional sphere of human intelligence the UK could still 
lay a key role. Technical intelligence had changed out of all recognition since 1945, but the 
 ‘cover’ and concealing the 
urpose of being in the city were crucial to protect security. CIA headquarters were informed 
and Kisevalter’s lack of judgement scrutinised thereby resulting in him being removed from 
te
p
techniques used to ‘run’ Penkovsky would be familiar to SIS personnel from the Second 
World War. A human agent could still perform a key role in undermining national 
intelligence and defence efforts, whether Oleg Penkovsky or George Blake.  
 
 
Security in Paris was paramount and the presence of this covert operation on French soil was 
not declared to the French government. The fewer people who knew about it the better and 
there was a possibility that French intelligence could have been penetrated by the KGB.920 
Well-planned tradecraft was used to conceal meetings with Penkovsky such as having him 
cross a bridge whilst under observation and then met in a car to be driven by a complicated 
route at speed to another location in the city for a meeting. Counter-surveillance was also 
mounted to ensure that he was not followed. There is a possibility that the French may have 
monitored Penkovsky as a Soviet official and his meetings with US and British personnel 
noted. Any Soviet source inside French security may then have been in a position to alert 
Moscow about a western penetration of the GRU. This was another possible source of 
compromise and demonstrates the extreme risks posed to Penkovsky. However, at this time 
French security were likely pre-occupied with political unrest, coup plots and the Algerian 
terrorist problem as they drifted towards ejection from North Africa in the early 1960s.  
 
 
CIA officer George Kisevalter, a loud, gregarious Russian, also committed a security breach 
in Paris when he went to a bar one night with SIS officer Michael Stokes and proceeded to 
tell strangers in the bar that he was meeting a Russian and discussed some of the things he 








 the case.922 Despite the “special relationship” between the two countries, close confinement 
l analysis. Paris 
as however Penkovsky’s last trip abroad. Meeting an agent across the English Channel was 
ne thing; continuing to run the operation in the ‘lion’s den’ of Moscow was quite another.  
tizen 
 load a drop-site in Moscow for Penkovsky, informing him that it was “for an important 
ternal asset working for the West.”925 With the short distance between embassy, 
for days on end resulted in declining relations inside the team with frequent arguments over 
trivial matters.923 As with agent recruitment and running, human intelligence is personality 
driven and it would have been ironic if one of the twentieth century’s most sensitive 
intelligence operations had been damaged by rows between team members over whose turn it 
was to empty a Paris hotel room’s rubbish bins. There may also have been rivalry between 
individuals and intelligence agencies because careers are “made” on such important cases 
whose output attracts high-level political interest. Major Soviet defectors were such a rarity 
that dealing with Penkovsky would be a once in a lifetime opportunity for a case officer. The 





Driving around Moscow and using safe houses to conduct meetings was not an option in 
Moscow. The KGB had vast surveillance resources in the city and official areas, embassies 
and locations where westerners congregated could be subject to hard-to-detect surveillance. 
Janet Chisholm from the British embassy met Penkovsky twelve times in the busy Arbat 
shopping street in Moscow over several months following his return from Paris.924 Chisholm 
had a legitimate reason to be there but KGB Headquarters and the British and American 
embassies were also close by so KGB surveillance coverage would have been likely and 
could be concealed in the crowds. The chance of detection was therefore increased and it 
would be hard to tell if the case had been compromised. It was likely judged an acceptable 
risk by the British, and the Americans had no alternative plan because the CIA’s assets in 
Moscow were negligible. In mid-1961 the Americans even considered using an Italian ci
to
in
accommodation and meeting site, it would be difficult for Chisholm to detect surveillance 











 that the Arbat district of Moscow was monitored by the KGB because they thought it was an 




This period in Moscow would be the final chapter in the case. In a letter to the CIA, 
Penkovsky noted that he thought that Janet Chisholm was under surveillance due to the 
presence of a suspicious vehicle after a meeting in January 1962.927 He stopped attending 
meetings with her but it is likely that the KGB now connected the two of them and were 
aware of covert meetings in the lobby of an apartment block in central Moscow.928 
Photographs of these meetings (if genuine) show Chisholm in Russian clothes rather than 
fashionable western designs. This may have alerted the KGB that she was ‘operational’ and 
wanted to blend into the crowd whilst engaging in covert activity.929  
 
 
Gioe notes that the pressure was really increasing on Penkovsky because he continued to 
                                                           
meet SIS and collect intelligence whilst knowing that the KGB likely knew about his 
espionage.930 At this time it might have been better to relegate Penkovsky to ‘sleeper’ status, 
cease all operational activity and dispose of any incriminating material such as codebooks 
and micro-cameras. Penkovsky was storing secret material in a hidden drawer in his desk at 
his home and this ‘smoking gun’ could lead to his downfall if a covert KGB search was made 
of the premises.  
 
 
Given Penkovsky’s almost messianic zeal to please the West, SIS and the CIA could likely 
not have persuaded him to stop his espionage. A CIA memorandum in January 1962 
nevertheless noted the risks of frequent meetings, the large backlog of material awaiting 













 material.931 They felt time should be given for things to “cool off” and to re-evaluate the case 
to determine its future pace and direction. It was even felt that they could “well afford to call 
a halt to photography for a few months” and noted ominously that Penkovsky “was not a 
ood judge of what risks he can and should take.”932 Examining Penkovsky’s declassified 
ebsite, particularly the secret Soviet journal Military Thought, it is 
oticeable that some of the data consists of low-grade articles on army tactics; it is bizarre 
 Long term intelligence 
dvantage and security were apparently sacrificed for short-term gain.  
e wanted to be the West’s “soldier”, the “greatest spy ever” and a real 
ccess to compensate for the ‘slights’ he had suffered in the USSR so his “controllers” could 
ot really control him. He appears to have become his own case officer. SIS and the CIA 
 
g
material on the CIA w
n
that Penkovsky was risking his life for this. Perhaps a better approach would have been for 
him to conserve his intelligence on ballistic missiles, nuclear weapons and high strategy for 
perhaps one clandestine meeting every six months in Moscow or when he was able to travel 
abroad. He would also have been very useful as a long-term asset as part of an “early 
warning” system to alert the West of a possible Soviet attack. It seems however that SIS did 
not want to decrease the operational tempo and covert meetings continued when Penkovsky 
was ready to pass material. It seems SIS had grown used to high-grade, high-volume output 




Importantly, Penkovsky’s personality likely meant that if he stopped spying it could damage 
his morale so he continued at his zealous pace, ultimately to his own destruction. He was 
impulsive and reckless, as seen by his recruitment attempts when he reached out to the CIA. 
He would do what he wanted to do, regardless of the risk; an indicator of a large ego and 




were likely ‘addicted’ to his product at a critical time in the Cold War and seemed to defer to 
him as he thought he knew what was best in his home territory of Moscow. If ‘dead-drops’ 
and alternative tradecraft had been used to run him instead of more personal meetings then he 








 The case produced a mass of correspondence and meetings between SIS and the CIA with the 
relationship becoming tense due to competing operational styles and personalities. Security 
was not helped when the Chisholms were posted back to London in the summer of 1962. The 
replacement Moscow ‘street agent’ was Pamela Cowell, the wife of Gervase Cowell, the new 
SIS station head.934 The same system of the ‘SIS wife’ was being used and the KGB would 
just need to move surveillance onto the new couple and look for any links with Penkovsky 
who was now apparently under suspicion. If the KGB closed in, SIS had no escape plan for 
Penkovsky, likely because his data was too valuable and he would be ‘run’ right up until 
termination; a seemingly callous decision likely reflecting the high-stakes in the Cold War 
and the difficulty of arranging an extraction for him from the USSR.935 No SIS papers have 
been released on the case so the British government’s reasoning about dealing with 
Penkovsky’s capture is unknown.  
 
 
An operational change occurred in mid-1962, likely reflecting Penkovsky’s concerns about 
etection. There were no further meetings in public with him, instead his handlers switched to 




official role and by June 1962 the CIA had an officer, Rodney Carlson, in post in Moscow.936 
It is noteworthy that it was only at this late stage that the CIA had support in the city and at a 
reception Penkovsky could identify his western contact with a special phrase and a tie-
clasp.937 This was good use of ‘natural’ cover with a plausible reason available for meeting 
foreign officials. However, any activity risked observation because Penkovsky would not 
attend a meeting with foreigners on his own. By this time his situation was nevertheless 
hopeless and he was seen for the last time at the British Embassy on 6 September 1962.938 A 
CIA memorandum noted that he missed a meeting on 13 September but they were not sure 
why.939 It is now thought that Penkovsky was arrested on 22 October 1962 during the Cuban 














 A final twist to the saga was that Penkovsky had been given an emergency signal codenamed 
DISTANT to be used in the event of a Soviet nuclear first strike or other dire emergency.940 
This consisted of him dialling a telephone number and making three breaths into the handset 
and hanging up. A ‘dead-drop’ would be made by Penkovsky containing further details of the 
emergency which would be cleared by a CIA or SIS officer. On 2 November 1962 DISTANT 
was activated by someone in Moscow. It is unclear if Penkovsky told the KGB the meaning 
of the message under duress or that he sought to start a nuclear war in the tense atmosphere of 
the time. It may have been a final grand “Samson bringing down the temple” gesture from the 
melodramatic Penkovsky; if he could not ‘save the world’ then he would drag it down into 
the flames with him. If the KGB knew DISTANT’s meaning then it took an enormous risk in 
the tense period after the Cuban Missile Crisis by activating the procedure to see who came to 
clear the drop and thus link Penkovsky to western intelligence.  
he spy who sought to save the world could not save himself, nor could western intelligence. 
e could have defected on one of his overseas trips but likely wanted to see his mission 




Gervase Cowell, SIS station chief, did not pass this information to London because he felt it 
was not legitimate and likely forced out of Penkovsky under duress.941 The CIA did however 
decide to examine the drop site and their operations officer Dick Jacob was apprehended by 
the KGB when he went there on 2 November 1962.942 Much confusion was generated 
because the KGB thought that Penkovsky was working for the British yet they had 
apprehended a CIA officer.943 It soon became clear to them that he was jointly run in an 
unprecedented operation. SIS courier Greville Wynne was also arrested in Hungary in 
November and was tried jointly with Penkovsky in a show-trial in May 1963. Wynne 
received an eight year sentence and was later exchanged for Soviet spy Gordon Lonsdale, 
who was imprisoned in England and Penkovsky was reportedly shot on 16 May 1963.944  
 















 a great intelligence asset he had been. CIA officer Joe Bulik had argued for a deal to be done 
to retrieve Penkovsky and SIS had been approached about it but the scheme came to 
nothing.945 The CIA was adamant that it did not want to approach the KGB/GRU to make a 
deal and discussions were held with SIS which produced no result. Penkovsky had been 
supplied with a false Soviet passport in the name of Mr Butov and use of a US submarine was 
mooted to help in his extraction from the Baltic States but it never went beyond the planning 
stage due to the risks involved and lack of political support.  
 
 
The bewildering array of material declassified by the CIA makes the Penkovsky case the 
most officially well-documented espionage case of the Cold War. What becomes apparent is 
the enormous amount of covert work that went into generating information for the 
telligence reports being produced in the CIA and SIS as well as the risks involved. The 
any books and articles written about Penkovsky tend to dwell on the tradecraft and 
rom his initial contact with the two American students in Moscow, Penkovsky was able to 
ation such as that concerning the shooting 
own of the U-2 and RB-47 reconnaissance aircraft. He noted that he was in “an excellent 
that no missiles were available to destroy them.947 Apparently Penkovsky, as an English 
in
m
clandestine activity, which is absorbing and is like something from a “thriller.” For the 
remainder of this chapter I will examine the material he passed on nuclear delivery systems 
which does not feature highly in secondary literature. To do this I examined every 
declassified page and transcript in the Penkovsky collection on the CIA’s website and his 
“memoirs.” No official Soviet documents such as rocket manuals and internal Russian 
military correspondence have been released. However, the Soviet journal Military Thought 
and transcripts of meetings in Paris and the UK as well as official internal CIA 




establish his bona fides by offering genuine inform
d
position to acquire information” and informed the Americans that fourteen SAM-2 missiles 
were launched to bring down the U-2.946 Penkovsky had been the GRU duty officer when the 







 speaker, was meant to interview Gary Powers, the downed U-2 pilot, but the KGB got to him 
first. The aircraft also did not receive a direct hit but was apparently destroyed by the blast 
wave of a missile launched from a missile site the U-2 flew over by chance.948 The use of so 
many missiles revealed that the air defence system was not as good as Khrushchev 
maintained; likely a relief to the UK which had a bomber-based nuclear deterrent. The RAF 
needed to avoid such missiles if it had to attack Soviet cities and military installations using 
its bombers. Penkovsky also revealed that a MiG-19 fighter was destroyed by one of the 
issiles and the pilot died as the aircraft tried to intercept the U-2.949 Penkovsky confirmed 
at the American RB-47 aircraft shot down over the Barents Sea in July 1960 was not flying 
clear Armaments, Air Force Development and 
estroying Hardened Targets with nuclear weapons.953 Ironically, some of these articles were 
uthored by Chief Marshal of Artillery Varentsov, who was Penkovsky’s mentor and who 
m
th
over Soviet territory and Khrushchev apparently said "well done boys that will keep them 
from flying too close.”950 Soviet military leaders thought of issuing an apology over the 
incident but Khrushchev overruled them to “let them know we are strong.”951 This confirmed 
British and American intelligence assessments that the aircraft was not over Soviet territory 
when it was destroyed.  
 
 
During his time as an agent, Penkovsky passed sixty-one issues of the secret version of the 
General Staff Journal Military Thought to the West and several issues of the Top Secret 
version produced since 1960.952 These were issued by the CIA under the IRONBARK code 
word to specially cleared readers under Top Secret classification. These theoretical military 
studies formed a special collection in the GRU and an examination of the articles reveals 
studies of the Control of Missile Units, Nu
d
a
helped him in his career. Helping to research and write some of these articles in army 
libraries and GRU archives allowed Penkovsky to gain access to more missile and military 
material for SIS and the CIA. He could lock himself in a room to photograph or make notes 
on files thereby providing unprecedented access to Soviet thinking on nuclear bombers and 












 be “apprehended and played back” and he could have “personal bias” against the Soviet 
system and “over-read” the hearsay he picked up. However, the documents he passed on gave 
the CIA “every confidence in him.”954 This was endorsed at high levels in the Pentagon when 
senior US Army officer General Maxwell Taylor, having read a selection of Penkovsky’s 
material concerning ICBMs, the death of Marshal Nedelin in a rocket accident and the U-2 
and RB-47 shoot-downs stated that the CIA “ought to brief the President on this.”955 Material 
going to the Oval Office was perhaps the ultimate endorsement of Penkovsky’s bona fides.  
 
 
In a later case review the CIA stated that eight issues of the Top Secret version of Military 
Thought were used to produce seventy-four reports and two secret versions resulted in fifty-
six reports being issued.956 Of these reports, eighty-nine were passed to a deleted country, 
which was likely the UK, with sixty-one sent to NATO countries.957 It is interesting that if 
the deleted country was the UK then some material was held back, unless the state in 
uestion was Canada. Penkovsky’s material was also later sent to NATO countries but at that 




co-ordinated with SIS and the CIA noted that Penkovsky had a 98% success rate with his 
photos and that SIS held the negatives for his pictures.958 This showed what an effective 
agent he was and the joint nature of the operation.  
 
 
In the early days of the operation the CIA noted that not everyone in Washington was willing 
to regard Penkovsky as a reliable source until he had established a good reporting record. For 
the National Intelligence Estimate dated 11 August 1961 for instance, the authors would not 
change the assessment concerning Soviet ICBMs on the strength of material from a source 
“about whom they knew nothing” which does show natural caution and scepticism.959 
However, as the case progressed, the volume and quality of material grew with documents 
being passed, observations made and Moscow gossip recorded. In an undated later, the CIA 














 guided rockets as well as their accompanying ground equipment.960 This was vital 
information for imagery analysts and technical intelligence specialists who sought greater 
understanding of nuclear weapons systems and how to collect intelligence about them. Papers 
reveal that through Penkovsky’s personal connections he was also able to gather information 
via “avenues of access” to named individuals of interest such as Sergei Korolenko, the 
famous senior Soviet missile and space expert as well as military officer Lt Col Igor Melekh, 
a lower ranking source who worked at the missile facility at Kapustin Yar.961 Friendships and 
cial occasions could yield information beyond Penkovsky’s normal access and information 
om Korolenko would be an enormous asset to western intelligence. In the event of 
 
formation from the rocket academy where he made over one hundred pages of notes from 
is time as a student undertaking a course.962 His value was also as a first-hand source giving 
tests had been observed of long-range missile systems.  
so
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Penkovsky’s detection, the KGB could establish what papers he had access to but it would be 
hard to determine how much gossip and loose-talk he revealed to the West. Only Penkovsky 
could reveal that, but no interrogation details have been revealed by the Russians so the 
accuracy of their damage assessment is unknown.  
 
 
None of the manuals or internal Soviet government papers Penkovsky passed has been 
declassified by the CIA but transcripts of his meetings with the CIA and SIS are available. In 
London in April 1961 Penkovsky revealed that the Sputnik rocket was a two-stage liquid 
fuelled rocket, weighing 100 tons and contained sixty-eight tons of fuel. He obtained this
in
h
a personal view on missiles which was a useful addition to the photographs, radar plots and 
radio intercepts that western intelligence would already have through technical intelligence 
collection. He was also able to relate information about German scientists working in the 
USSR on rocketry so if they returned to the West they could be interviewed.963 At the same 
meeting he discussed ICBMs and was able to confirm that the current Soviet system had two 
stages. He had never studied these missiles closely but their electronics were revealed to be 
“far behind” where the USSR wanted them to be and Moscow was “struggling with this.” 











The Russians were also trying to gather intelligence on western ballistic missile systems to 
help reduce the delays in their programme.964 Penkovsky was unable to give precise locations 
for Soviet ICBM bases in existence or being planned because the extensive building 
programme was shrouded in secrecy. However, he had heard a rumour that missile bases for 
the destruction of the UK were “north of Leningrad” in Murmansk Oblast.965 This was useful 
for the UK to know in order to direct further intelligence collection and to target such 
facilities if conflict arose. It is also noteworthy that even a major intelligence agent with good 
access such as Penkovsky did not see all nuclear weapon material and serious intelligence 
gaps would still exist in western knowledge despite his best efforts. The exposure of 
Penkovsky would also likely lead to enhanced security measures within the Russian 
government which would compound the problem of covert human intelligence collection 
against the nuclear target. Exposure of western covert human intelligence methods would 
lso facilitate the Russians planting agents on the west or detecting on-going operations.  





In his debriefs, Penkovsky did sometimes come across as erratic and unstable. He proposed 
blowing up the Russian Ministry of Defence building with a small 2 kiloton nuclear bomb 
before a western nuclear strike.966 He mused that the same fate should befall the Russian 
Strategic Rocket Force Headquarters whose location he revealed to be at Perkhushtovo near 
Moscow.967 Information on nuclear infrastructure was useful data for allied nuclear target 
lists and further intelligence collection. In London, Penkovsky also provided details 
concerning the death of Marshal Nedelin, Chief of Strategic Rocket Forces, discussed in 
Chapter 2, the true nature of which had been concealed to cover-up a rocket accident.  
 
 
In London, Penkovsky further revealed that the USSR was experimenting with “atomic 
energy” as a rocket fuel which was being used when Marshal Nedelin was killed.968 He was 
also able to confirm that the USSR had no solid fuel for its ballistic missiles, unlike the 









 consuming, dangerous and made its weapons vulnerable to attack. The death of Nedelin 
ccurred whilst the Russians were pursuing the use of Boron as a possible high calorie fuel. 
s to 
lean information on this area. In London he revealed an experimental rocket being tested at 
apustin Yar called the RK-74 which had a range of 1000km, although he had no data on it. 
e also 
oted that Varentsov thought that the USSR’s few ICBMs could hit the United States but not 




Penkovsky revealed that many scientists died in this tragedy which caused delays to Russia’s 
ballistic missile programme.969 The USSR was keen to have smaller fuel compartments in its 
rockets, meaning a smaller and lighter rocket body could be used and a bigger nuclear 
warhead deployed. This was all useful background material for western rocket engineers and 
enabled an understanding to be gained of the Soviet missile programme’s current state and 
how long it would take to progress.  
 
 
Penkovsky was also able to provide information on future rocket tests and experimental 
work. This would ensure that western intelligence collection could be primed to gather 
material and to understand which systems were being tested in advance. The articles he 
provided from Military Thought did not contain anything on ICBMs because the systems 
were Top Secret and so particularly sensitive. Penkovsky had to rely on personal contact
g
K
This sort of information was helpful for SIGINT operations against Soviet rocket activity as 
well as photographic material gathered on test areas by satellite reconnaissance systems 
which were then being launched. Penkovsky was able to obtain some information on ICBMs 
from his patron, Marshal Varentsov, who saw him as a ‘son’ and trusted family member; 
never guessing that he was a covert western intelligence asset. Penkovsky noted that 
Khrushchev frequently spoke about the USSR’s ICBM capability but discussions with 
Varentsov made it clear that it was a vain boast to impress the West. Penkovsky commented 
that Khrushchev “either does not have them at all, or has only a few” ICBMs.970 H
n
w
operationally as far as Penkovsky could tell. Only a very limited strike could therefore be 








 Penkovsky was also important because he could reveal Russian shortcomings through his 
political reporting. This belied Khrushchev’s public bluster and he reported that the Soviet 
leader was just trying to intimidate the West. In the London debrief, the ICBM programme 
was described by Penkovsky as “one failure after another” and he thought that it would be 2-
3 years before functioning ICBMs would be ready as part of a credible force.971 He also 
revealed that the ICBM did not have a perfected electronic guidance system. This would 
likely have been reassuring for western intelligence agencies and leaders because Penkovsky 
felt confident that the USSR had no capability for mass attack using ICBMs and therefore 
surprise nuclear attack was unlikely. It would also mean that strategic nuclear facilities in 
merica such as command centres, bomber and missile bases could not be destroyed in a 
rst-strike. America’s nuclear deterrent would therefore continue to function because 
DR. It was 




retaliation against the USSR could still be achieved. However, Penkovsky’s material warned 
that in the future it would be a different picture because the USSR was putting great effort 
into developing its rocket programme and solving its myriad problems. Another of 
Penkovsky’s great benefits was his commentary on future Soviet intentions and had he 
survived, he could have provided “early warning” well into the future, as a Russian 
commenting on Russian affairs with a good range of contacts. Such was the importance of his 
insights that Sir Dick White, Chief of SIS, met him and conveyed a personal message of 
thanks from Lord Mountbatten, Chief of the Defence Staff, stating that his material “would 
be of the highest value and importance to the Free World.”972 This meeting was held instead 
of agreeing to his request to meet the Queen to pledge his allegiance to her; a session which 
could have had security implications for this most sensitive of covert operations.  
 
 
Some of the information Penkovsky provided was of particular interest to the UK due to its 
proximity to Soviet forces in East Germany. He revealed that there were two brigades of 
Soviet nuclear missiles in the GDR whose presence was officially denied by the USSR. 
Penkovsky was unclear if these were battlefield nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles targeted 
on the UK.973 This was an interesting comment because, as seen in Chapter Three, the JIC 








 territory; a position terrifyingly disproved in the Cuban missile crisis the following year. 
However research from 1998 reveals that long-range nuclear missiles were deployed 
temporarily to the GDR in 1959.974  
 
 
Penkovsky was also able to provide personal, professional observations because he was a 
Russian artillery officer as well as a trained intelligence collector seeing events and 
equipment through Russian eyes. He knew what information would be useful to the West and 
how to collect it. It is ironic that the skills he developed for service with Russian intelligence 
were used to such adverse effect against them. He reported having seen the Russian R-5 
ballistic missile, described by him as a “huge rocket”, whilst on a course but had not had the 
chance to study it, in addition to describing the prototype R-7 and R-9 missiles.975 He could 
confirm sizes and shapes of equipment which could clarify data picked up from photography 
and he had the benefit of seeing systems close-up at ground level. This information later 
helped with imagery intelligence analysis during the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962. 
Proximity also aided intelligence collection of data which could not be gained from SIGINT 
or photography, such as his observation in London that the USSR struggled with the 
production of high quality metal. He revealed that the Russians could not increase the thrust 
of rocket and aircraft engines because their metal could not withstand the temperatures and 
stresses involved, thereby limiting power, range and warhead payload.976 He also revealed 
during a debrief in Paris in September 1961 that a special coating had been developed for 
missile fuel tanks allowing them to store their fuel for a longer period and so increase the 
mount of time that a system could be held at readiness during a crisis. This again was very 




assessment and aid decision-making during a crisis. It could also influence export controls 
from the UK through prohibiting the sale of certain materials and equipment to the USSR to 
prevent their use in its weapons programmes.  
 
 
Penkovsky was also able to provide data concerning the spectacular Russian propaganda 











 weapon delivery system due to its high speed and problems with accurately aiming it at great 
distance. However, he noted that the Russians were working on this problem.977 He also 
revealed in London that the models of Sputnik that the Russians sent for an exhibition in 
ondon were false, designed to mislead western intelligence if they were covertly examined 
y experts. The USSR had also appreciated the use of space for intelligence collection 
 could then reveal any intelligence so gleaned 
 future debriefs; in London in 1961 he clearly had several years of first-hand information to 
ivulge from handwritten notes and his impressive memory. For instance, he revealed the 
existence of a secret rocket launching base on Novaya Zemlya Island constructed by the 




because Penkovsky reported that Yuri Gagarin’s April 1961 journey into orbit had resulted in 
photographs being taken and Sputniks had been equipped with various special sensors for 
intelligence collection.978 This is ironic in view of America’s efforts in this field outlined in 
Chapter Three. Penkovsky further revealed that the Soviet General Staff was “livid” when 
they found that American satellites had been launched over the USSR and described them as 
“Spy Sputniks.”979 It is ironic that by launching Sputnik as a propaganda device, the USSR 
overflew the United States thereby creating a precedent that it was acceptable to fly satellites 
over another country. The USSR could then hardly complain if American intelligence 
collection satellites traversed the territory of the Soviet Union.  
 
 
Contacts with other military and intelligence officers, as well as officials, also yielded 
information especially if Penkovsky ingratiated himself by presenting gifts. The CIA wryly 
noted that they would “automatically be valuable, unwitting informants.”980 In the event of a 
leak of information from the case it would also be very difficult for the KGB to trace where 
the West’s covert source was located. Unlike a classified report being circulated in Moscow 
whose movement and handling could be traced by the KGB, Penkovsky’s reports produced 
from gossip, meetings and conversations were compiled from multiple human sources so 
their origin would be difficult to trace. His circle of contacts at different levels in the Soviet 
hierarchy provided access to intelligence on subjects he did not normally deal with. As a 
trusted officer he could undoubtedly ask probing questions without drawing undue attention 










 for nuclear tests. The USSR had detected a western submarine in the area so they knew that 
intelligence agencies were interested in this obscure, barren island.981 This intelligence was 
of interest to the UK because it indicated that the Russians could hit Britain by launching 
ballistic missiles from the north from a secret, unexpected location.982 This in turn could 
provide a future targets for intense intelligence scrutiny and for bombing missions if war 
occurred. Penkovsky obtained this information from another officer called Colonel Buzinov 
who also revealed that the R-12 missile was being serially produced but the R-14 was not yet 
in large-scale production, the latter having a range of 4,500 km; both systems had atomic 
warheads.983 Penkovsky also revealed the construction of several secret dispersed sites where 
ballistic missiles were due to be stationed in the north and south of Russia but he could not 
confirm the precise locations.984 Any speculation about the location of missile launching sites 
would of course provide further intelligence collection opportunities through satellite 
surveillance and observation of construction techniques and layout of facilities before they 
were concealed by camouflage. Without advance warning, ballistic missile facilities might 
have remained undetected but knowledge of their location and nature would allow allied 
targeting in wartime.  
 
 
Penkovsky also helped to confirm intelligence collected from other sources and aided 
analysis as his crucial data flowed into the intelligence pool available through allied co-
operation. For instance, in a Paris debrief he revealed an R-12 ballistic missile test was 
undertaken with a high-yield nuclear warhead on 8 September 1961 from Kapustin Yar with 
a detonation point in Central Asia.985 This was a test of a nuclear bomb on a missile which 
was detonated high in the atmosphere and Varentsov had witnessed it, later discussing the 
event with Penkovsky.986 This material could be matched with SIGINT and radar plots to 
understand what had occurred thereby aiding analysis of flight profiles and rocket 
performance. As an artillery specialist, Penkovsky was able to explain that conventional 
















 accuracy was determined then a nuclear warhead would be used on the missile.987 Many tests 
were undertaken involving rockets, Penkovsky revealed, because Khrushchev insisted on it, 
seeing it as a means to demonstrate Soviet power. As an ‘insider’ Penkovsky could reveal 
real intentions such as tests being undertaken for reasons of prestige and propaganda rather 
than military necessity or technical advancement. This would not be apparent to outside 
observers using technical intelligence collection methods so it filled an intelligence gap. 
Penkovsky also stated that nuclear weapons were occasionally taken out of storage under 
strict security and moved to missile bases to increase readiness states and this was done 
during the Berlin crisis.988 This again was important information for intelligence analysts to 
gauge Soviet nuclear readiness states and could reveal when a nuclear strike was imminent, 
how angry or threatened the USSR felt or even determine whether the allies should mount a 
nuclear strike before Soviet nuclear weapons were deployed.  
 
 
Penkovsky obviously had an intense dislike of Khrushchev which comes across during his 
debriefs in London and Paris. Penkovsky appeared to be impulsive and was likely unstable 
with grievances having accumulated over many years. In Paris he said that the Soviet leader 
was “a maniac” and even mused that it would be “worth while to assassinate him” before he 
makes a “tremendous attack.”989 He even encouraged the West to “invoke a small local 
onflict with the Soviets in some remote area” to test their resolve and perhaps inflict a defeat 
n them, so deterring future aggression.990 He further referred to Khrushchev as an “atomic 
c
o
Hitler” but thought that he “does not want a world war” but perhaps “if he feels he has 
sufficient strength to knock out the USA and England” then “it is possible that he may strike 
first.”991 Penkovsky was obviously concerned about growing Soviet nuclear strength and the 
personality and intentions of its leader. He also felt that he had a unique and crucial role in 














 The CIA had a particular interest in ICBMs and pressed Penkovsky on this issue. They dwelt 
on his time at the Soviet Missile Academy and the debriefing notes state that he “reported in 
detail” about the different systems he studied during the nine month course.992 He was also 
able to reveal budgetary problems with the rocket programmes and conflict between the 
ground forces and the newly formed Strategic Rocket Forces.993 His course had only given 
him limited access to information on ICBMs but he was able to confirm that the missile under 
development had two stages and was liquid fuelled; the fuel was also dangerous and unstable 
but solid and nuclear fuels were being explored.994 The ICBM he knew about was 
experimental and so beset with problems that it could not be considered a front-line 
operational weapon. Only 5-6 people had access to location maps for ballistic missile bases 
and Penkovsky sought to access this information from conversations with others, particularly 
his father-in-law.995 Varentsov was quoted to the CIA by Penkovsky as saying that “with 
respect to ICBMs, up to now we don’t have a damn thing” and “everything is on paper.” 
However, with the lower-range systems which could target the UK, “we can fulfil the 
missions.”996 This confirmed the vulnerability the UK felt from shorter-range Russian 
allistic missiles in the event of conflict and the threat to the UK’s bomber-based nuclear 




SAM2 missiles; one of which shot down the U-2 aircraft in May 1960.997 Despite the 
shortcomings of Soviet missile programmes, Penkovsky sounded a note of caution with the 
comment that “Khrushchev and the General Staff can leave you behind” and they were 
“throwing together these rockets and can do terrible damage with them.”998 He also warned 
about ballistic missile development that “according to powerful people in the leadership, he 
(Khrushchev) will need two or three more years. But not longer, gentlemen, not longer 
believe me.”999  
 
 
In addition to information on ballistic missiles, Penkovsky also provided information on 














 in London that Russian bombers carried cruise missiles with a 25 kiloton nuclear warhead 
nd a 50 kiloton free-fall atomic bomb was available but the hydrogen bomb carried on 
uch priceless material in a deception operation and receive nothing in return. 
uch of the material could not have been gathered from any other technical source. If 
enkovsky had not passed this material on nuclear bombers and ballistic missiles then the 
West would not have had any of these insights and would have been left with conjecture 
                   
a
Soviet aircraft had an unknown yield.1000 This was useful information concerning the Soviet 
armoury and confirmed British assessments that ‘stand-off’ nuclear weapons were carried on 
Soviet bombers. He also confirmed that Long Range Aviation units were small and “there 
never was a programme to make large numbers of long-range aircraft.”1001 This showed that 
the ‘bomber gap’ was a myth, as exposed by U-2 over-flights, confirming more conservative 
British estimates of Soviet bomber assets. Penkovsky, whilst in the army, was using an 
unwitting officer friend in the air force called Major General Pozovnyy for information on 
aircraft. Penkovsky confirmed, as the UK assessed, that new ballistic missile units would 
“under no circumstances” replace the Long Range Air Force.1002 He was adamant that long-
range aviation would be maintained but production would be at a slow pace. Penkovsky 
stated that “Stalin had been all for aviation” but Khrushchev assigned it a less important role; 
bombers would however continue to be produced and improved.1003 To help damage the 
Soviet Air Force, Penkovsky also corrected the CIA’s intelligence about the location of the 
Aviation HQ in Moscow so the Americans could be assured of destroying it in wartime.1004 




Reading through the declassified CIA files on Penkovsky’s debriefings, it is remarkable how 
much material was passed to the West and the insights he provided. Most of the thousands of 
pages of documentary material he revealed have not been released. However, the CIA 
personnel running the case thought that the breadth, quantity and quality of the materials 
provided indicated that he was a genuine defector. No intelligence organisation could have 














 based on partial information. The material was also received at a crucial time in the Cold 
War. Penkovsky proved to be of value during the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962, 
although his role remains controversial and has become part of the mythology of the Cold 
War. This was a potentially apocalyptic event when theories about nuclear bombers, ballistic 
missiles and attack strategies threatened to turn into horrifying reality. 
 
Penkovsky and the Cuban Missile Crisis 
 
In some popular literature Penkovsky is credited with alerting the West to Khrushchev’s plan 
to send nuclear missiles to Cuba in the autumn of 1962. However, from the declassified 
transcripts of his debriefings with the CIA and SIS it is clear that he did not know that such a 
plan was being implemented. Within the Russian government only a few people knew about 
the forward deployment of nuclear weapons to the Caribbean. The movement of ballistic 
missiles and all the naval and ground assets that were required to mount Operation ANADYR 
(its Russian code name) remained unheard of by Penkovsky. This reveals the dangerous 
limitations of human and technical intelligence when a crucial national security event was 
missed despite all Penkovsky’s contacts and access. However, if the agent does not have 
access to specially compartmented information and security is too rigid then they cannot alert 
their controller.  
 
 
This communications problem with Penkovsky had been seen earlier in August 1961. He had 
Cold War’s most potent symbol and western access to the east denied. Western intelligence 
d ‘run’ sources in the east thereby losing intelligence data.  
                   
learned that the Berlin Wall was about to be constructed but due to the absence of an urgent 
communications system for contacting his controllers, he was unable to alert the West.1006 
This momentous event can be seen as an intelligence failure and it is a terrible ‘if’ with 
perhaps the history of the Cold War being rather different if President Kennedy had known 
about the wall’s construction in advance. However, had the West known about it there was 
probably little it could have done in the face of Russian intentions to close off the city and 
prevent the exodus of citizens from the east. Instead the city was divided for 28 years by the 







Declassified CIA material shows that early indications of the Cuban crisis did not come from 
Penkovsky. The Americans thought that the Russians might move nuclear weapons to Cuba 
as early as August 1962.1007 In a memorandum dated 10 August 1962, the CIA had noticed 
surface-to-air missiles and support personnel deploying to Cuba from the USSR and it was 
assessed that they were going there to defend high-value targets from air attack or U-2 
surveillance.1008 CIA Director John McCone briefed the President about his suspicions that 
ussian MRBMs were to be deployed to the island at a meeting on 22 August 1962 and U-2 
ped up debriefings of Cuban refugees via its Opa 
ocka centre in Florida in the coming months with authentic reports of mysterious 
 CIA memorandum of 16 October 1962 identified a Soviet missile site 
uth-west of Havana complete with trailers for SS-3 and SS-4 missiles.1014 The CIA knew 
ith high confidence, due to Soviet missile manuals passed to them by Penkovsky, that these 
R
over-flights increased.1009 The CIA also step
L
construction sites and vehicle movements on Cuba emerging in September 1962. On 12 
September for instance a canvas covered lorry was seen and the interviewee thought its cargo 
resembled a rocket; later identified as a likely SS-4 Shyster missile.1010  
 
 
The CIA also had intelligence that on 9 September 1962 President Castro’s pilot Claudio 
Morinas, said that there were “mobile ramps for intermediate range rockets” on the island.1011 
Cuban refugee reports also indicated that vehicle convoys had been seen with unusual trailers 
65-70 feet long and eight feet wide.1012 A rocket with four fins was seen on one trailer and 




systems could be deployed with no heavy construction work at the site. The missiles also had 
a single-stage with a 3000 pound warhead and needed liquid oxygen for fuel whereas the SS-













 systems used in conjunction with these ballistic missiles, their support vehicles and what they 
all looked like as well as the time to reach operational readiness being “quite short.”1016  
 
 
From 16 October 1962, the code word IRONBARK appeared on reports going to the 
Chairman of the United States Intelligence Board, identifying that it was produced using 
Penkovsky’s material.1017 A memorandum compared what was seen at Cuban ballistic 
missile sites to satellite and U-2 imagery taken of the USSR; all intelligence sources were 
clearly coming together in assessments. The types of missiles on Cuba had yet to be 
determined at this stage. The CIA noted that “valid clandestine sources” confirm a 1020 
nautical mile range for the SS-3 missile which can be readily deployed to a site in six 
hours.1018 Another report of 18 October 1962 revealed that the SS-4 missile “could be 
launched within eighteen hours after the decision to launch” and a reload undertaken of its 
launcher “within 5 hours after the initial firing.”1019 The SS-5 missile was said to have a 2200 
nautical mile range and the CIA stated it knew what its warhead stores looked like and 
analysts were currently searching for the command and control links for the launch sites, 
hose nature they were clearly familiar with.1020 It should be noted however that it is now 
nown that the USSR had deployed tactical nuclear weapons to Cuba which remained 




undetected, which again shows the limitations of intelligence. Nevertheless, many of the 
intelligence reports produced during the Cuban Missile Crisis show a level of detail 
indicating that it was Penkovsky’s material that was being used.  
 
 
Daily reports issued during the crisis regularly used IRONBARK material to assess the layout 
of missile sites and to estimate how soon they would be operational. Identification of missiles 
was done by size and shape, vehicles, position and spacing of equipment. Some of this had 
been seen in Moscow military parades but the CIA noted that “the spacing of launchers 










 Wynne’s visits to Moscow and Janet Chisholm’s pram. It was now being used practically in a 
crisis to aid decision-makers at a crucial time when nuclear war was a real possibility. 
Penkovsky had been able to supply data on ballistic missiles which aided identification of 
stems, their deployment and usage but many intelligence gaps remained. For instance, the 
IA did not know if nuclear warheads were actually in Cuba stating that “we are not likely to 
EXCOMM can say what happened during the crisis and many smaller groups broke off to 
hold separate discussions. The main participants are also now dead so it is very difficult to 




get any” evidence of this.1022 The CIA would get no further help from Penkovsky because he 
had been caught at some earlier date and spent the crisis in custody. However, he had been 
very helpful through providing intelligence which assisted during the crisis. It is questionable 
how useful he would have been in providing data during the crucial days of October 1962 due 
to communications problems. Also, a man with messianic zeal, advocating the nuclear 
destruction of his own country, could have been most dangerous if he was influencing 
decision-makers at this time.  
 
 
In the UK it is hard to discern if Penkovsky’s material helped London’s decision making. 
Nothing in JIC files gives a hint that Penkovsky existed or that any of his special code-word 
information was circulated in Whitehall. His material may have been incorporated into 
intelligence reports as “read-only with no quote or action-on” giving no indication that it was 
used. It would perhaps have allowed more confident decisions to be made but ‘insiders’ gave 
no hint of the existence of a special human source.1023 JIC papers on the Cuban Missile Crisis 
only mention photos of Cuba received from the United States (likely U-2 imagery) but 
nothing is revealed concerning human sources.1024  
 
 
President Kennedy’s initial reaction to finding Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba was to mount 
an air attack but as the crisis progressed, he developed a more sober attitude. How valuable 
Penkovsky’s information was and his role in the crisis depends on how Kennedy and the rest 













 different times. Intelligence may also have been circulated as part of broader assessments 
without it being necessarily attributed to Penkvosky so again, his value as an agent cannot be 
accurately gauged.  
 
 
Penkovsky, assuming he was genuine and remained undetected, was a highly successful deep 
penetration agent inside Soviet military intelligence with some access to figures around the 
senior Soviet leadership. However, it should be remembered that when the crisis in Cuba was 
underway, Penkovsky was under arrest by the KGB. Also, he gave no warning about nuclear 
missiles being sent to Cuba thereby raising the question of how useful he would have been in 
this situation. Further, how would he have been contacted, what access would he have had to 
relevant intelligence and could he have passed information to the West without being 
detected? Also, if Penkovsky had been an agent controlled by the KGB, would it be more 
likely that they would have left him in place to help Moscow once their nuclear missiles in 
uba had been discovered? An agent assumes supreme importance during a crisis and the 
ct that he was arrested tends to suggest that he was a genuine Russian defector. 
 in the Cuban missile crisis will only be 
chievable if it is known exactly what was passed to the West, how it was interpreted and 
serted into the decision-making process and influenced decisions at vital points. This would 
important agent within the Kremlin since 1945.”1025 However, as assets were sparse there 




Additionally if the Russians, to their horror, realised the scale of his betrayal and the nuclear 
secrets he had revealed, they would then realise that the Americans knew that Khrushchev’s 
boasts about Russia’s ICBMs and military prowess were hollow. The USSR was then not in a 
position to threaten the United States during the crisis and would either be forced into a 
humiliating ‘climb-down’ or face a war and obliteration.  
 
 
It is likely that an assessment of Penkovsky’s role
a
in
require Russian and American archives to be fully opened but this in unlikely in the near 
future, if at all. The issue will be constantly re-interpreted and assessed as more data emerges. 
We are left with sparse declassified documents and the comments of those who participated 






 that Penkovsky had “supreme importance” during the Cuban missile crisis and “it was a view 
consistently shared by Macmillan.”1026 Richard Helms, CIA Deputy Director Plans, thought 
that Penkovsky’s technical intelligence on Russian MRBMs was of great importance because 
it provided Kennedy with “three extra days” from 16-19 October 1962 to decide what to do 
about the weapons.1027 In this period Kennedy went from belligerence to implementing the 
‘quarantine’ against Cuba, but the intelligence did not stop the MRBMs from being prepared. 
ven when the USSR knew that the United States had intelligence about the deployment its 
ctivities did not stop.  
rmer UK ambassador to Moscow, 
otes that Penkovsky’s intelligence “was an important factor which must have influenced 





However, McGeorge Bundy, Kennedy’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs noted 
that “Penkovsky had no discernible relation to the real assessments and actions of the US 
government in the missile crisis.”1028 Former CIA analyst Raymond Garthoff noted that 
Penkovsky’s military material was “useful background information”1029 which does seem 
rather bland. These comments may reflect what access the individual had, because very few 
people would have had the complete picture of what Penkovsky provided for both security 
reasons and because of its quantity. Sir Nicholas Henderson, JIC Chairman, stated that 
Penkovsky’s material “was of crucial importance to us in assessing the state of Soviet 
preparedness and intentions” and senior SIS officer Maurice Oldfield, in Washington at the 
time, said it had “supreme importance.”1030 Evidence in the declassified British files about 
how Penkovsky’s material was used is negligible and participants may have received it for 
intelligence purposes only but not for inclusion in any released reports. The importance of 
intelligence is likely derived from how it is integrated with other material and then used by 












 Khrushchev knew that we knew.”1031 Sir Frank believed that Penkovsky’s information 
“ensured that Khrushchev could not indulge in diplomatic nuclear blackmail.”1032  
 
 
It should be remembered that Penkovsky’s data on missiles also enabled the United States to 
gauge the operational nuclear threat it faced. Washington calculated that the SS-4 MRBM, if 
fired from Cuba, could hit seven Strategic Air Command bases in the United States whereas 
the SS-5 missile could hit eighteen bomber bases, one ICBM base and fifty-eight cities with 
more than 100,000 people in them. However, the operational state of the missiles did not 
equal the political intention to use them and without very accurate intelligence this is 
possible to measure, thus adding to the danger of the crisis. Attitudes would likely be 
uided by psychology not logic. If so, this is alarming when Kennedy’s poor decision-making 
Union’s security apparatus it is remarkable that he survived at all. It is also curious that a man 




during the Bay of Pigs operation in April 1961 is examined and Penkovsky’s description of 
Khrushchev as an “atomic Hitler” and “a maniac” are recalled from the CIA’s debriefing 
notes. If the Cuban Missile Crisis had escalated then both the UK and the US could have 
jointly found themselves in a nuclear war, the ultimate price of the “special relationship.” In 
conclusion, I would like to examine the end of the Penkovsky case which is still the subject 
of controversy. 
 
Theories Concerning The Capture Of Penkovsky 
 
In secondary literature and in the CIA’s debriefing reports, Penkovsky was clearly a fanatical 
character who took considerable risks approaching western intelligence services. The risks 
were enhanced through operating as a double agent for a little less than two years in a 
pervasive surveillance environment where exposure and death could occur at any time. Could 
any normal, stable, rational human voluntarily undertake and thrive in this role? Some 
commentators, such as Gioe, believe that if better tradecraft had been used then he might 
have survived longer. However, in the extreme operating conditions imposed by the Soviet 
who had been sent home from Ankara, betrayed his own supervisor and the GRU, as well as 









 security-minded Russians. But, it is ironic that just as the ‘old boy network’ had aided the 
Cambridge spies in the UK during the early Cold War period, so the patronage of General 
arentsov, family connections and the support of some colleagues in the GRU enabled 
enkovsky to survive with his sensitive access intact.  
idence that a close friend of the Chisholms, Moscow Daily Telegraph 
orrespondent Jeremy Wolfenden may have been working for the KGB perhaps after being 
ave picked up comments or indications 
at the operation was running, or even informed on the Chisholms which led the KGB to 






After a review of the current literature, it is hard to say definitively how the Penkovsky 
operation failed but then all intelligence operations are finite and the issue has acted as a 
magnet for conspiracy theorists. If Penkovsky’s approaches to the West had been detected by 
the KGB in 1960 then perhaps it is highly likely that he would have been arrested before he 
did any damage to Soviet security. The tradecraft that was used to protect him in London and 
Paris, as shown by Gioe’s analysis, was good by the standard of the time. However, in 
Moscow, the numerous personal meetings in an environment with pervasive security with the 
wife of the SIS station head whose identity had been revealed to the Russians by SIS traitor 
George Blake was perhaps a risk too far. At that time though, she was the only asset available 
to the operation permanently based in Moscow; it may have been considered as an unlikely 
communications arrangement that the KGB may have discounted it. Duns also speculates, 
with limited ev
c
blackmailed over his homosexuality.1033 He could h
th
Penkovsky. In Moscow it might have been better if only occasional meetings had been held 
and dead-drops used to communicate with Penkovsky as he had initially suggested when he 
approached the CIA. The operation could have been suspended and intelligence conserved 
until he could travel abroad. The use of Wynne as an intermediary was a good tactic because 
he had a legitimate reason to go to Moscow and with Penkovsky’s help could get through 
Russian customs without a search whilst carrying secret materials. However, as a westerner 
he would be under KGB scrutiny, having travelled to Moscow several times for a commercial 
purpose which did not seem to generate much business. Interestingly, DP4, the SIS 
department which dealt with British businessmen and frequent travellers to Russia, had 





 then he could have been put under extra surveillance and his covert relationship with 
Penkovsky established.1034 Penkovsky, during his debriefs, had also told SIS and the CIA that 
the KGB paid particular attention to foreigners in restaurants so any meetings held there 
would be closely monitored.  
 
 
The reason for Penkovsky’s capture and the termination of the operation will likely only be 
known if the KGB opens its archives, but if it did would they be believed? In the current 
political climate, it is unlikely that such an event will occur. Disinformation would likely be 
used to conceal the existence of any possible undisclosed “mole” that existed in the West. It 
seems unlikely that George Blake was the only traitor in SIS in the Cold War and the CIA did 
seem suspiciously “spy-free” at that time. Blake was only caught due to a defector from 
Poland who provided crucial clues to his identity and questions raised about Blake’s time in 
Berlin.1035 If there had been no defector then he could likely have remained undetected for 
years. It is noteworthy that in the Blake case, the Russians allowed a CIA/SIS telephone 
tapping tunnel in Berlin to remain in place for years to protect the fact that he revealed it and 
allowed the USSR to suffer damaging losses of intelligence. It is however unlikely that 
Penkovsky was allowed to continue to operate and inflict such severe losses of intelligence 
on the USSR.  
 
 
Reading the declassified material Penkovsky passed during meetings in the West (which 
excludes retained documents) any ‘mole’ that existed would have needed to be extremely 
valuable. The losses of such nuclear material for the USSR at such a crucial time would 
likely have been intolerable and highly dangerous as the weakness of the USSR was revealed. 
Penkovsky was also undermining Khrushchev’s propaganda and showed the Soviet 
leadership in a really unflattering light. However, if Penkovsky was genuine and survived for 
so long then there may not have been a ‘mole’ in the West. The ideas of Peter Wright and the 
hunt for a traitor in MI5 must therefore be called into question.1036 Wright doubted 
Penkovsky’s bona fides and suspected that he was either planted on the West or had his 









 what material he provided. In the UK his material was distributed under the codenames 
ARNIKA and RUPEE.1037 Wright appears to have been under the influence of KGB defector 
Anatoli Golitsin who was a propagator of theories concerning KGB plots and disinformation 
whereby any Russian defector was an agent controlled by Moscow to sow confusion. 
owever, there was a chance that a source in the UK could have betrayed Penkovsky because 
ccording to Wright over 1,700 people received his output.1038 Wright also heavily criticises 
, a courier at the National Security Agency and Lt-Col William Whalen on the 
telligence staff of the Pentagon’s Joint Chiefs of Staff.1039 During my research I found an 
teresting CIA memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence from Richard Helms, 
H
a
the tradecraft used to run Penkovsky and is suspicious of the timeliness of the nuclear 
material he provided, which was just the sort of intelligence the West needed in 1961-62. It 




With so much intelligence produced by Penkovsky, numerous reports were created and 
circulated because intelligence is only useful if it gets into the hands of policy makers who 
have to make decisions. The circle of access therefore widens and the chance of a security 
breach increases. If material is fed back to KGB counterintelligence then the presence of a 
Russian traitor is confirmed and an investigation may lead to his detection. Bower points out 




CIA Deputy Director Plans. He noted that the CIA still had no definitive explanation for 
Penkovsky’s loss but the previous week the CIA met an agent (deleted name) for a 
debriefing.1040 This unknown source, not mentioned by any authors, stated that “our people in 
the US realized that some important information was leaking out of the USSR” and a process 
of elimination led them to Penkovsky.1041 The document is heavily redacted and the source of 
the information, possibly a KGB officer, is unknown but it appears that Soviet personnel 
gathered this information in the United States; whether this is genuine data or Soviet 













 a speech in Kiev admitting that Penkovsky “had done a lot of harm” but some good, as the 
United States now knew the strengths and advances made by the USSR.1042 This does seem 
to be more of Khrushchev’s rhetoric because Penkovsky revealed much about Soviet 
weakness. Far more controversial is an undated memorandum from CIA Director John 
McCone to the United States Intelligence Board which states that Penkovsky provided 8,000 
pages of reporting and he was thought to be authentic but was caught by “a penetration in the 
British government who saw Wyn (sic) and Penkovsky together.”1043 How the CIA Director 
came to this conclusion, blaming the UK for the failure of the operation and what the source 
of this uncorroborated information was, remains unclear.  
 
 
Despite doubts expressed by some authors about whether Penkovsky was genuine, both SIS 
 SIS to “protect me” they let him down and his own zeal escalated his 
     
and the CIA appear to believe that his material was genuine, even when he knew he was 
under suspicion. CIA Director John McCone wrote in a memorandum to the President’s 
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board in a case review in 1963 that deception was “something 
that we always feared” but Penkovsky’s bona fides had been checked “extremely carefully” 
and the dissemination of his reports was held up to ensure their validity.1044 After examining 
his data alongside other intelligence sources it was concluded that “this was authentic.”1045 It 
should also be borne in mind however that after all the authentications and assurances given 
by senior intelligence personnel, it would be really humiliating and cause reputational 
disaster if it was found that the whole Penkovsky case was an elaborate deception. Having 
read the declassified notes and a wealth of literature I would say that he was a genuine 
defector and a provider of much crucial intelligence at a dangerous, tense time in the Cold 
War. He was however largely motivated by revenge, money and driven by ego rather than 
solely noble aims to build a better, safer world.  
 
 
Penkovsky ended up as his own controller and case officer. In his recruitment letter he had 









 downfall.1046 At a meeting in Birmingham on 27 April 1961 he told his controllers that “I did 
not come to you to do little things” but “I am capable of great things.”1047 In a memorandum 
in 1963 CIA Officer Joe Bulik said Penkovsky made a “tremendous contribution” to the West 
and more like him were needed.1048 The Chief of the CIA’s Soviet Division also noted 
Penkovsky’s “unique and outstanding value” and he was “by far the most productive 
intelligence operation he had ever known” and with “the possible exception of technical 




an in the 
ght place at the right time with the right access. His recruitment and running showed that 
ccessful espionage operations could be mounted, albeit temporarily, in the USSR and 
“show-trial” and reported execution may have been Moscow’s attempt to deter future 
                   
 
In conclusion the Penkovsky case is the most fascinating, well documented and important 
human intelligence operation for the West during the Cold War. The depth, importance and 
breadth of information provided suggests that Penkovsky was a genuine defector whose vital 
revelations informed the British and Americans about Soviet nuclear weapon delivery 
systems at a crucial time. He added unique material to the intelligence gained from SIGINT 
operations, covert over-flights and other intelligence collection activities discussed in 
previous chapters. In the ‘wilderness of mirrors’ of the intelligence world it was natural that 
the West would be suspicious of him but, on balance, it seems that he was not sent by 
Moscow or was under their control. Many unanswered questions remain however and it is 
unlikely that they will be resolved for many years, if at all. His material provided insights into 
Soviet intentions as well as capabilities, data unavailable from other sources at the time due 
to the intelligence collection problems previously highlighted. Penkovsky’s case is a 
testament to the enormous intelligence hurdles the UK and America faced when working 
against the Soviet nuclear target. He does seem to have been the fortuitous right m
ri
su
human intelligence remained a vital element of the total amount of data available to policy 
makers. It is unknown if his counter-intelligence information led to further recruitment of 










 Penkovskys. Gioe examined the private papers of SIS Soviet Department Head and 
Penkovsky’s case officer, Harold Shergold. Shergold wrote, “We always had agents in 
Eastern Europe producing first class intelligence” and “we were very successful, which is 
what people don’t realise because we never told anybody.”1050 Whether this success included 
the Soviet Union, and Penkovsky’s espionage inspired other Russians, remains unknown, but 










This thesis examines what the British government knew about the Soviet Union’s nuclear 
weapon delivery systems and the problems it encountered in attempting to gather intelligence 
on them. It is clear that despite the difficulties they had to overcome, British intelligence 
analysts provided a reasonably accurate assessment of the Soviet Union’s nuclear bombers 
and its ballistic missile forces from 1949-62. Their job was to collect and analyse information 
fused from multiple sources and assess it to establish the discernible facts about these forces. 
Their conclusions, with caveats, then had to be promulgated in a way which was useful and 
understandable for policy makers, suitably nuanced and with value added through assessment 
and comment.  
 
It is important to caveat any conclusions on this topic with the observation that full details of 
the intelligence assessments made at this time are unlikely to be released and the source 
material used to write the reports remains classified. Many papers will have been destroyed, 
personnel are now deceased and much material may not have been committed to paper at the 
time. Any documents in The National Archives are also deposited because the British 
government wants them to be released, so the possibility of ‘hidden agendas’ and security 
considerations still exists. The revelations about the RAF’s involvement in the US-sponsored 
covert balloon programme, participation in the U-2 over-flights and the covert radar facility 
in Cyprus shows that there are likely to be many more intelligence collection activities which 
remain concealed. The exact level of success by the allies in breaking Russian cryptographic 
systems and the possible existence of deception operations undertaken by the USSR and the 
West will likely remain obscure. Limited information is available concerning the UK’s covert 
over-fights of the USSR under Operation JIU-JITSU but the participants in such undertakings 
are likely now deceased. However, newly declassified material does confirm the long-
rumoured covert over-flight of Kapustin Yar by the RAF.  
 
No operational papers from SIS or GCHQ concerning the USSR’s nuclear weapon delivery 
systems have been declassified so it is impossible to say how successful these organisations 





Penkovsky case shows how human intelligence developed from debriefing German scientists 
to successfully ‘running’ an agent in place in Moscow by the end of the period covered by 
my research. Clearly, much benefit was derived from a well-placed human source but it is 
unknown if he had contemporaries in the USSR or further sources were developed using the 
material he provided. It is also unknown what the exact scale and nature of British technical 
intelligence collection operations were in locations such as Cyprus. Russian archives 
concerning nuclear weapon delivery systems have also not been opened and only a few 
Russian writers have published material on the subject which makes forming a conclusion 
about their nuclear weapon delivery systems difficult. The current nature of the Putin regime 
and relations between Russia and the West will also make substantial releases of material on 
Soviet nuclear weapons unlikely in the near future. It is also difficult to assess the role of 
western intelligence service traitors such as George Blake and ‘Kim’ Philby who provided 
highly sensitive intelligence about sources, methods and assessments to the USSR and how 
much disinformation could have been passed to the West to give a distorted impression of the 
USSR’s nuclear capabilities. 
 
Despite the enormous problems in trying to collect intelligence on the USSR, the UK’s 
intelligence analysts appear to have adopted a measured and dispassionate approach to their 
task. They were working with partial information on new fields such as atomic energy, 
nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles and had to develop techniques to work against these 
targets. They apparently made good use of whatever data they had from all sources, both 
overt and covert. This material could never provide definitive analysis on their targets. 
Reading through hundreds of JIC and other intelligence assessments from 1949-62, the reader 
is struck by the lack of emotion and exaggeration in their output. The analysts must have 
been subject to the stresses and fears of their dangerous era from the first Soviet atomic and 
hydrogen bombs, through the Stalinist period, the Korean War, McCarthyism, espionage 
scandals, the Berlin Wall’s construction and the Cuban Missile Crisis. It is impossible to say 
how much political influence may have occurred in intelligence assessments, but the authors 
of the documents I examined seemingly gave honest, frank appraisals of the intelligence 
material they assessed. There is no evidence of the sort of distortion and exaggeration seen in 
certain American intelligence assessments from that period. It was common in JIC 





intentions in certain areas such as targeting, nuclear strategy and the number of nuclear 
warheads they held. Analysts were aware of the limitations of intelligence and seemed 
willing to admit these shortcomings to policy branches and their senior customers. Although 
apparently honest, it is alarming that it was impossible to accurately assess the capabilities of 
a state which could potentially have annihilated the UK. However, this is the nature of 
intelligence assessment, not a science but the art of forming caveated judgements backed by 
experience and whatever limited information is available from whatever sources. I believe 
that the analysts succeeded in providing the best assessments they could from the partial 
material they had available during the period 1949-62. 
 
British analysts appreciated, and nobody disputes, that the USSR could have obliterated the 
UK with its nuclear arsenal during this period, as Russia can today. The reports produced 
helped policymakers to guide the country through a difficult and dangerous time. The UK 
was able to construct and test nuclear weapons in the austerity years after the Second World 
War and intelligence assessments helped to design and operate the impressive airborne 
nuclear deterrent forces built up by Britain from the mid-1950s. Analysts and policy makers 
also faced up to the fact that there was no weapons system which could guarantee the UK 
protection from a large Soviet nuclear bomber attack or one involving ballistic missiles. At 
the end of the period of this study, it was clear that advances in Soviet nuclear weapon 
technology rendered the RAF’s nuclear bomber force vulnerable to pre-emptive missile 
attack and undermined plans for the UK’s Blue Streak land-based ballistic missile. From 
examining many intelligence and policy papers, it was clear that the British government 
believed that the only hope of survival for the UK and the West was to deter a Soviet nuclear 
attack. The cost of solely conventional defence to match the Soviet military would have been 
vast and nuclear weapons acted as the ‘ultimate weapon’ to deter a hostile state, assessed as 
unlikely to risk escalation and nuclear conflict. Without nuclear weapons it would have been 
more likely that the USSR could have attempted aggression or intimidation against Western 
Europe. The real measure of intelligence success is that nuclear war did not occur and no 
nuclear weapon was used in anger after 1945. However, conflict over Berlin or an escalation 






The JIC assessed that the UK would remain relatively safe from pre-emptive nuclear strike or 
conventional war as long as the US could not be ‘decapitated’ in a Soviet nuclear first strike. 
With the US having nuclear missiles in hardened silos in America, shorter-range Thor and 
Jupiter nuclear missiles based in Europe, long-range nuclear bombers on alert in America and 
its nuclear bombers in the UK, Spain, North Africa and the Pacific, it made it extremely 
difficult for the USSR to co-ordinate a pre-emptive catastrophic attack on American nuclear 
forces. By the early 1960s, Ballistic Missile Early Warning radar was entering service and 
Polaris submarines were being deployed, thereby complicating the USSR’s attack planning 
and ensuring that an American second-strike capability remained. In JIC and MOD policy 
discussions, the theme of the UK remaining safe so long as the US was able to retaliate after 
a Soviet nuclear first-strike is apparent. British intelligence could help to reinforce this 
assessment by showing that the USSR was struggling to produce long-range bombers which 
could attack the US and return home as well as identifying problems with Russian 
development of its ICBMs. However, it should be remembered that the USSR could have 
devastated the UK and Western Europe with short range nuclear bombers and missiles, but it 
would be well into the 1960s before it could inflict such damage on the US. 
 
Concerning nuclear bombers, British intelligence in the 1950s appreciated the danger from a 
growing Soviet Long-Range Air Force armed with nuclear weapons. Analysis of Attaché 
files shows that the British government was trying to use all intelligence sources it had 
available and to develop new ones. Sources were limited in the early 1950s, with heavy 
reliance on returning Germans who had worked in the USSR, open literature and Attaché 
reports. To their credit, British analysts, unlike politicians, never got caught up in the 
‘bomber gap’ controversy seen in the US and the assessments I examined were normally 
nuanced with acknowledgment of limited sources and knowledge. The assessments of the 
number and types of Soviet nuclear bombers were generally more conservative than those of 
the US. The American ‘bomber gap’ appears to have resulted from a United States Air Force 
keen to expand in the face of opposition from the other two services and an aircraft industry 
seeking contracts. The American estimates for the Soviet Air Force seem to have expanded as 
a result of this bureaucratic pressure whereas the British assessments were more measured 





than a new service struggling for recognition against the other armed forces who also sought 
to maintain America’s nuclear deterrent.  
 
However, the British government assessed that Soviet nuclear bombers could overload the 
UK’s air defences if they were determined, and the Strath Report revealed the horror of what 
would happen if a nuclear strike occurred. Despite this nuclear sword of Damocles hanging 
over the nation, it did not generate terror or hysteria in intelligence analysts and assessments 
apparently remained balanced and dispassionately conservative. Intelligence assessment was 
neither alarmist or dismissive of the risks the UK faced. The intelligence picture improved in 
the latter half of the 1950s as long-range radar, aerial reconnaissance and satellites came into 
service in intelligence operations thereby allowing observation of the USSR’s aircraft testing 
facilities, factories and airbases. No Russian bomber entered service that the West was 
unaware of and the UK correctly assessed that the Soviet bomber force would not be run 
down once ballistic missiles entered service. The Soviet Long-Range Air Force would 
continue to enjoy limited expansion once ballistic missiles were developed and to receive 
modern aircraft and missiles for the rest of the Cold War. It remained a parallel threat to 
ballistic missiles to this day.  
 
With the USSR’s acquisition of ballistic missiles, the UK faced a difficult challenge because 
they were developed as a new technology in remote areas of Russia amid great secrecy. New 
techniques had to be developed to collect and analyse intelligence on these programmes. The 
UK, as with bombers, had experience of the power of missiles as it was the first nation in 
history to suffer a missile attack from 1944 onwards. The UK had also faced serious 
problems in the war collecting intelligence on, and destroying, German rocket sites and 
factories. This was despite occupied Europe being close to the UK; the secret police state of 
the USSR was further away and a more difficult intelligence target. British analysts highlight 
these collection problems in many of their reports. 
 
As with bombers, the best initial intelligence came from skilfully and systematically 





exhausted by the mid-1950s, with the return of some Germans delayed to ensure that their 
information had less value to western intelligence. The volume and type of data in the files 
concerning this operation is impressive and was highly likely useful to British analysts to 
confirm or refute assumptions. Developments in radar and SIGINT provided more 
intelligence data on Soviet weapons from the mid-1950s as intelligence agencies planned 
their collection against the elusive target of Russian ballistic missiles. Later in the period, 
Colonel Oleg Penkovsky helped to add considerably to intelligence knowledge with personal 
observations and the numerous documents such as missile manuals that he passed to the 
West. Several conferences were held between American and British specialists in the 1950s 
which acted as useful sessions to clarify thinking on Russian ballistic missiles. Although 
there was a ‘missile gap’ controversy in the US there did not seem to be much discussion of it 
amongst British intelligence analysts who likely viewed it as another American ‘myth’.  
 
The UK’s main concern was with ballistic missiles which could hit Britain from the USSR or 
Eastern Europe rather than the longer-range systems which could target America. This 
became a key element in the Powell Report which led to the cancellation of the UK’s Blue 
Streak ballistic missile and was an occasion where intelligence estimates had a direct impact 
on defence policy. Even though the UK was assessed as vulnerable to Soviet nuclear attack, 
the US becoming vulnerable to a pre-emptive nuclear strike would undermine the security of 
the UK. However, it was thankfully many years before the USSR had sufficient numbers of 
high-quality, accurate long-range ballistic missiles to pose a threat to American strategic 
nuclear forces. Throughout the period, intelligence analysts assessed that the USSR could 
annihilate the UK but at no time did they assess that they were likely to do so; they had the 
capability but not the intention.  
 
By 1962, advances in SIGINT, radar, aircraft such as the U-2 and the Corona satellite 
programme as well as Penkovsky’s espionage had given the UK and the US a better 
understanding of Russian bomber and missile strengths, capabilities and programmes. The 
close intelligence relationship between the two states also allowed maximum benefit to 
accrue from these operations. Radar and ELINT surveillance of the Kapustin Yar and 





would have struggled to gather by itself. Some of this data concerned shorter-range missile 
systems which posed a direct threat to the UK. The UK also benefitted from American 
experience with its space and ballistic missile programmes, using such knowledge in 
intelligence assessment. No ballistic missile system apparently entered service in the USSR 
which the West was unaware of due to surveillance of testing facilities by various sources. 
The British seemed to appreciate Russian developmental problems with bombers and ballistic 
missiles and thought that systems would not be operationally deployed straight after testing 
and therefore did not pose an immediate threat. In the US the opposite view seemed to be 
held, thereby ‘justifying’ greater defence expenditure. This is ironic because UK intelligence 
assessments suggest that the threat to the US was limited by the USSR having too few long-
range bombers and nuclear missiles whereas the UK was under greater threat posed by the 
proximity of shorter range nuclear bombers and missiles. The development of missile 
intelligence also provided the UK with a firm base for more intelligence developments during 
the rest of the Cold War and its intelligence position was better than it had been in 1949. 
 
In the field of aerial reconnaissance, British intelligence again built on its wartime experience 
and close ties to the Americans throughout the period 1949-62. German photographic 
material from the war was very useful during the 1950s to gain an understanding of Russian 
geography and military and industrial facilities. As ground penetration of the USSR was 
difficult to achieve, so aerial systems seemed to offer a partial solution to the intelligence 
collection problem. In addition to mounting surveillance from border areas, the RAF 
undertook hazardous over-flights of the USSR, using American supplied aircraft, under 
Operation JIU-JITSU which could have caused major political problems if the aircraft had 
crashed or been shot down. These missions, which the US thought too hazardous for it to 
undertake, show the lengths that the UK was prepared to go to in its intelligence collection 
activities and to increase its standing in the wartime ‘special relationship’ which grew 
stronger in the Cold War. From the declassified CIA history of the U-2 aircraft, it is also clear 
that the RAF mounted a dangerous independent covert over-flight of the Kapustin Yar 
missile facility, reportedly with the aircraft nearly being shot down in the process. The UK 
also had a previously undisclosed role in the release of intelligence collection balloons, sent 






The American U-2 programme initially sought to launch missions from the UK and this 
shows the closeness of the relationship between the two states on covert intelligence issues. 
Examination of the recently released CIA history of the programme shows that RAF pilots 
mounted some over-flights of the USSR and the UK was a beneficiary of the vast amounts of 
photography which was gathered and helped in its interpretation. British involvement in this 
programme remained hidden for many years; especially in the aftermath of the 1 May 1960 
shoot-down of one of the aircraft. The UK also had to deal with the fall-out from the 
destruction of the American RB-47 intelligence aircraft in July 1960, an aircraft which had 
operated from the UK. From 1961, satellite imagery came on-line with the Corona 
programme and the UK had access to some of its output, as proven by a document found in 
the National Reconnaissance Office files. This programme and the U-2 missions showed that 
the missile and bomber ‘gaps’ did not exist and the West could be more confident about 
accurately assessing the USSR’s nuclear capabilities and intentions. Their output also 
provided numerous extra targets for the West’s growing nuclear arsenal. Knowledge of 
nuclear forces and being able to verify their size and nature would ultimately lead to nuclear 
agreements between the superpowers such as SALT, START and INF so there was a long-
term ‘peace dividend’ from the development of technical intelligence collection. In the early 
1960s this knowledge also helped to deliver the Partial Test Ban Treaty which was a 
considerable issue for the British Government and Harold Macmillan. This was the first 
treaty to be concluded with the USSR on nuclear weapons and was also the last nuclear 
agreement for many years.  
 
The UK had been involved in human espionage for many years and the successful ‘running’ 
of Colonel Oleg Penkovsky showed what was possible with an agent in the right place at the 
right time. His recruitment, management and the processing of his material was a product of 
the ‘special relationship’ between SIS and the CIA. The CIA had the resources to maintain 
the operation and the SIS had the assets in place in Moscow to run the case. A plethora of 
books and comments indicates that Penkovsky was a valued agent who produced material of 
enormous value on bombers, missiles and Soviet politics. He also confirmed British 
intelligence assessments that the Soviet Union had problems developing ballistic missiles, did 
not have many long-range nuclear missiles and that the bomber programme was still 





have been exaggerated, he did provide material of great value to aid the West’s understanding 
of the deployment and use of Soviet nuclear weapons and Moscow’s intentions. The 
declassified CIA material I examined shows the involvement of SIS in the operation in 
unprecedented detail and comments made in documents demonstrates the first-hand 
knowledge he passed on concerning Soviet nuclear bombers and missiles. His overall 
importance is hard to judge because none of the official documents such as Soviet missile 
manuals have been released. His success as an agent ‘in place’ did show that Soviet security 
was not invincible and successful covert operations could be run in Moscow. This could 
provide valuable experience for further operations, perhaps with Russians who were recruited 
after being identified by Penkovsky. 
 
Overall, my research showed a secret coterie of British intelligence analysts in various 
departments working with American colleagues, but not dominated by them, dealing with 
sensitive and highly dangerous issues during the most terrifying stand-off in modern history. 
They had gaps in their coverage which caused tremendous difficulties in trying to come to a 
balanced view but there is no evidence I could find of exaggeration of the threat posed by the 
USSR‘s nuclear delivery systems or any attempt to avoid uncomfortable conclusions. 
Intelligence analysts could not see into the future and their sources could not produce a 
definitive assessment on what events would unfold. They worked on partial intelligence and 
the rest was assessment and judgement. Analysts could not precisely determine Soviet 
intentions but they could attempt to measure Moscow’s nuclear weapon capabilities. It is not 
possible to say how much influence their assessments had on policy-makers because they are 
not reflected in policy documents, except for the Blue Streak missile cancellation. The few 
released documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis in The National Archives for instance, give 
no hint that Penkovsky existed. JIC papers do not mention intelligence sources and methods 
and this made assessing the importance of intelligence during the period 1949 to 1962 even 
more difficult. It is unknown how each intelligence report may have influenced a particular 
decision or what the policy branches thought of any assessments they read or if they used the 






The thesis shows that in the early years of the Cold War intelligence about the Soviet Union’s 
nuclear weapon delivery systems was sparse, but it must be emphasised that the USSR was a 
particularly difficult intelligence target. Technological innovation, originality, imagination 
and skill all helped western intelligence agencies to overcome some of these intelligence 
challenges. It also drew the United States and the United Kingdom closer together in the 
intelligence field with co-operation on highly sensitive projects. The exigencies of 
intelligence gathering prompted the use of unlikely collection methods such as balloons, jet-
powered gliders and novel radar systems. Western governments were also prepared to break 
international law, deceive other nations and take considerable risks which could have led to 
conflict in order to collect intelligence. This thesis helps to add to our knowledge of how the 
Cold War was fought through the medium of intelligence collection and analysis. It places 
particular emphasis on the UK’s role in previously hidden aspects of secret intelligence 
collection during this difficult and dangerous time. 
 
The UK’s assessments of Soviet ballistic missiles and long-range bombers appear measured 
and reasonable during the period with no major errors which noticeably damaged national 
security. Analysts were caught by surprise when Sputnik was launched in 1957 and they had 
sparse information on Soviet deployment of nuclear missiles on submarines, but the latter 
was an extremely difficult target. There were some errors concerning the short-term 
deployment of Soviet nuclear missiles to the GDR in 1959 and the accuracy of, and date by 
which, a ballistic missile could hit the UK when launched from the USSR. However, these 
reflect the difficulty of the target that the UK faced rather than the shortcomings of the 
system and the people working within it. Miscalculation over Soviet missiles also led to the 
cancellation of Blue Streak but this project was also enmeshed in inter-service politics and 
rivalry rather than being the product of overly pessimistic intelligence assessments. British 
involvement in over-flights was also dangerous but arguably worth the risk in view of the 
intelligence it collected, which was unavailable from any other means. Overall, UK 
intelligence assessments gave a stark and broadly accurate insight into the threats the country 
faced at that time from Soviet nuclear weapon delivery systems. It is a measure of success 
that the UK and the West survived this dark chapter in their history and we are still here 







ACAS (Int)   Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Intelligence) 
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BND (SG)   British Nuclear Deterrent (Study Group) 
BRIXMIS   British Military Mission to East Germany 
CAS    Chief of the Air Staff 
CDS    Chief of the Defence Staff 
CIA    Central Intelligence Agency 
COMINT   Communications Intelligence 
DPRC    Defence Policy Research Committee 
DSP    Defence Support Programme 
ELINT    Electronic Intelligence 
EXCOMM   Executive Committee of the US National Security Council 
FO    Foreign Office 
GCHQ    Government Communications Headquarters 
GDR    German Democratic Republic 
GNTK State Committee for the Co-ordination of Scientific Research 
Work (USSR)  
GRU    Soviet Military Intelligence 
GX    Captured German Wartime Aerial Intelligence 
HUMINT   Human Intelligence 
ICBM    Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 
INF    Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty 
IRBM    Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile 




JIB    Joint Intelligence Bureau 
JIC    Joint Intelligence Committee 
KGB    Committee on State Security (USSR) 
KT    Kiloton 
LRAF    Long-Range Air Force (USSR) 
MI5    British Security Service 
MI6    British Secret Intelligence Service 
MIDAS   Missile Defence Alarm System 
MOD    Ministry of Defence 
MRBM   Medium Range Ballistic Missile 
MT    Megaton 
NATO    North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
NRO    National Reconnaissance Office (US) 
ORBAT   Order of Battle 
OSA    Office of Special Activities (US) 
PM    Prime Minister 
RAF    Royal Air Force 
RAND    Research and Development Corporation (US) 
RN    Royal Navy 
SAC    Strategic Air Command 
SALT    Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty 
SAM    Surface-to-Air Missile 
SIGINT   Signals Intelligence 
SIS    Secret Intelligence Service 
SofS    Secretary of State (UK) 
SS-3    SHYSTER Medium Range Ballistic Missile (USSR) 




SS-6    SAPWOOD Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (USSR) 
SS-7    SADDLER Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (USSR) 
START   Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
TELINT   Telemetry Intelligence 
TNA    The National Archives 
U-2    Utility-2 Aircraft 
UK    United Kingdom 
US    United States 
USAF    United States Air Force 
USSR    Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
V-1    German Wartime “Doodlebug” Cruise Missile 
V-2    German Wartime Ballistic Missile 









Published official documents 
Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction (HC 898): Report of a 
Committee of Privy Councillors dated 14 July 2004 
Unpublished official documents 
The National Archives, Public Record Office, Kew, Surrey 
AIR 2 – Air Ministry and Ministry of Defence: Registered Files: 1887-1985 
AIR 8 – Air Ministry and Ministry of Defence: Department of the Chief of the Air 
Staff: Registered Files: 1916-1982.  
AIR 14 – Air Ministry: Bomber Command: Registered Files 
AIR 19 – Air Ministry, and Ministry of Defence, Air Department: Private Office 
Papers: 1917-1983 
AIR 20 – Air Historical Branch: Papers, 1874-1983 
AIR 22 – Air Ministry: Periodical Returns, Intelligence Summaries and Bulletins: 
1936-1963.  
AIR 40 – Air Ministry, Directorate of Intelligence and related bodies: Intelligence 
Reports and Papers: 1926-1984 
AIR 41 – Air Ministry, and Ministry of Defence: Air Historical Branch: Narratives 
and Monographs 
AVIA 6 – Ministry of Defence and predecessors: Royal Aircraft Factory and 
successors 






CAB 21 – Cabinet Office and predecessors: Registered Files (1916 to 1965): 1916-
1973 
CAB 128 – Cabinet: Minutes (CM and CC Series), 1945-62 
CAB 129 – Cabinet Memoranda (CP and C Series), 1945-62 
CAB 130 – Cabinet: Miscellaneous Committees: Minutes and Papers (GEN, MISC 
and REF Series), 1945-62 
CAB 134 – Cabinet: Miscellaneous Committees: Minutes and Papers (General 
Series), 1945-62 
CAB 137 – War Cabinet and Cabinet: Joint Technical Warfare Committee: 
Correspondence and Papers, 1943-48 
CAB 158 – Ministry of Defence and Cabinet Office: Central Intelligence Machinery: 
Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee later Committee: Memoranda (JIC Series), 1947 – 
1962 
CAB 159 – Ministry of Defence and Cabinet Office: Central Intelligence Machinery: 
Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee later Committee: Minutes (JIC Series), 1947-1962 
CAB 163 – War Cabinet, Ministry of Defence, and Cabinet Office: Central 
Intelligence Machinery: Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, later Committee: 
Secretariat: Files, 1939 -62 
CAB 176 - War Cabinet, Ministry of Defence and Cabinet Office: Joint Intelligence 
Sub-Committee, later Committee: Secretariat: Minutes (JIC (SEC)), 1942-57 
CAB 179 - Ministry of Defence and Cabinet Office: Central Intelligence Machinery: 
Joint Intelligence Committee: Weekly Reviews and Surveys (WRCI, JIC (WSI)), 
1956-63 
CAB 182 – Cabinet Office: Central Intelligence Machinery: Joint Intelligence 
Committee: Sub-Committees, Working Parties etc: Minutes, Memoranda and Papers, 
1957-62 






DEFE 5 – Ministry of Defence: Chiefs of Staff Committee – Memoranda, 1947-62 
DEFE 6 – Ministry of Defence: Chiefs of Staff Committee – Joint Planning Staff and 
Defence Planning Staff Reports, 1947-62 
DEFE 7 – Ministry of Defence: Registered Files, 1942-1979 
DEFE 9 – Ministry of Defence: Papers of Defence Research Policy Committee: 1945-
1952 
DEFE 10 – Minutes and Papers of Major Committees and Working Parties, Minutes 
and Papers, 1942-62 
DEFE 13 - Ministry of Defence: Private Office: Registered Files (all Ministers’): 
1950-1979 
DEFE 19 – Ministry of Defence: Central Defence Scientific Staff and Predecessors: 
Registered Files (CSA, AE1 and A Series) and Papers, 1948-1962 
DEFE 21 – Ministry of Defence: Directorate of Scientific Intelligence: Joint 
Intelligence Bureau: Division of Scientific Intelligence and Division of Atomic 
Energy Intelligence and Directorate of Scientific and Technical Intelligence: 
Registered Files, 1946-62  
DEFE 23 – Ministry of Defence: Permanent Under Secretary of State for Defence: 
Registered Files (D/PUS and PUS Series), 1956-62 
DEFE 32 – Ministry of Defence: Chiefs of Staff Committee: Secretary's Standard 
Files, 1946-62 
DEFE 40 – Ministry of Defence: Papers of R V Jones, Director of Scientific 
Intelligence, 1939-54 
DEFE 41 – Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence: Scientific and Technical 
Intelligence Branch and Overseas Liaison Branch: Registered Files (includes Joint 
Intelligence Committee (Germany) Minutes), 1946-62 
DEFE 44 - Ministry of Defence - Directorate of Scientific Intelligence: Joint 






Energy Intelligence; Defence Intelligence Staff: Directorate of Scientific and 
Technical Intelligence: Reports, Notes and Memoranda, 1944-1962 
DEFE 60 – Ministry of Defence: Joint Intelligence Bureau: Economic and General 
Division 
FO 181 – Foreign Office: Embassy and Consulates: Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics 
FO 371 – Foreign Office: Political Departments: General Correspondence, 1949-1962 
HW 160 – Government Communications Headquarters 
KV 4 – The Security Service: Policy (Pol F Series) Files  
PREM 3 – Prime Officer’s Office 1937-46 
PREM 8 – Prime Minister's Office: Correspondence and Papers, 1945-1951 
PREM 11 - Prime Minister's Office: Correspondence and Papers, 1951-1962 
T225 – Treasury: Defence Policy and Materiel Division: Registered Files 
WO 208 – War Office: Directorate of Military Operations and Intelligence, and 
Directorate of Military Intelligence; Ministry of Defence, Defence Intelligence Staff, 
1949-1962 
WO 216 – War Office: Armed Forces 1935-1964 
Biographies and Diaries 
Blake, George, No Other Choice (London, 1990) 
Bower, Tom, The Perfect English Spy. Sir Dick White and the Secret War, 1935-90 
(London, 1995) 
Catterall, Peter (ed), The Macmillan Diaries Volume 2: Prime Minister and after 






Deacon, Richard, “C” A Biography of Sir Maurice Oldfield Head of MI6 (London, 
1985) 
Deriabin, Peter (Ed), The Penkovsky Papers (London, 1965). 
Horne, Alistair, Macmillan 1957-1986 Volume 2 of the Official Biography (London, 
1989) 
Jones, R.V., Most Secret War (London, 1978) 
Jones, R.V., Reflections on Intelligence (London, 1989) 
Kelly, David, Behind the Iron Curtain (London, 1954) 
Khrushchev, Nikita, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament (Boston, 1974)   
Macmillan, Harold, Pointing the Way (London, 1972) 
Penkovsky, Oleg, The Penkovsky Papers. The Russian Who Spied for the West 
(translated by Peter Deriabin) (London, 1965) 
Philby, Kim, My Silent War (London, 1968) 
Roberts, Frank, Dealing With Dictators: The Destruction and Revival of Europe 
1930-70 (London, 1991) 
Schecter, Jerrold and Deriabin, Peter, The Spy Who Saved the World: How a Soviet 
Colonel Changed the Course of the Cold War (London, 1992) 
Watkinson, Harold, Turning Points (London, 1986) 
Wright, Peter, Spycatcher (Australia, 1987) 
Wynne, Greville, The Man From Moscow (London, 1967) 
Secondary Sources 
Unpublished PhD Theses 
Gioe, D. ‘The Anglo-American Special Intelligence Relationship: Wartime Causes 






Haddon, C. ‘Union Jacks and Red Stars on Them: UK Intelligence, the Soviet Nuclear 
Threat and British Nuclear Weapons Policy 1945-70.’ Queen Mary, University of 
London, 2008. 
Books 
Aldrich, Richard J. (ed), British Intelligence, Strategy and the Cold War (London, 
1992) 
Aldrich, Richard J., Espionage, security and intelligence in Britain, 1945-1970 
(Manchester, 1998) 
Aldrich, Richard J., The Hidden Hand. Britain, America and Cold War Secret 
Intelligence (London, 2001) 
Aldrich, Richard J., GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain’s Most Secret 
Intelligence Agency (London, 2011) 
Allison, Graham, The Secret Cuban Missile Crisis Documents: CIA (London, 1994) 
Alsop, Stewart, The Center (New York, 1968) 
Ambrose, Stephen, Eisenhower: The President Volume 2 1952-69 (London, 1984) 
Andrew, Christopher and Dilks, David (eds), The Missing Dimension: Governments 
and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century (London, 1984) 
Andrew, Christopher, For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the 
American Presidency from to Washington to Bush (London, 1995) 
Arnold, Lorna, Britain and the H-Bomb (London, 2001) 
Ashley, Clarence, CIA Spymaster (Gretna, 2004) 
Babington-Smith, Constance, Evidence in Camera: Photographic Intelligence in 
World War Two (London, 1974) 







Baylis, John and Stoddar, Kristan The British Nuclear Experience: The Role of 
Beliefs, Culture and Identity (Oxford, 2015) 
Beschloss, Michael, May Day: Eisenhower, Khrushchev and the U2 Affair (New 
York, 1986) 
Bissell, Richard, Reflections of a Cold Warrior: From Yalta to the Bay of Pigs (Yale, 
1996) 
Brook-Shepherd, Gordon, The Storm Birds: Soviet Post-War Defectors (London, 
1989) 
Brugioni, Dino, Eyes In The Sky: Eisenhower, The CIA and Cold War Aerial 
Espionage (Annapolis, 2010) 
Burrows, William, By Any Means Necessary: America’s Secret Air War (London, 
2001) 
Clark, Ian and Wheeler, Nicholas, The British Origins of Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1958 
(Oxford, 1989) 
Clark, Ian, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship: Britain’s Deterrent and 
America 1957-62 (London, 1994). 
Corera, Gordon, MI6: Life and Death in the British Secret Service (London, 2011) 
Cradock, Percy, Know Your Enemy. How the Joint Intelligence Committee Saw the 
World (London, 2002) 
Davies, Philip H.J., MI6 and the Machinery of Spying (London, 2004) 
Dockrill, Michael, British Defence since 1945 (Oxford, 1988) 
Dorrill, Stephen, MI6. Fifty Years of Special Operations (London, 2000) 
Dover, Robert and Goodman, Michael, Learning From The Secret Past: Cases In 
British Intelligence History (Washington, 2011)  






Duns, Jeremy, Dead Drop: The True Story of Oleg Penkovsky and the Cold War’s 
Most Dangerous Operation (London, 2013) 
Dylan, Huw, Defence Intelligence and the Cold War: Britain’s Joint Intelligence 
Bureau 1945-64 (Oxford, 2014) 
Eisenhower, Dwight D, Waging Peace: The White House Years 1956-61 (New York, 
1965) 
Farmilo, Graham, Churchill’s Bomb: A Hidden History of Science, War and Politics 
(London, 2014) 
Freedman, Lawrence, US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat (London, 1977) 
Freedman, Lawrence, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, Third Edition (London, 
2003) 
Gaddis, John Lewis, Strategies of Containment. A Critical Appraisal of Post-War 
American National Security Policy (London, 1982) 
Gaddis, John Lewis, We Now Know. Rethinking Cold War History (London, 1998) 
Gaddis, John Lewis (ed), Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb (London, 1999)  
Gantz, Kenneth, The United States Air Force Report On The Ballistic Missile: Its 
Technology, Logistics and Strategy (New York, 1958) 
Geraghty, Tony, BRIXMIS. The untold exploits of Britain’s most daring Cold War spy 
mission (London, 1997) 
Gioe, David, Scott, Len, Andrew, Christopher (eds), An International History of the 
Cuban Missile Crisis: A 50 Year Retrospective (London, 2014) 
Goodman, Michael, Spying on the Nuclear Bear: Anglo-American Intelligence and 
the Soviet Bomb, (Stanford, 2007) 
Goodman, Michael, The Official History Of The Joint Intelligence Committee Volume 






Groom, AJR, British Thinking About Nuclear Weapons (London, 1974) 
Hart, John, The CIA’s Russians (Annapolis, 2003) 
Hayter, William, The Kremlin and The Embassy (London, 1966) 
Hennessy, Peter, The Secret State. Whitehall and the Cold War, Revised and Updated 
Edition (London, 2002) 
Hennessy, Peter, Cabinets and the Bomb (London, 2007) 
Herman, Michael, Intelligence Services in the Information Age (London, 2001) 
Hill, Nicholas, A Vertical Empire: The History of the UK Rocket and Space 
Programme 1950-71 (London, 2001) 
Hoare, Oliver (ed), British Intelligence in the Twentieth Century: A Missing 
Dimension (London, 2003) 
Holloway, David, Stalin and the Bomb. The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-
1956 (London, 1994) 
Jackson, Robert, High Cold War: Strategic Air Reconnaissance (London,1996) 
Jeffery, Keith, MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909-49 (London, 
2011) 
Lashmar, Paul, Spy Flights of the Cold War (London, 1996). 
Lewin, Ronald, Ultra Goes to War (London, 1978) 
Maddrell, Paul, Spying on Science: Western Intelligence in Divided Germany, 1945-
1961 (Oxford, 2006) 
Masterman, John, The Double-Cross System (Yale, 1972) 
Menaul, Stewart, Countdown: Britain’s Strategic Nuclear Forces (London, 1980) 







Nesbit, Roy, Eyes Of The RAF: A History of Photo Reconnaissance (Stroud, 1996) 
Parry, Albert, Russia’s Rockets and Missiles (London, 1960) 
Paterson, Robert H., Britain’s Strategic Nuclear Deterrent: From before the V-
Bomber to beyond Trident (London, 1997) 
Peebles, Curtis, The Moby Dick Project: Reconnaissance Balloons Over Russia 
(Washington, 1991) 
Peebles, Curtis, The Corona Project: America’s First Spy Satellites (Annapolis, 1997) 
Pocock, Chris, The U-2 Spyplane: Toward the Unknown. A New History of the Early 
Years (Atglen, Pennsylvania, 2000) 
Pocock, Chris, Dragon Lady: The History of the U-2 Spyplane (London, 1989) 
Pocock, Rowland F, German Guided Missiles of the Second World War (New York, 
1968) 
Podvig, Pavel (ed), Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (London, 2004) 
Polmar. Norman, Spyplane: The U-2 History Declassified (New York, 2001) 
Powers, Gary, Operation Overflight (London, 1971) 
Prados, John, The Soviet Estimate: US Intelligence Analysis and Russian Military 
Strength (New York, 1982) 
Preble, Chris, JFK and the Missile Gap (Illinois, 2004) 
Quinlan, Michael, Thinking About Nuclear Weapons: Principles, Problems, Prospects 
(Oxford, 2009).    
Richelson, Jeffrey and Ball, Desmond, The Ties That Bind: Intelligence Cooperation 
between the UKUSA Counties-The United Kingdom, the United States of America, 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand (London, 1990)   
Richelson, Jeffrey, America’s Space Sentinels: DSP Satellites and National Security 






Richelson, Jeffrey, America’s Secret Eyes in Space: The US Keyhole Spy Satellite 
Program (London, 1990) 
Riste, Olav, The Norwegian Intelligence Service, 1945-1970 (London, 1999) 
Roman, Peter J., Eisenhower and the Missile Gap (London, 1995) 
Rostow, Walt W, Open Skies: Eisenhower’s Proposal of July 21st 1955 (Texas, 1982) 
Ruffner, Kevin, CORONA: America’s First Satellite Programme (Washington, 1995) 
Scott, Len, Macmillan, Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis: Political, Military and 
Intelligence Aspects (London, 1999) 
Service, Robert, Stalin: A Biography (New York, 1998) 
Stocker, Jeremy, Britain and Ballistic Missile Defence 1942-2002 (London, 2002) 
Taubman, Philip, Secret Empire: Eisenhower, the CIA, and the Hidden Story of 
America’s Space Espionage (London, 2004). 
Tokaev, Grigori, Comrade X (London, 1956). 
Twigge, Stephen and Scott, Len, Planning Armageddon: Britain, The United States 
and the Command of Western Nuclear Forces, 1945-1964 (Amsterdam, 2000) 
Welzenbach, Donald E and Pedlow, Gregory W, The CIA and Overhead 
Reconnaissance: The U2 and Oxcart Programs 1954-74 (CIA Washington, 1992) 
West, Nigel, GCHQ: The Secret Wireless War, 1900-86 (London, 1986) 
West, Nigel, The Friends: Britain’s Postwar Secret Intelligence Operations (London, 
1988) 
West, Nigel, At Her Majesty’s Secret Service: The Chiefs of Britain’s Intelligence 
Agency, MI6 (London, 2006) 
Winterbotham, Frederick, The Ultra Secret (London, 1973)   






Wynn, Humphrey, RAF Nuclear Deterrent Forces (London, 1994) 
Young, Richard Anthony, The Flying Bomb (Surrey, 1978) 
Zaloga, Steven, Target America: The Soviet Union and the Strategic Arms Race 1945-
64 (Novato CA, 1993) 
Zaloga, Steven, The Kremlin’s Nuclear Sword: The Rise and Fall of Russia’s 
Strategic Nuclear Forces, 1945-2000 (New York, 2002) 
Zaloga, Steven, V-1 Flying Bomb 1942–52 (Oxford 2005) 
Articles 
Aldrich, Richard ‘Did Waldegrave Work? The Impact of Open Government on British 
History.’ Twentieth Century British History 9:1 (1998), 
Aldrich, Richard ‘GCHQ and Sigint in the early Cold War 1945-70’ Intelligence and 
National Security, 16(1) (2001)   
Braybrook, Ray ‘A Mighty Failure – The Bounder.’ Flying Review International, 20, 
No.3 pp.32-34 
Brugioni, Dino ‘GENETRIX-The Intelligence Balloon’ Military Intelligence Jan-Mar 
(1989) 
Cole, Benjamin ‘British Technical Intelligence and the Soviet Intermediate Range 
Ballistic Missile Threat, 1952-1960’, Intelligence and National Security, 14(2) (1999)   
Hughes, Jeff  ‘The Strath Report: Britain Confronts The H-Bomb, 1954-1955.’ 
History and Technology (2003), Vol. 19(3) pp.257-275 
Huw, Dylan: ‘Britain and the Missile Gap: British Estimates on the Soviet Ballistic 
Missile Threat, 1957-61’, Intelligence and National Security, 23:6 (2008) 
Pocock, Chris ‘Operation “Robin” and the British Over-flight of Kapustin Yar: A 






Pocock, Chris ‘Reconnaissance Canberras – Some Untold Stories’ RAF Historical 
Society Journal, Vol. 43a, April 2008. 
Scott, Len ‘Espionage and the Cold War: Oleg Penkovsky and the Cuban Missile 
Crisis.’ Intelligence and National Security, 17:3, (2001) 
Uhl, Matthias and Ivkin, Vladimir “Operation ATOM”: The Soviet Union’s 
Stationing of Nuclear Missiles in the German Democratic Republic, 1959.’ Cold War 
International History Project Bulletin, 12/13 (Winter/Fall 2001) 
Young, Ken ‘The Royal Navy’s Polaris Lobby, 1955-62.’ Journal of Strategic Studies, 
25(3), 2002 
Zaloga, Steven ‘Most Secret Weapon: The Origins of Soviet Strategic Cruise Missiles, 
1945-60’ Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol.6, No.1 (June 1993) 
 
 
 
235 
